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Abstract 
 
 
Human rights education (HRE) is a growing pedagogical force that lacks conceptual theorisation 
and awareness of an emerging postsecular context.  This hampers the extent to which it can 
accomplish its aims of encouraging friendship between people of different religious and 
philosophical traditions while advancing a universal culture of rights.  The thesis analyses the role 
of religion within HRE literature, both at an international and theoretical level, and in the 
curriculum documents for English schools, finding parallel weaknesses resulting from this 
shallow theoretical base. 
 
The thesis contributes to HRE literature with a distinctive analysis of the foundational concept of 
dignity and the meaning-giving narratives that contributed to the concept’s development.  It 
unravels the complexities surrounding an often mentioned but seldom explained concept, 
identifying relationships between inherent worth, human flourishing and societal recognition.  It 
demonstrates that taking an inclusive approach to this conceptual framework allows for two 
crucial ingredients in contemporary society: different meaning-giving narratives may be held, 
while a common ethical understanding of rights based on dignity is adhered to.  It argues that the 
concept of dignity is a foundation for a particular pedagogical approach that advances a 
commitment to the inherent worth of the human person.  The approach consists of two reflexive 
elements: a self-reflective enquiry into the faiths and philosophies of the individual learners and a 
dialogue with and for others.  These elements are essential if the colonial mistakes of earlier 
human rights movements are to be avoided, and they identify the significance of religious 
education in HRE.  A proposal for a recontextualised form of HRE that is theologically and 
religiously literate presents a distinctive offering to guide policy and practice.  The proposal 
acknowledges the overlap between educational movement and theological thought and makes 
specific reference to contributions from contemporary Catholic thinking. 
 
The thesis aims to motivate further research to carry forward the HRE proposal and develop new 
thinking about postsecular education. 
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Introduction 
 
Human rights education (HRE) aims to advance a common rights based culture and promote the 
full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity (UN General Assembly 
1948, 1966, 1989, 1993; UNHCR 1994, 2005).  It also strives to promote mutual respect and 
understanding between different groups, including different religious groups.  These two aims 
were defined in Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 and a 
series of successor UN agreements, declarations and conventions.  The aims present interesting 
challenges as one strives towards an agreed universal ethic, a universal culture of rights, while the 
other suggests particularism, recognition of diversity and the value of difference and cultural 
relativism.  They reflect a desire to establish a shared moral understanding which can unite people 
from different backgrounds. HRE has become an important international education movement 
reflected in many UN declarations, the work of international agencies such as UNESCO and 
UNICEF and other inter-governmental bodies.  In recent decades HRE has evolved, globally 
expanded and found places in many countries’ education systems (Andreopoulos & Claude 1997; 
Campbell & Covell 2001; Keet 2007; Ramirez et al. 2006; Suarez 2006; Suarez & Ramirez 2007; 
Tibbitts 2002; UNESCO 2005).  In the last decade human rights have been given a stronger 
profile in the English secondary school curriculum (QCA 2001, 2007a, 2007b). 
 
HRE is under-theorised (Keet 2007, p.1; Suarez & Ramirez 2007, p.22) and lacks conceptual 
clarity in the case of dignity.  The UDHR proclaims a belief in the inherent dignity of the human 
person as a foundational concept for universal human rights but it is not defined (Arieli 2002).  In 
other fields such as law and medicine, conceptual discussion about human rights refers to, and 
focuses on, the concept of dignity.  However, there is little conceptual theorising of dignity in 
educational writing and especially in HRE literature.  This thesis seeks to address this omission. 
 
The significance of religion, religious education and spirituality for HRE is also an area that 
reflects a lack of theoretical understanding. On the one hand, religion is depicted in some 
educational literature as a force against human rights (Davies 2008) and religious issues are 
frequently identified as obstacles for HRE. On the other hand HRE seeks to deepen understanding 
and friendship between different groups, including religious groups. There are historical and 
theoretical links between religious movements and theologies and the development of HRE and 
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its more prominent pedagogical forms.  Furthermore, scholars describe the present as a 
postsecular era in which religion endures or is resurgent and theories of secularisation are 
challenged (Berger et al. 2008; Boeve 2003, 2007; Davie 2002; Davie et al. 2003; Habermas 
2008; Heelas & Woodhead 2005; Micklethwait & Wooldridge 2009). 
 
This study takes a critical stance to HRE, seeking to address the religious dimensions through 
greater theorising about the foundational concept of dignity.  This theorising takes the form of 
concept analyses with historical conceptual and contextual conceptual research.  The contextual 
conceptual research refers to theological and philosophical ‘meaning-giving narratives’.  Through 
the analysis this study explores the links between religion and HRE and reappraises the trend 
towards a secular conception of HRE.  It draws on ancient sources to clarify the concept of 
dignity and argues that dignity requires distinctive educational approaches in HRE.  The study is 
concerned with these foundational understandings and their implications for a philosophy, or 
theology, of human rights education 
 
Research Question: Purpose, Objectives, Contribution and Focus of the Study 
 
This study has four purposes.  (a) The first asks the research question, How is religion presented 
in human rights education agreements, educational literature and national curricula documents?  
This question is addressed through an analysis of international documents, educational writings 
and a study of the English secondary school curriculum documents.  Such links are not explored 
in the existing literature but, in doing so, light is cast on the aims and approaches of HRE. There 
are few detailed references to theological or religious influences in the international documents, 
and in many places there is a clear sense that HRE is a secular ideology in which religion has 
little place, if any.  The analysis of the English curriculum illustrates this sense, where there are 
few articulated links between citizenship and religious education in the curriculum guidance for 
the teaching of human rights. This constitutes a critical analysis of religion in HRE literature and 
reveals difficulties with the current range of treatments that require changes. 
 
(b)  The second research question is: What is the significance of dignity for HRE? While there are 
important debates about dignity and human rights in law, medicine, philosophy and theology, 
there is little equivalent discussion in HRE literature. It is sometimes equated with respect or 
equality but it is largely proffered as the basis for human rights without justification or 
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elaboration. The thesis addresses that gap. It provides a critical analysis of the significance and 
meaning of dignity in human rights and human rights education.  This is achieved through a cross 
disciplinary conceptual analysis of the dignity discourse, a conceptual analysis of dignity in the 
context of HRE literature and historical conceptual and contextual research into the meanings of 
dignity.  Some are critical of the concept of dignity while others think there are enduring 
arguments for its significance providing a possible point of convergence across religious 
traditions.  The analysis I offer reveals that within the theological and philosophical sources of the 
concept of dignity (Classical, Christian and Kantian), three interrelated meanings emerge: 
intrinsic (or inherent or ontological worth), societal recognition and respect, and human 
flourishing.  This constitutes a critical historical conceptual analysis of dignity.  From this 
analysis a coherent account of dignity is advanced (detailed below).  
(c) The study asks a further research question: How might HRE be re-imagined for a postsecular 
context? The thesis develops an inter-disciplinary approach to HRE that recognizes the 
importance of religion and religious education to HRE.  It is a corrective to approaches that are 
non-religiously secular or based exclusively on political ideology or philosophy.  The approach is 
centred on the concept of dignity.  Responding to post-colonial criticisms of western notions of 
human rights, the approach builds on theological trends that are aligned with recent philosophical 
understandings of dignity.  The approach to HRE stresses self-reflective enquiry into how one’s 
own religious tradition frames the intrinsic importance of dignity, and dialogue with others about 
different traditions and shared experiences of dignity and suffering.  It avoids legislative 
declaratory approaches to moral education.  It adopts a model of HRE based on dialogue using 
the three-fold sense of dignity to provide a common conceptual framework underpinning rights 
and framing their applications. This constitutes a contextual conceptual analysis of dignity and 
the development of an inclusive, self-reflective and dialogical approach to HRE for a postsecular 
society. 
 
(d) Finally, in answering the three questions mentioned above, the thesis makes an innovative 
methodological contribution to education in developing a theology of human rights education 
through concept analysis.  This aims to sensitize educational research to the postsecular context 
and offers insights into how theological reflection might contribute to pedagogy. 
 
The study contributes to knowledge and understanding of the HRE field in a number of ways.  
HRE is an emerging and contested field that has not been adequately located within the 
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contemporary postsecular context.  Understanding the significance of religion and religious 
education for HRE is important for theorists and practitioners in particular and educationists in 
general.  Important insights are gained from examining the concept of dignity and its theological 
and philosophical meaning and significance for HRE.  This brings HRE into line with other 
practical and theoretical fields.  This study provides a basis for developing inclusive HRE 
programmes that are methodologically aligned with religious education and provide for more 
rounded enquiry into human rights and the values that underpin them. 
 
Important insights are gained from a historical conceptual analysis of HRE that can frame its 
pedagogical structure in self-reflective and dialogical terms, rather than instrumentalist and 
exclusivistic terms.  Once dignity is understood in terms that include inherent or intrinsic worth, it 
inspires an educational frame that has a universally applied concern for the person and the 
process. Further insights are gained about the contribution of theological reflection to pedagogy 
in educational research and the importance of contextual narratives for concept analysis. 
 
 
Definition of Dignity 
 
Dignity is a term that is used in differing ways.  It may mean social standing or moral propriety or 
comportment and is applied to positions of authority, human beings and sometimes non-human 
animals.  The following definition of dignity is the one that this thesis advances and finds strong 
evidence for in the literature examined here, subject to limitations acknowledged below.  Dignity 
is a compound or complex concept involving three elements that are inter-related.  Firstly, dignity 
means the inherent worth of the human being, or person, which is also be described as intrinsic, 
ontological or unearned.  This is the foundational element of the concept, which grounds and 
justifies human rights.  It is not something that can be removed as it is bound up with the human 
being or person.  It is not something that is dependent on particular levels of ability, skill, or 
quality.  The thesis draws on Kantian ideas to underpin this, along with modern Catholic thought, 
and traces this element in early Christian ideas of the image of God and the image of Christ.  
‘Inherent dignity’ is found in international statements.  Secondly, dignity is related to societal 
response, in as much as it demands a moral response, and also in so far as the meaning giving 
narratives (philosophical and theological) which advance this notion of dignity are manifestations 
within society.  Inherent worth should be attributed with appropriate societal recognition and the 
recognizing, or failure to recognise, that inherent worth is important.  This theme is present in the 
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sources and while the link between inherent and attributive dignity is necessary, it is also 
problematic.  Thirdly, dignity relates to human flourishing, which includes moral development 
along with the development of the particular capacities and attributes of human beings or person.   
Thus while the inherent worth is unchanging, the extent to which a person flourishes and the way 
in which they develop is variable and is related to the societal recognition.  This thesis delineates 
this framework or compound construct of dignity.  The relationship between these elements is 
complex.  In this thesis they are associated because separation is found to be problematic and 
ultimately unsatisfactory. The humiliation of a person deprives them of an aspect of dignity as it 
diminishes or corrupts their personality and or body and yet their inherent worth remains.  This 
working definition is found within the literatures examined and seems to have particular 
resonance within the western philosophical and theological thought.  Dignity is a dynamic and 
complex or compound concept.  It is, of course, a definition that is challenged, as is the concept 
itself. 
 
 
Rationale for this study 
 
HRE is commonly presented without reference to a religious or philosophical framework to 
ground it.  Donnelly (1982) and Henkin (1998) are prominent and well regarded for their secular 
views of human rights.  Davies (2008) has argued that education needs to equip children to reject 
extremist forms of religion through the abandonment of accepting truths uncritically. Osler and 
Starkey (2005c) maintain an approach to HRE that tends to see difficulties with religion.  This 
position applies in general terms to international human rights documents, academic educational 
published works and guidance for teachers, as well as some local curricula.  The reticence to refer 
directly to any specific theologies or philosophies stems from the concern to develop and 
maintain a consensus among the member states of the UN in support of the 1948 UDHR and 
belies the political basis for HRE.  At that time, theologians and philosophers from different 
traditions considered the question of reaching a consensus over human rights.  Agreement could 
be reached as long as the basis and justification were excluded and undefined (Schulman 2008; 
UNESCO 1948).  There were pragmatic reasons for not seeking to explore in the declarations 
how religions or philosophies may interpret ideas such as dignity or rights, as this may have 
delayed or even derailed agreement over the UDHR (Glendon 1999).  This practical decision 
born out of a need for agreement, has, with perhaps one exception (UNESCO 1969), excluded 
future references to theologies and philosophies in HRE literature. 
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In avoiding references to religion, important links between religious education (RE) and HRE 
have not been adequately identified or researched though they have begun to be noted (Guyette 
2009; Willaime 2007).  Possible theological foundations, which may be used by a large 
proportion of the world’s population to base understandings of moral conduct, are not referred to 
in any detail in HRE.  The thrust of HRE excludes the examination of philosophies or theologies 
that may underpin human rights, give meaning to human rights concepts, or frame how human 
rights are discussed or applied.  These features are not within the scope of the movement, which 
is concerned with the application of a set of universal norms that are taken for granted as self-
evident realities (Keet 2007).  In HRE, religion is more likely seen as a cause of difficulties 
(Andreopoulos & Claude 1997; Benedek 2006; Davies 2008; Osler 2005a, 2005b; Osler & 
Starkey 2005c).  Possible benefits are not referred to. Davies’ argument (2008) that the 
acceptance of simple truths should be challenged in education (out of a concern to avoid 
extremism), runs counter to the idea that some moral beliefs should be promoted, such as a belief 
that human beings have some kind of moral worth that leads to the need for their human rights to 
be acknowledged. 
 
The lack of engagement with religion and religious education within HRE, combined with the 
lack of conceptual engagement with dignity, provides the backdrop for the rationale of this study 
that resides in the need to critically explore the theology and philosophy of the concept of dignity 
and recontextualise HRE for the postsecular reality.  This is a contemporary education policy 
concern and the conclusions of the thesis should inform policy and practical HRE programmes 
and initiatives. 
 
This study consists of the examination of two groups of literature and a proposal.  It is inter-
disciplinary insofar as it draws both on ethical, philosophical and theological sources and 
educational material.  This thesis selects key UN international documents which have enduring 
significance in virtue of their inter-governmental and historic status and literature which discusses 
or interprets these documents for academic and professional educator audiences.  The material 
includes a particular example of HRE in English secondary school curriculum documentation.  
HRE as reflected in these sources does not make links with religious beliefs, beyond the most 
general references, and rarely refers to religious education.  This is at odds with the professed aim 
in HRE to encourage inter-religious understanding and encourage all people, including those of 
faith, to aspire to shared values in the form of human rights.  Human rights and human rights 
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education make frequent references to the term dignity, an idea to which religious traditions and 
philosophies give considerable attention.  This makes the inconsistency more problematic. 
The second literature group includes theological, philosophical, legal and ethical discussions 
surrounding dignity and its application.  What unites this multidisciplinary group is an interest in 
dignity in relation to human rights and how that is viewed both theoretically and in application.  
This thesis is a critical study that will advance our knowledge about the foundations of HRE, the 
influence of theology and religion on its development and the role these may have in contributing 
to understandings of HRE aims and pedagogy for a postsecular context. 
The primary interest of this study, as reflected in the questions above, is related to a concern 
about the current trajectory of HRE and tendencies and approaches within HRE.  The conceptual 
disengagement and lack of consideration for religion and religious education results in HRE 
becoming distanced from societies in which religion plays a significant role in motivating human 
behaviour for others and framing moral beliefs.  By uncritically disregarding these factors, HRE 
is weakened educationally and portrayed as conceptually shallow.  Examples of developments 
found in religious communities may not be recognized as HRE because of their religious 
orientation and yet seem to meet fundamental aims of HRE.  The disconnection with religions is 
so potent in the English curriculum that an alternative subject!citizenship!was created in which 
to locate HRE.  The secular formation of HRE is emphasised and religious links are not 
acknowledged.  There is scepticism of any benefit that religion or RE may provide to HRE.  My 
interest in this matter is informed by my seven years of teaching RE in the period before and after 
the development of citizenship education.  I experienced teaching HRE as a component of RE and 
then witnessed the arrival of a politically conceived secular subject, citizenship, in which HRE 
was located.  I have been surprised to notice a theoretical and philosophical shallowness in HRE, 
contrasting the depth and criticality of ethics and plurality of perspectives acknowledged in RE.  
While RE in England encourages the examination of different methods of ethical decision making 
and plurality, I feel that human rights are frequently treated as accepted universals in HRE.  
Human rights educationalists seem to inform citizenship education, adapting to the opportunity of 
a new subject field.  While these anecdotal experiences and perspectives are not substantiated by 
this thesis, they did inspire the research and the findings seem to concur with them. 
A number of grounds are advanced for this study.  First, HRE holds as an aim the development of 
peace and understanding between peoples of different religions (Reardon 1997).  This aim 
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implies that religion and RE are priority concerns.  In a world that can be described as postsecular 
these merit study. 
Second, the literature review reveals a significant philosophical and theological interest in dignity 
in medicine and law.  In these areas the historical conceptual development of the idea is related to 
the contemporary human rights context and therefore there are grounds to examine it within the 
HRE context. 
Third, the history of the development of human rights and concerns for freedom and liberty are 
infused with ideas from philosophy and theology, and political movements for social change.  
Meaning-giving narratives have informed the development of rights and how they are understood.  
The lack of reference to these narratives within the literature of HRE provides grounds to 
consider them in this context. 
 
Researching Theological and Philosophical sources 
 
Carr observes: 
 
Research … always conveys a commitment to philosophical beliefs even if it is unintended and 
even though it remains implicit and unacknowledged … It follows that philosophical reflection 
and argumentation are central features of the methods and procedures of educational research. 
(1995, p.1) 
 
Following Carr, and extending the scope of his argument, the thesis draws on theological and 
philosophical sources.  While concepts may be treated in quite different ways in theology and 
philosophy, in the case of dignity there are common ethical correlations.  A presupposition of this 
study, which is borne out in the analysis, is that theological ideas influence human rights in 
different ways, and are important considerations for the development of policy and practice of 
HRE.  The subject matter of this study includes ideas understood as informed by revelation, 
constituting genuinely held interpretations of the world.  This is reaffirmed by Eliott Eisner’s 
observation in his 1993 address to the American Educational Research Association: 
 
If there are different ways to understand the world, and if there are different forms that make such 
understanding possible, then it would seem to follow that any comprehensive effort to understand 
the process and outcomes of schooling would profit from a pluralistic rather than a monolithic 
approach to research. (Eisner 1993, p.8) 
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This approach is appropriate in a context that is postsecular, where religious understandings are 
not excluded, and secularisation theory not assumed.  Metaphysics, as a field of philosophy, has 
fallen out of fashion, especially in the philosophy of education and educational research.  
However Ruitenberg (2009) is critical of those who see education as a social science rather than 
as a field of theories, policies and practices that can be approached from a variety of ways, 
including natural and social sciences and the humanities.  Ruitenberg suggests that philosophers 
of education must not submit to talking in paradigms of expectations of the social sciences with 
the emphasis on data, technique and the tripartite breakdown of method into data gathering, data 
analysis and data representation.  Bridges and Smith had earlier argued similarly that: 
 
Such a very narrow, apparently scientific, conception of empirical research threatens to consign to 
oblivion philosophy, history, much sociology and, in fact, anything that is explicitly theoretical, as 
well as more specific forms of enquiry that identify themselves, for example, as life history, 
illuminative case studies, deconstructive approaches and discourse analysis.  (Bridges & Smith 
2006, p.132) 
 
Rowbottom and Aiston argue: 
 
On the conceptual level, we need to recognize that it is the difference between good and bad 
inquiry with which we should be concerned, with respect to the question of overarching method, 
and that inquiry is multi-faceted. (Rowbottom & Aiston 2006, p.154) 
 
Following Bridges and Smith, Ruitenberg and Pring (2004), this study understands itself to be 
engaged with this broader conception of research.  Adapting Bridges (2006, p.261), it can be 
argued that commitment to a plural and inclusive view of enquiry is consistent with: 
 
(i) The desirability of drawing more fine-grained distinctions between different 
kinds of enquiry in respect of the principle of differentiation, in this study 
through the application of forms of concept analysis. 
(ii) The drawing into the field of educational enquiry of a wider variety of 
disciplinary resources (in this study from theology and philosophy) whose 
relevance was previously neglected. 
(iii) The combination of different disciplinary traditions in ‘multidisciplinary’ or 
‘inter-disciplinary’ enquiry to investigate a particular aspect of educational 
policy or practice. 
 
More is needed to clarify this broad approach to research as Kuhn (1977) notes that intellectual 
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progress requires a context in which there is relatively close agreement on theories, methods of 
enquiry and the requirements for the initiation of newcomers into the discipline. 
 
Concept analysis and development  
 
Cohen et al. (2005) observe that concepts express generalisations from particulars.  A concept is 
the relationship between the symbol and an idea of conception.  Concepts enable us to impose 
meaning on the world by giving reality sense, order and coherence: 
 
They are the means by which we are able to come to terms with our experience.  How we perceive 
the world, then, is highly dependent on the repertoire of concepts we can command. (Ibid. p.13) 
 
Concepts may also express profound realities such as the kind Plato believed reflected true 
reality.  Leedy (1997) observes that ideas and concepts have origins, growth, and development 
and exert influence on their age.  Concepts are valuable in knowledge generation as they capture 
and label abstract ideas and meanings.  Different techniques can be used to develop 
understandings of concepts (McCormack et al. 2002, pp.95!6).  What might be called the 
maturation of concepts, or the development of deeper understandings of concepts, is important for 
theoretical and practical purposes with HRE, where dignity is referred to and yet is not delineated 
sufficiently.  It is claimed that concepts are an aid to understanding and are important in the 
development of knowledge as they are the building blocks or foundation from which theories are 
constructed (Chinn & Kramer 1995, p.78; Rodgers & Knafl 1993, p.2 & 5).  For Walker and 
Avant, the refining of ambiguous concepts is important in the development of construct-validity 
and contributes to theory construction (1995, p.93). 
 
Concepts may be ‘mental formulations of experience’ (Chinn & Kramer 1995, p.78), ‘words 
describing mental images of phenomena’ (Fawcett 1989, p.2), and ‘linguistic representations, or 
symbols of reality’ (Moody 1990, p.52).  Rodgers suggests that a tentative consensus has been 
reached when he notes: 
 
that concepts are cognitive in nature and that they are comprised of attributes abstracted from reality, 
expressed in some form and utilized for some common purpose.  Consequently, concepts are more 
than words or mental images alone. (Rodgers 1993, p.30) 
 
However he also notes a contrasting observation that, ‘an emphasis on use alone is not sufficient 
to capture the complex nature of concepts.’ (Rodgers 1993, p.30) 
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Concepts have profound significance within theology and form doctrinal beliefs that influence 
attitudes and understandings within the religious communities who hold them, though those 
doctrinal understandings are also acknowledged to be incomplete.  This study also suggests that 
in the case of dignity, moral concepts have come to shape ideas beyond the religious communities 
in wider legal and cultural currency. 
 
In education, concept analysis could be described as a study to clarify generic or essential 
meaning, different alternative meanings, and the appropriate use of the concept (Schumacher & 
McMillan 1993, pp.50 & 450).  It is generally thought that the analyst assumes a neutral position 
when analysing a concept before taking a value position (Ibid. p.508).  Concepts in education are 
often complex and the process of defining and breaking down or sub-dividing the concept is an 
important and common aspect of educational research (Anderson & Arsenault 1998, pp.59!60).  
The analysis may be descriptive, but it may also help to develop or build theory. Schumacher and 
McMillan (1993) argue that analytical studies of concepts aid in the development of knowledge 
and the improvement of practices in education.  This thesis undertakes both a descriptive analysis 
of dignity and builds a theory of dignity as applied to HRE.  It does not resolve the question of 
the extent to which concepts are theory formed or theory forming (Risjord 2009) but it 
demonstrates that concepts are understood through contextual narratives (theological and 
philosophical traditions). 
 
Keet (2007), in his study of HRE, undertakes historical conceptual analysis.  This integration was 
supported by Leedy’s understanding of ‘historical conceptual research’ (1997, p.182), which 
draws different forms of analysis together with concept analysis.  Leedy argues: 
 
 [I]deas and concepts have origins, growth, and development [and that] tracing the origin, 
development, and influence of ideas and concepts [is a] valid type of historical research that is 
exciting, challenging and refreshing. (Ibid.) 
 
Leedy’s orientation contributes to the research design.  In examining dignity in HRE this study 
identifies significant theological and philosophical correlations with the concept’s place in 
education but that in addition the concept has developed and has shifting meanings.  It also 
integrates Risjord’s observations (2009) about the significance of contextual understanding for 
making meaning out of concepts.  This study analyses the discourse surrounding dignity, 
attributes and meanings of the concept of dignity in HRE and the significance of contextual 
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understandings of dignity, found within meaning-giving narrative traditions.  It then uses the 
findings to advance a proposal for developing HRE. 
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis advances a logical progression through chapters that undertake inter-related enquiries, 
which begin by looking broadly across a multidisciplinary field but then narrow in focus, relating 
philosophical and theological discussions to the educational context at hand.  Concepts have 
histories within philosophical and theological traditions and contexts that contribute to their 
definitional structures.  Keet (2007) has observed that theoretically concepts have an infinite 
number of meanings but that in their deployment they have meaning-assumptions attached to 
them that signify their central attributes and essential meaning.  This study provides a 
comprehensive and inter-disciplinary conceptual analysis of dignity in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6.  It 
notes that dignity is deployed in dissimilar ways depending on the narrative or framework that 
utilises them.  The inclusion of theological contextual narrative analyses makes this study 
distinctive from Keet’s, along with the narrow focus on dignity. 
 
The thesis is structured around two critical studies and a proposal.  The first examines the link 
between religion, RE and HRE in a postsecular context (Chapters 1 and 2).  The second is a 
critical and inter-disciplinary concept study of dignity in contemporary discourses (Chapter 3), 
historical, philosophical and theological discourses (Chapter 4), in human rights education 
literature (Chapter 5), and in contemporary theological and philosophical literature (Chapter 6).  
The proposal (Chapter 7) draws on the findings of these studies and advances a recontextualised 
approach to HRE. 
 
General Limitations 
 
The thesis is limited by a number of factors.  The thesis is focused on human rights education and 
refers to discourse about human dignity so references to dignity should, unless otherwise 
identified in the text, be assumed to refer to human dignity.  There are important debates about 
(non-human) animal rights and the worth of the (non-human) animal that are well explored and 
advocated by Singer (1986, 1993) but these are excluded from the scope of this thesis as HRE as 
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in the international context it is commonly referred only to human beings and human civilization.  
It should be noted that a key issue in human rights development that is referred to in the thesis is 
the widening of the boundaries of moral significance by revealing new suffering that is previously 
unacknowledged or inadequately recognized (Baxi 2003).  The question of the significance of the 
inherent worth of the non-human animal is important and may have implications for this present 
work although it is set aside. 
 
Within much of the literature references to human dignity, dignity of the human person and 
dignity of human beings occur interchangeably.  There are distinctive debates and discussions 
about being and person or personhood in ethics more widely that do have baring on some aspects 
of these discussions, for instance in the measurement of the human worth of a patient seeking 
euthanasia or a human foetus or embryo.  There are also important debates about the nature of the 
self.  These produce highly specialized and important debates but this thesis is principally 
concerned with the uses and applications of dignity, in relation to human rights. 
 
The survey of the traditions of dignity is based largely on secondary literature to establish an 
indicative overview.  This could be improved with much greater in depth study of the sources of 
dignity, which is beyond the scope of this project.  The sources chosen and interpretations made 
are those commonly cited in relation to human rights. 
 
Studies of religious traditions could be extended beyond Christianity to examine the extent to 
which the other Abrahamic religions, Judaism and Islam, and the other of the world’s principal 
religious traditions provide resources for dignity.  The extent to which all religions have 
compatible notions of dignity defines the scope for the approach suggested in this thesis and 
further, detailed and systematic studies of those individual traditions would explore the 
parameters of this compatibility.  Hinduism and Buddhism in particular offer challenges with the 
belief in reincarnation and the belief that Buddha was an animal in a previous incarnation.  These 
religious traditions are also complex and diverse and so generalizations about them are avoided. 
 
The ‘sanctity’ or ‘sacredness’ of life discourse is a distinctive area of discussion that merits 
specific attention.  It is related to aspects of the dignity discourse, most notably in application to 
start and end of life issues, and has importance in religious circles but is set aside here as beyond 
the boundaries of this research.  It is distinguishable from the human rights discussions about 
dignity. 
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Part of this study examines the aims of HRE expressed by curriculum writers.  While these will 
guide and direct teachers and schools in the development of schemes of work and lessons, 
questions remain about the ways in which RE and HRE are linked, or could be linked, in school 
practice.  There are likely to be examples where such links are made and further research would 
test this judgment and may reveal useful information about the practicability of what is proposed 
here, or alternative ways of integrating religious and human rights education.  To begin, however, 
it is necessary to establish the relationship between religion and HRE as expressed in various 
international and education literature. 
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Chapter 1 
Human rights education and religion 
 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce and understand human rights education (HRE) through the 
prism of a postsecular context and critically analyse the treatments between HRE and religion.  It 
examines HRE international documentation, educational literature and teaching guidance, which 
present various relationships between religion and HRE with different resulting consequences. 
 
Part One: Human rights education and the postsecular analysis provides a concise study of 
postsecularity and HRE, a key context that HRE needs to be located within.  Part Two: 
Diminishing roles of religion identifies three interpretations of the place of religion in HRE 
sources. Human rights are initially considered as ideas that have their own integrity, independent 
from any ideology, philosophy and theology.  Part Three: Critical issues for a human rights 
centred education examines the implications of separating human rights from any philosophical 
or theological dependency and problematises such separation.  Part Four: Enduring roles for 
religion explores other treatments in which religion is variously viewed as providing a grounding 
in HRE, being recognized in HRE and being interrelated with human rights in HRE.  An 
acknowledgement of such views provides a counterbalance to the secular separation of meaning 
giving narrative from human rights claims. 
 
While HRE is commonly conceived of in secular non-religious terms (Baxi & Mann 2006; Osler 
& Starkey 2005, 2010), religion has had a significant role in HRE.  The connection between 
meaning-giving narratives and human rights is not well attended to in accounts of HRE but there 
are theoretical arguments and other forms of evidence that suggest these connections are 
important.  To conceive of HRE in secular non-religious terms is to misunderstand these 
connections.  The findings of this chapter, which refer in quite broad terms to the international 
HRE movement and academic literature, serves as a background for the study of curriculum 
documentation for secondary schools in England in Chapter 2 and also for the remaining 
chapters. 
 
HRE is commonly understood as a movement that began with the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) and this review includes the formation and discussion of that document 
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and the period since then to the present.  References to earlier periods are made where appropriate 
as certain historic religious movements are cited in literature from the modern HRE period. 
 
The limitations of this approach are as follows.  A comprehensive account of HRE would need 
educational sector by sector studies and geographical region by region studies, by specialists from 
within those areas.  All that is attempted here is an account of the internationally agreed 
presentation of HRE and the educational literature around these agreements, which is more 
appropriate to the scope and focus of this thesis.  This is illustrated and amplified with selective 
examples from particular sectors and regions in an attempt to capture a representation of the 
range of examples. 
 
The critical religious issues that are expounded are selected from a much wider range of possible 
tensions related to human rights.  The focus on religion is chosen because of the specific aim of 
HRE to encourage understanding and friendship between people of different religions and the 
theological associations with dignity, revealed in the research. 
 
 
Part One: Human rights education and the postsecular analysis 
 
The backdrop to this thesis is the development of an international educational movement in a 
changing religious context that can be termed postsecular. 
 
(i) Human Rights Education: In recent decades HRE has evolved into what could be described as 
a burgeoning pedagogical formation (Keet 2007, p.1) based on human rights universals 
(Andreopoulos & Claude 1997; Campbell & Covell 2001; Claude 1996; Suarez 2006; Suarez & 
Ramirez 2007; Tibbitts 2002). Ramirez, Suarez and Meyer (2006) refer to a worldwide rise of 
HRE.  Suarez and Ramirez (2007) chart the ‘dramatic expansion’ of HRE since the mid-1970s 
and pronounce on the ‘strength and the success of human rights education at the global level.’ 
(Ibid. pp.22!3)  An increasing number of developing countries have included HRE in their 
education systems since the 1980s (UNESCO 2005).  Despite this HRE is under-theorized (Keet 
2007; Suarez & Ramirez 2007). 
 
The United Nations defines HRE as ‘training, dissemination, and information efforts aimed at the 
building of a universal culture of human rights through the imparting of knowledge and skills and 
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the moulding of attitudes.’ (UNESCO 1998, p.3)  It was first defined in 1948 in the Preamble and 
Article 26 of the UDHR, which stated: 
 
Now, Therefore THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the 
end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, 
shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by 
progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective 
recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the 
peoples of territories under their jurisdiction. (UN General Assembly 1948, Preamble) 
 
The Preamble makes clear that the UDHR has an instrumentalist educational aim.  Teaching and 
education are declared fundamental to the purpose of the UDHR.  They are not simply an element 
of human rights but tools for achieving rights and the observance of the dignity and worth of the 
human.  They serve the human rights project as a whole.  The educational purpose arose in 
consideration of what should be done with the UDHR once it had been written and this purpose is 
present in the choice of the word ‘proclaims’, used in the operative paragraph (Morsink 1999, 
p.20).  Morsink notes, ‘The General Assembly proclaims this universal declaration of human 
rights’ (Ibid. pp.320!1) and some delegates felt that the declaration’s main importance was as an 
educational instrument.  This was combined with a legislative importance, that the Declaration 
was a ‘common standard’ for all nations to achieve.  Morsink links HRE closely to the UDHR: 
 
The connection between the Universal Declaration and human rights education is even closer than 
the Resolution and Proclamation suggest. It is not just that the Declaration is an authoritative 
exposition of the principles enunciated in the Charter, and not just that Article 26 of the 
Declaration makes human rights an educational goal. Human rights education itself is the first and 
primary purpose of the Universal Declaration as a whole. The entire Declaration was proclaimed 
by the Third General Assembly, ‘to the end that every individual and every organ of society, 
keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote 
respect for these rights and freedoms.’ (Ibid. p.326, italics my emphasis) 
 
The preamble of the UDHR stresses the importance of a common understanding of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms and that these are values which can be seen as common standards of 
achievement.  These values should be promoted through teaching and education by every 
individual and organisation.  HRE is both an individual and a collective duty and a tool for the 
promotion of human rights (Baxi 1997).  It is instrumental in conception.  Article 26 and the 
Preamble of the UDHR together affirm everyone’s right to education and their right to HRE.  The 
educational dimension of what the UDHR set out to achieve is central to the project.  
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Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the 
strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall 
further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. (UN General Assembly 
1948, Article 26, para. b) 
 
Article 26 provides more texture to the kind of education HRE refers to.  It relates to human 
flourishing, supporting the universal rights but also improving respect, understanding, tolerance 
and friendship between different peoples, including peoples of different religions.  HRE is aimed 
at producing true citizens of the world, imbued with civic values of respect for pluralism, peace, 
dignity and rights (Baxi 1997).  It is about the free and full development of the human 
personality.  It is a high political aspiration resulting from the experience of the horrors of the 
Second World War. 
 
HRE, therefore, was at its inception and remains today, in UN definitions, a politically conceived 
force for societal transformation.  For example, the UNESCO World Plan of Action on Education 
for Human Rights and Democracy (UNESCO 1993) states that HRE is a force for bringing about 
such societal change.  HRE has the responsibility to bring about accelerated development.  
Education is a force for global social and political change and is a tool of development.  The 
definition used in the ongoing World Programme for Human Rights Education (UNHCR 2005) (a 
UN initiative to develop and extend HRE in member states) expresses this societal change as the 
establishment of a universal culture of human rights.  The definition of HRE agreed for this 
initiative reflects how that original idea has grown and developed into a more substantive and all 
embracing conception: 
 
Human rights education can be defined as education, training and information aiming at building a 
universal culture of human rights through the sharing of knowledge, imparting of skills and 
moulding of attitudes directed to: (a) The strengthening of respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms; (b) The full development of the human personality and the sense of its 
dignity; (c) The promotion of understanding, tolerance, gender equality and friendship among all 
nations, indigenous peoples and racial, national, ethnic, religious and linguistic groups; (d) The 
enabling of all persons to participate effectively in a free and democratic society governed by the 
rule of law; (e) The building and maintenance of peace;  (f) The promotion of people-centred 
sustainable development and social justice. (UNHCR 2005) 
 
HRE includes a combination of imparting skills, sharing of knowledge and moulding attitudes.  
The transformative dimension of HRE applies to outward global change, conceived through inner 
personal change. 
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The legal and political strength of HRE has been bolstered by its inclusion in the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (UN General Assembly 1989) (CRC), which signatories have a legal 
obligation to implement.  Member states must report on their implementation frequently to the 
UN.  Article 29 of the CRC states that education of the child shall be directed to full human 
development in its widest sense, and respect for: human rights and fundamental freedoms; the 
principles of the United Nations Charter; the child's parents; and his or her own cultural identity 
and values.  Competent, well-educated teachers and schools should offer a relevant curriculum to 
develop ‘the child’s personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest 
potential.’ (UN General Assembly 1989)  The individual is situated within his or her own frame 
of individual development, and also in the values framework of the wider community and the 
environment.  Education for the individual is education within a community (Ibid.).  Here we see 
interesting tensions.  On the one hand, education is for the liberation of the individual and the 
development of their particular personal talents and abilities.  On the other hand, education is 
social, communal and involves knowledge sharing and attitude formation.  Taken apart, these 
elements could be strikingly different in appearance, even polar opposites.  HRE might be 
education to liberate the individual from their social setting and community limitations.  
Alternatively, HRE may be education to socialise individuals into a common moral culture of 
behaviour.  How these different trends are reconciled, balanced or conceptualised is not self-
evident from the declarations, which merely state them both as components in the HRE project. 
 
During the 1990s, the international documents on HRE were elaborated and progressively 
became part of a worldwide educational discourse (Lenhart & Savolainen 2002).  In 1995, HRE 
had gained enough momentum that the United Nations proclaimed a United Nations Decade for 
Human Rights Education (1995!2004) (UNHCR 1994) and after that a World Programme for 
Human Rights Education, the second phase of which is currently underway (UNHCR 2005).  By 
the end of the 1990s, numerous teaching orientated resources were produced which sought to 
translate educational ideas into strategies, pedagogies and professional practice (Lenhart & 
Savolainen 2002; OHCHR 2003; Reardon 1995; UNESCO 1998).  There was a drive to make 
HRE an integral part of mainstream education, integrated into all subjects and, in the UK, 
especially in citizenship education (Gearon 2003a, 2007; Smith 2003), though it is notable that 
the phrase ‘human rights education’ is not used in UK curriculum documents or government 
education policy. 
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HRE now includes a diaspora of educational projects from peace education (Tibbitts 2008) to 
citizenship (Osler 2000), from education for sustainable development to personal moral 
development.  The common standard of achievement in the Preamble has become the universal 
culture in the new definition.  The new definition reflects an acknowledgment of the concerns of 
specific group rights, especially women and indigenous peoples, the concern for participative 
democracy and the ongoing need for peace and also reflects the more environmental moral 
consciousness of the present age.  It has enlarged to include developments in rights themselves 
(Gearon 2003b) and therefore reflects the evolution of human rights in the international sphere.  
HRE is not simply restricted to schools or professionals but rather, ‘human rights education 
should involve more than the provision of information and should constitute a comprehensive 
lifelong process by which people at all levels of development and in all societies learn respect for 
the dignity of others and the means and methods of ensuring that respect in all societies’ 
(UNHCR 1994). 
 
HRE has slipped into the language of a number of different bodies, organisations, governmental 
and inter-governmental structures (Suarez & Ramirez 2007; Tibbitts 2002).  It is not the exclusive 
preserve of the UN organisations.  HRE projects were initially found in the work of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and educational non-profit organisations in informal 
education and popular education.  More recently, HRE has become prevalent in a wide range of 
different settings throughout the world including inter-governmental agencies such as the United 
Nations, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security, Cooperation and Education in 
Europe, the Organisation of America States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.  It is 
found in formal education of all levels.  It is present in training for many different professional 
groups including social workers (Hodgkins & Newell 2002), teachers (Osler & Starkey 1996, 
2010), lawyers (Wilson 1997) and police officers (Andreopoulos 2002). 
 
A broad range of different organisations, groups, and actors have taken leading roles in the HRE 
movement.  These include a number of inter-governmental organisations and prominent here are 
United Nations bodies including UNICEF (2008), UNESCO (1998) and the Office for the High 
Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR 1999, 2003), as well as regional inter-governmental 
bodies such as the Council of Europe (Starkey 1991b).  In addition there are non-governmental 
organisations involved, such as Amnesty International and Liberty (Branson and Philips 2005).  
In some parts of the world professional organisations have taken a leading role, as was the case 
with the group Lawyers for South Africa and there are also a number of academic originations 
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including the Human Rights Education Associates (http://www.hrea.org/) and the People’s 
Movement for Human Rights Education (http://www.pdhre.org) (CEDAL 1996).  This has led to 
a huge range of outputs, including declarations, resources projects and programmes so numerous 
as to fill a number of substantial databases (Lebmann 2002). 
 
Ideas about peace education and international education have converged with human rights and 
the inter-governmental institutions and structures of the UN.  HRE is politically motivated and 
instrumentally conceived.  It has emerged through the aegis of international and inter-
governmental agencies but it is also found in NGOs, development organisations, pressure groups 
and educational institutions.  It reflects a desire for peace and universally shared values, rather 
than a particular educational understanding and, as such, takes many different educational forms.  
In the post war period, HRE received the resources of global institutions and became an 
international movement.  For some, its significance for the future of the world is unparalleled: 
 
The creation of a global culture of human rights appears to be the only means by which the 
universal goals of peace, development and democracy can be achieved… Education has a crucial 
role in promoting a culture of human rights. (Osler & Starkey 2005c, p.37) 
 
HRE constitutes an international influence on national moral education and a unique contribution 
to education.  Because human rights in the twenty-first century are international, with 
international agreements and conventions that are widely known, HRE provides a footing in the 
curriculum that is supranational.  Just as it can offer a position of consensus within diverse 
societies, it can provide an influence from a perspective of international or global consensus.  
This is cited as being particularly important in post-conflict settings.  Bertrand Ramcharan 
functioned as the High Commissioner for Human Rights and Under Secretary-General of the 
United Nations.  While at the United Nations, Dr. Ramcharan served in the Center for Human 
Rights and acted as Political Advisor to the Yugoslav Peace Negotiations.  From his perspective, 
human rights education plays a crucial role:  
 
‘Last year, I completed a mission in 16 Central Asian countries during which it became clear to 
me that however poor a country, whatever difficulties a country may have, attaching importance to 
human rights education can really help to take the cause of human rights forward.’ (Ramcharan 
2005, p.75) 
 
From his work in the Yugoslav peace negotiations alongside US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, 
Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg, and British Foreign Secretary Lord David 
Owen, he: 
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became more and more convinced that if we are to prevent situations of this nature!and I do not 
have the magic wand but am looking way into the future!human rights education is important. I 
think that the cultural effects of human rights education and international law are important. (Ibid.) 
 
It is difficult to make empirically founded claims about the effectiveness of HRE as a tool for 
moral education. Covell and Howe have argued it is effective (Covell & Howe 1999, 2000, 2001, 
2005) though the positive effects they identify are characterised mainly in terms of improved 
school behaviour.  They have undertaken a number of their own studies in Canada and the UK to 
examine the impact of teaching children’s rights as a means of promoting rights-respecting 
attitudes.  Covell et al. (2002) conclude that HRE clearly gives children a better understanding of 
rights and can encourage children to learn that they are worthy of respect, have rights and live in 
a society which is committed to their present and future well being.  Covell et al. believe these 
feelings are necessary precursors to treating others with respect and socially responsible 
behaviour, noting that racial and other kinds of conflict often result from feelings of personal 
insecurity and poor self-esteem.  If children are not taught about their rights they are more likely 
to equate their rights with their wishes, and fail to understand the rights of all.  Teaching 
children’s rights necessitates democratic styles of teaching; teachers and schools must model the 
rights that children have.  Finally, they argue that the classroom atmosphere can improve as a 
result of taking a HRE approach.  Covell and Howe (2005) are cautiously optimistic that HRE 
can have a positive impact and provide an effective model of moral education but they 
acknowledge that the evidence is not conclusive.  Campbell and Covell (2001) have evidence that 
HRE among adults has a positive impact on the way children are viewed.  They see attitudinal 
changes as crucial, as these form the basis for behaviours. There are other examples of school 
based projects which seem to have promising outcomes (Driel 2005) but the evidence is not 
strong. 
 
Howe and Covell are of the view that one of the obstacles holding back the development of HRE 
is the lack of appropriate participation in the education structures which children inhabit (Howe & 
Covell 2000).  They argue that Canada does not fulfill its duty of ensuring that children are 
listened to within education institutions, as listed under the CRC.  The CRC takes this element 
seriously enough to make provision for this a requirement and states that there needs to be 
legislation for age appropriate participation in the education system.  Five years after Howe and 
Covell published their concerns Jonny observed a similar situation: 
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Although the participatory rights of children are protected in the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, the full exercise of these rights is still largely dependent upon adults for their recognition.  
Consequently, this raises the concern that children are not treated fairly in institutions such as 
schools where adults hold a disproportionate amount of power. … When we consider the 
philosophical, legal and political justifications for upholding the participatory rights of youth there 
appears to be a valid claim for creating structures of opportunity that will allow young people to 
participate in the school environment.  From a philosophical standpoint, it is clear that children 
have the ability to make certain choices.  Legally, it would also be prudent for schools to 
encourage youth participation because it is a fundamental right of children. (Jonny 2005, p.15) 
 
Examples of this are present elsewhere. A report published by UNICEF UK in 2004 noted that in 
the UK, children feel their schools were only moderately democratic with only moderate levels of 
participation present (Jarvis 2004).  This theme is mentioned in research conducted in Nigeria 
which revealed serious weaknesses in the extent to which Nigerian children are aware of their 
participation rights (Ejieh & Akinola 2009).  The contexts are quite different but the theme is the 
same. 
 
In addition to these kinds of concerns, there are theoretical questions about HRE.  It is criticised 
for being under-theorised (Keet 2007; Suarez & Ramirez 2007).  Education has long been 
grappling with human rights related issues such as racism, intolerance, culture and gender without 
integration with HRE discourse.  The sterile association between human rights instruments and 
provisions and multicultural education present long-standing pedagogical challenges.  Both of 
these result in ‘an educational practice that treats HRE as a declarationist “add-on” and a 
conceptual educational framework that struggles to comprehend the embeddedness and 
ontological nature of human rights within education’ (Keet 2007, Ch. 1, p.8).  HRE becomes 
more problematic where religion is concerned. 
 
(ii) A postsecular age: The idea of a postsecular context or age arises from a growing consensus 
among sociologists and others that the predictions of the secularisation thesis have not 
materialised (Berger 1999; Davie 2002; Heelas & Woodhead 2005).  Secularisation theory 
associated modern development with a diminishing of religion, leading ultimately to its demise.  
The more modern a society would become the less religious it would be.  A fully modern Europe 
or Britain would be fully secular.  However, evidence suggests this process has stalled and some 
now doubt it was ever inevitable. 
 
Secularisation in the sense it was given in the positivist era has not become verified historical 
reality on the scale that had been predicted.  The places where such a conception may have been 
historically entertained represent only a tiny part of today’s world.  Such a conception has very 
little chance of succeeding in imposing its model upon the rest of the world.  For instance, de-
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Christianisation is not a reality in the United States.  A decline in religious faith is not on the cards 
in the Middle East either.  Besides, there is a great enduring conflict between secular forms of 
thought and religious ones. … [S]ecularism in turn is itself undergoing a crisis, whilst the crisis in 
religious faith has not gone away. (Balibar 2005, p.47)  
 
Religion remains prominent in modern societies and public life.  Rather than there being a linear 
progression from religious-unmodern to unreligious-modern, modern societies seem much more 
diverse, justifying the idea of multiple modernities: 
 
Advocates of multiple modernities recognize two very simple things: first that there is more than 
one way of being modern, and second that not all modernities are necessarily secular…the United 
States and Europe should be seen simply as different versions of modernity. (Berger et al. 2008, 
p.44) 
 
In Britain this plurality is characterised by two trends.  On the one hand there are new forms of 
religion, while on the other there is growth of traditional forms of religion resulting from 
geographic migration.  Meaning-giving narratives that are not atheistically rational or scientific 
persist in people’s beliefs and values.  Europe is arguably unique in that it is rather more secular 
in its form of modernity than many other parts of the world (Davie 2002), but even here there are 
many signs that secularisation has stalled and is not universally evident.  For example Holland 
has experienced increased numbers of Muslims and Christians as a result of immigration, Poland 
remains devoutly Catholic long after the demise of the soviet influence, and Greece still 
associates its civic identity with Orthodox Christianity, giving it tax benefits and paying its 
priests.  However perhaps the most striking model of the new norm is found across the Atlantic: 
 
The United States, with the undiminished vibrancy of its religious communities and the 
unchanging proportion of religiously committed and active citizens, nevertheless remains the 
spearhead of modernisation. It was long regarded as the great exception to the secularising trend, 
yet informed by the globally extended perspective on other cultures and world religions, the 
United States now seems to exemplify the norm. (Habermas 2008, p.18) 
 
Habermas observes that the perception of global strife based on religious civilisational clashes 
underlines the reality that religion seems not to be disappearing.  It is prominent in the public 
sphere. 
 
While the causes and explanations of this trend receive different explanations, its existence 
cannot easily be refuted as it has become widely acknowledged in sociology, philosophy and 
theology (Berger 1999; Boeve 2007; Davie 2002; Habermas 2008; Heelas & Woodhead 2005), in 
urban geography (Rajagopalan 2010), art and literature (King 2005; McClure 1995; Roberts 
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2008).  A postsecular society is not necessarily one which has been re-spiritualised or re-
Christianised but rather, ‘[P]ost-secular societies are neither religious nor secular,
 
they do not 
prescribe or privilege a religion, but neither do
 
they actively and intentionally refrain from doing 
so.’ (Dalferth 2010, p.317)  Thus the context is postsecular in that it constitutes a paradigm shift 
of perspective that no longer rests on the assumption of a theory of secularisation.  The religious 
situation in Britain has been transformed by ongoing processes of detraditionalisation and 
pluralisation.  These are evidenced in trends that show movement from secularity to detraditional 
spirituality (believing without belonging), as well as an increasing diversity of religions such as 
the growth of Islam and Pentecostal Christianity (Boeve 2007).  The movement from 
secularisation to detraditionalisation and individualisation is evidenced in the growth of identity 
construction in understanding self, values and life choices.  Pluralisation refers to plurality of 
forms of religion and spiritual expression within religious groups, between religious groups 
resulting from geographic migration and the blurring of boundaries of groups (Jackson 2004).  
These trends combine to form a much more complex picture than that suggested by notions of 
religious decline and secular growth. 
 
Human rights are frequently interpreted as a sign of a secularisation process, expressing shared 
values unconnected or unrelated to religion as suggested by some leading human rights scholars 
(Donnelly 1982; Henkin 1998; Klug 2000). The recognition of a postsecular context requires 
some adjustment of this perspective. 
 
 (iii) Education in the postsecular age: The emergence of a distinctive postsecular discourse 
includes reflections on education.  Some suggest that what is needed is a reversal of what they 
perceive as a secularisation of knowledge and learning.  Schmalzbauer (2007) observes that in the 
American academy, scholarship was seen as having little to do with religion; Athens had little to 
do with Jerusalem: 
 
More recently, mainline Protestant, Catholic, and evangelical scholars have lamented the 
exclusion of religious perspectives from academic discourse.  Though they have taken very 
different positions on the relative merits of secularisation, both the secular and religious accounts 
of higher education concur on one major point: religion has had little to do with scholarship in the 
modern university. (Ibid. p.1) 
 
They suggest that something close to the secularisation of knowledge did occur: 
 
In the language of secularisation theory, the relationship between religion and the making of 
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knowledge was reshaped through the processes of privatisation, differentiation, and 
rationalisation.  Once central to the public discourse of professors, religious faith became a private 
matter best discussed in the spheres of home and church rather than in the classroom.  In a 
structurally-differentiated university organized along disciplinary lines, theology went from being 
the ‘queen of the sciences’ to a marginal field confined to seminaries and departments of religion.  
As scholars embraced a vision of scientific objectivity closed to spiritual values, religion was 
pushed to the margins of academic research. (Ibid.) 
 
The postsecular period is marked by academics rethinking the place of religion on college and 
university campuses, with conversations focused on religious literacy and the contrast between 
religion and spirituality.  Some focused on religion in the light of specific traditions or 
communities of faith, while others focus on concerns such as personal meaning and civic 
engagement (Jacobsen & Hustedt Jacobsen 2008). 
 
Schools are also drawn into this discourse in terms of curriculum provision and exclusions for 
students of particular religious traditions.  Frequently these have been associated with the 
question of religious dress in schools, questions about the nature and place of religious education 
and sometimes aspects of the science curriculum and also critical debates about the place and 
appropriateness of state funded schools of a religious character.  These can touch any aspect of 
school life. Reich observes: 
 
The question of whether Muslim students should be obliged to attend compulsory swimming 
lessons in public primary schools has been widely discussed in both the legal and political arena 
after a decision by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court in 1993 found such an obligation to be 
unconstitutional. (Reich 2009, p.754) 
 
Educational institutions that might have considered themselves secular in such a way that made 
religious dimensions irrelevant may be required to rethink their stance.  Habermas argues that 
both religious and secular mentalities must be open to a complementary learning process if we are 
to balance shared citizenship and cultural difference and also: 
 
[S]ecular citizens in Europe must learn to live, the sooner the better, in a postsecular society and in 
so doing they will be following the example of religious citizens, who have already come to terms 
with the ethical expectations of democratic citizenship.  So far secular citizens have not been 
expected to make a similar effort. (Habermas 2006, p.4) 
 
However he is cautious to note that not all societies show postsecular features: 
 
A ‘postsecular’ society must at some point have been in a ‘secular’ state.  The controversial term 
can therefore only be applied to the affluent societies of Europe or countries such as Canada, 
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Australia and New Zealand, where people’s religious ties have steadily or rather quite dramatically 
lapsed in the post-War period.  These regions have witnessed a spreading awareness that their 
citizens are living in a secularised society.  In terms of sociological indicators, the religious 
behaviour and convictions of the local populations have by no means changed to such an extent as 
to justify labelling these societies ‘postsecular’.  Here, trends towards de-institutionalised and new 
spiritual forms of religiosity have not offset the tangible losses by the major religious 
communities. (Habermas 2008, p.17) 
 
The UK can be included among the affluent societies of Europe. 
 
The conceptualisation of human rights as a secular alternative to religion (Donnelly 1982; Henkin 
1998) raises critical questions in the light of this postsecular thinking.  Can such a 
conceptualisation remain in the light of modern societies in which religion or religions remain 
important features?  This conception may polarise human rights against indigenous situations 
where subtle cultural forms and narratives important to those indigenous self-understandings, 
may contain elements that conflict with aspects of human rights.  It may delegitimise local 
understandings and commitments.  In a post-colonial context such an approach seems 
problematic.  Alternatively if human rights can be conceived as values that may be underpinned 
or supported by religions (Dietrich 2007; Hollenbach 1979, 2002; Mahoney 2008; Perry 1998) 
then this difficulty may be averted. However, some might fear this in turn would undermine the 
rights themselves as Howard and Donnelly suggest (1986). 
 
HRE, if conceived as a secular alternative to religious and moral education, is rendered 
problematic as well.  It may seem discontinuous with educational endeavours which enquire into 
religious and spiritual value forming traditions and narratives, and seek for inter-religious 
understanding and peace.  These enquiries are legitimated only in so far as they accord with 
human rights universals.  They are superseded when they are not in accordance.  It is not clear 
how religious education may be of value in this situation except in a subservient role, as a cultural 
curiosity constrained by approved parameters.  What then of the kinds of learning that take place 
within RE, and the extent to which religions may be valued as sources of knowledge or meaning 
that is significant?  The subject seems to become something of marginal importance. 
Alternatively if rights education is sensitive to religious differences and the value that religions 
bring as sources of understanding and meaning of morals and other principles, then religious 
education may be viewed as critically complementary to HRE, providing what might be a strong 
foundation that is embedded in a narrative that has been lived out through communities.  The 
question of the relationship between HRE and religion, and also religious education, is made 
more complex in a postsecular context. 
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Part Two: Diminishing roles of religion in HRE 
 
Religion is framed as a diminishing force within HRE.  It is variously conceived as a challenge or 
obstacle for HRE, something that must be verified or audited in HRE or something that should be 
replaced with HRE.  These roles diminish religion in distinct ways though they also overlap one 
another. 
 
(i) Religion as a challenge for HRE: Human rights in the late twentieth century came to be seen 
as a secular non-religious expression of values (Gearon 2002; Klug 2000) developed in secular 
government and inter-governmental agencies and reflecting a pragmatic agreement (Nickel 
2007).  Religious differences presented a challenge in the drafting stage of the UDHR (Glendon 
1999).  There were few attempts to justify human rights and their universality, but the 
commission of philosophers and theologians established to prepare the Bill in the 1940s did 
explore the issues.  The representatives from China and the Lebanon initiated a discussion and 
before long the Yugoslav, French and English representatives were arguing over which came 
first, man or society.  India’s representative argued that the key thing was to affirm faith in human 
rights and avoid ideology, but others challenged this stating that whatever was said, all had 
ideological presuppositions.  In the end the Chair, Eleanor Roosevelt, moved matters on though 
the issue returned sporadically.  In these discussions, the attempt to find a common philosophical 
or theological rationale was unsuccessful.  In the light of this experience, religion might have 
begun to appear unhelpful for establishing and maintaining human rights.  There is little mention 
of religion in the early conventions or declarations, nor much awareness of or sensitivity to 
religious differences affecting the application in local situations (Gearon 2003a, 2008). 
 
One of the themes of HRE texts is the characterisation of religion as a problem for rights.  
Mention of religion is commonly found in discussions of human rights problems such as 
conflicts, the tension between group rights and individual rights and the clash of religious morals 
and human rights values (Osler & Starkey 2010, p89, pp.91!93).  Religion is thus viewed as a 
challenge for human rights education, reinforced by the evidence that religion has been an 
opponent or a violator of human rights (Gearon 2002). 
 
An example illustrates this dynamic.  Osler and Starkey, contributors to thinking on citizenship 
and human rights education in the UK, offer some examples of HRE that avoid religious 
connections (Osler & Starkey 2005a).  They describe how a Primary headteacher took a human 
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rights education approach to a multi-denominational primary school in Ireland with reported 
successful outcomes in term of participation, ownership, behaviour and learning about human 
rights (Ibid. p.148).  This school was independent of religious authorities and the moral 
framework adopted by the school was based on human rights with no reference to religious 
traditions.  It was not clear whether religious or philosophical resources were drawn upon to 
inform the moral education framework and inter-religious dialogue does not seem to have been 
part of the project.  The relationship between the philosophical and religious narratives that 
contextualise values important for understandings of human rights is not a priority in this 
perspective, and the implication is that it is an obstacle.  In addition it is unreasonable to 
generalize about the about the place of religion in HRE in the context of plural societies from 
particularised examples of monoreligious or highly sectarian contexts. 
 
Approaches to citizenship in France follow a ‘civic republican’ model around abstract universal 
terms and include human rights education (Kirwan 2005).  These focus on legal conceptions of 
human rights with no reference to ethnicity or religion (Brubaker 1998).  Starkey notes that in 
France, the school’s key role is the socialisation of citizens into a single national culture based on 
the human rights principles (Starkey 2000).  Such an aim is questionable in that it reduces people 
to a single dimension, rooted to a single civilisation, something that fails to adequately 
acknowledge multiplicity or complexity within identity (Sen 2006). 
 
 (ii) Human rights education as the auditor of religion: Osler suggests that human rights offer 
procedural values of tolerance, mutual respect and dialogue and peaceful resolution of 
differences, which provide the framework for handling difference in a multicultural democracy 
(Osler 2005b).  She suggests that this model can be used in schools to develop an approach which 
allows young people to see themselves a part of a total community while respecting and taking 
account of relevant differences to ensure genuine equality.  Here human rights are advanced as an 
auditor of different moral codes, but it is not clear what happens when a cultural or religious 
moral code fails against a particular interpretation of the human rights standard.  A particular 
reason for this concern is that divisive nationalistic ideas can be reinforced in religion classes: 
 
Europe's regional human rights agency, the Council of Europe, is working on developing a ‘culture 
of religion’ subject that takes an ‘ethics’ and ‘human rights’ based approach to religious teaching, in 
order to provide an alternative to governments that currently offer required religion classes that can 
be a source of division and ethnic nationalism, as in Serbia-Montenegro … HRE has been linked 
with local and national efforts to fight racism, xenophobia, anti-semitism and the extreme right. 
(Tibbits 2006, p.2)  
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There may be moral codes which are incompatible with human rights, as Freeman suggests 
(2005).  If such a code is based on a profoundly held religious belief it is unlikely to be set aside 
easily, even through a democratic discussion process, assuming such could be fairly established 
and operated in schools.  Underpinning this approach is a commitment to the western idea of 
liberal democracy (Donnelly 1982) so this approach cannot itself be free of claims of 
imperialism.  Nevertheless, seeing HRE as providing the process to engage with the discussion 
and sharing of different values and traditions has some merit as it draws attention to the 
educational processes on which any HRE programme is dependent.  Indeed dialogue has been 
central to religious traditions for thousands of years and is important to education (Stern 2007, 
p.63). 
 
A related challenge presents itself to NGOs working in non-western countries in informal HRE 
programmes.  Here the risk is that a sense of superiority might disregard local culture, ironic 
given that modern human rights were borne out of opposition to Nazi imperialism and its ruthless 
treatment of cultures it considered dispensable (Freeman 2005).  Transformative education 
theories have been accused of imposing external cultural expectations (Bowers & Apffel-Margin 
2005) and the dangers of exploitation in the globalised world are well identified (Castells 1998).  
Appiah proposes a cosmopolitan solution to this.  He argues that cosmopolitanism is humanist.  It 
thinks that no human is alien but resists a form of universalising humanism, such as Victorian 
mission Christianity, which manifested love of others by attempting to impose their own 
purportedly superior ways (Appiah 2005, 2006).  He thinks there is a simple choice.  We can 
either follow a kind of universalism which is sensitive to the ways in which historical context 
shapes the significance of a practice, or an anti-universalism that protects difference by taking 
each community into a moral world of its own.  What this sensitivity means or entails is not clear. 
 
(iii) HRE in place of religion: Religion can be portrayed as a profoundly negative force, deeply 
opposed to human rights. Extremist examples have been used to justify an argument that religion 
is inappropriate in any moral education venture (Davies 2008).  Using human rights as a basis for 
moral education encourages a sense that the UDHR reflects normative and universal cross 
cultural moral truths.  It implies that human rights exist in an objective sense not unlike Plato’s 
Forms (1997).  Their professed universality and inviolability give human rights the status of 
absolute ultimate values.  HRE therefore can be conceived as a substitute for a form of moral 
education previously defined by divine revelation, but where political agreement replaces divine 
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authority.  The democratic nature of human rights (democratic insofar as they were agreed at an 
inter-governmental level and reflect the will of the governments of the world) lends them a 
pragmatic weighting, but they could equally be a pragmatic necessity.  The passion with which 
human rights can be held, especially by rights activists, can make it almost taboo to question their 
existence.  At a Human Rights Education International conference at Roehampton University in 
June 2005, Dr Linda King, Chief Section of Education for Peace and Human Rights at UNESCO 
(Paris) felt obliged to begin her presentation with the claim ‘I believe in human rights’ after a 
critical philosophical treatment from Professor Terence McLaughlin, which had explored a more 
cautious attitude towards them based on Richard Rorty’s view that they are sentimental in nature, 
rather than rationally justified moral norms (1993).  HRE could be seen as education in absolutes, 
perhaps not unlike the teaching of faith and morals in some Christian traditions.  It follows that if 
human rights are adopted to be taught and followed, they may in the minds of teachers and pupils 
take on the kind of authority previously afforded to religious maxims. 
 
The historic nature of the agreement of the UDHR becomes a portentous moment, a revelation to 
a war torn world.  People who see human suffering may be powerfully motivated by what they 
see to become involved in campaigning for the oppressed, working to alleviate their suffering.  In 
feeling compassion for these victims, the desire to bring about change may alter their perspective 
of human rights such that these become visible manifestations of their passionate desire for 
justice.  This is the kind of sentimentally based concern for the human condition that Rorty points 
to.  However, human rights may become believed in, in the sense that a conscience, intuition or 
feeling may tell you an injustice is occurring.  Felt in these terms, human rights take on a 
metaphysical quality, masking philosophical or educational shortcomings or other theoretical 
problems (Davies et al. 2005). 
 
In placing human rights at the centre of the belief system, their philosophical integrity becomes a 
critical test to their validity.  Put another way, if human rights are attempts at expressing other 
beliefs in certain values or theologies, such as dignity or equality, then their imperfection or need 
for refinement is no obstacle to their justification for they are notions that point to the values, 
rather than the values themselves.  If they are offered as the only, and final way forward, as some 
human rights educationalists suggest (Osler & Starkey 2005a, 2010) then their philosophical 
rigour matters more so.  In philosophy, the position of human rights is more tenuous than the 
legal structures and political declarations suggest.  The importance of international political 
agreements and institutions give human rights an aura of foundational value, an underpinning of 
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the global morality which they profess to express.  On closer inspection the international 
documents refer to dignity and other values as foundation concepts, rather than claiming rights 
are themselves the foundational ideas. 
 
 
Part Three: Critical issues for a human rights centred education 
 
In different ways, HRE places ideological legitimacy for the moral education programme on the 
integrity of human rights alone, with no dependent or associated reference to one or more 
philosophical or theological traditions.  The integrity of the moral education espoused rests on the 
ability for rights to stand on their own.  In this approach it is implied that we no longer need to 
discuss which values we should adopt to underpin our moral education, or what these are.  We 
have agreed on them and they are found in human rights agreements.  Now we need to get on 
with the job of moral education.  However, there are a series of critical issues regarding the 
integrity of human rights as ideas which stand independently of any ideology, theology or 
philosophy.  There are philosophical challenges to their existence and there are philosophical 
traditions which link them to theological or metaphysical ideas.  There are other important moral 
ideas not covered by human rights. They exclude reflection on the nature of the person and 
human development, and finally, they lead to a narrow legislative form of moral education that 
may be ineffective and theoretically problematic. 
 
(i) Rights do not exist: In philosophical circles, critics fundamentally reject their existence.  
MacIntyre argues that rights presuppose, ‘the existence of a socially established set of rules.  
Such a set of rules only comes into existence at particular historical periods under particular 
social circumstances.  They are in no way universal features of the human condition.’ (1981, 
p.65) 
 
Rights have a specific and local character based on the behaviour that is expected by 
communities.  MacIntyre goes on to argue that the notion of human rights found in the 
contemporary era is quite unlike anything in ancient periods.  As a concept it is dislocated from 
the major philosophical and theological narratives of society. 
 
It would of course be a little odd that there should be such rights attaching to human beings simply 
qua human beings in light of the fact, which I alluded to in my discussion of Gewirth's argument, 
that there is no expression in any ancient or medieval language correctly translated by our 
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expression 'a right' until near the close of the middle ages: The concept lacks any means of 
expression in Hebrew, Greek, Latin or Arabic, classical or medieval, before 1400, let alone in Old 
English, or in Japanese even as late as the mid-nineteenth century.  From this it does not of course 
follow that there are no natural or human rights; it only follows that one could not have known 
that there were.  And this at least raises certain questions.  But we do not need to be distracted into 
answering them for the truth is plain: There are no such things as rights, and belief in them is one 
with belief in witches and in unicorns. (Ibid. p.67) 
 
MacIntyre is suspicious of moral ideas that are not rooted in human history.  He dismisses all 
accounts of rights because there are no self-evident moral truths in general.  This is a rejection of 
the naturalism of thinkers such as Bradley who sought to locate moral truth in the material world 
(Bradley 1952) and a rejection of claims that ethics can be intuitively known (Moore 1966).  
Contemporary arguments for human rights depend upon claims that they are intuitively known 
but such claims are not to be relied upon: 
 
The best reason for asserting so bluntly that there are no such things as rights is indeed of 
precisely the same type as the best reason which we possess for asserting that there are no witches 
and . . . unicorns: Every attempt to give good reasons for believing that there are such rights has 
failed.  The eighteenth-century philosophical defenders of natural rights sometimes suggest that 
the assertions which state that men possess them are self-evident truths; but we know there are no 
self-evident truths.  Twentieth-century moral philosophers have sometimes appealed to their and 
our intuitions; but one of the things that we ought to have learned from the history of moral 
philosophy is that the introduction of the word 'intuition' by a moral philosopher is always a signal 
that something has gone badly wrong with an argument. (MacIntyre 1981, p.67) 
 
The implication of MacIntyre’s critique, if correct, is that HRE would be basing itself on a 
philosophically doubtful or even unjustifiable belief.  MacIntyre (2009) has recently 
acknowledged the challenges involved in combining personal belief commitments with a 
philosophical enterprise and these insights seem to point towards the complex relationship of 
beliefs and rights.   
 
(ii) Rights have a natural basis: There are those who argue that rights can have a natural basis.  
Finnis is a strong advocate of this (Finnis 1980).  Others are less ambitious in their attempts to 
prove natural rights exist but still think they are a component of human rights (Hart 1955; Steiner 
1974, 1977).  Natural law remains a prominent ethical theory in Catholic moral theology but 
natural rights are not popular among political philosophers.   
 
This philosophical uncertainty is replaced with pragmatic acceptance.  Human rights come to be 
accepted without the need of a firm foundation.  MacDonald argues that there are reasons for this 
because all values fall into this non-rational and uncertain condition: 
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There are no certainties in the field of values.  For there are no true or false beliefs about values, 
but only better or worse decisions and choices.  And to encourage the better decision we need to 
employ devices which are artistic rather than scientific.  For our aim is not intellectual assent, but 
practical effects…. [V]alues, I think, concern only behaviour.  They are not known, but accepted 
and acted upon. (Macdonald 1982, p.40)  
 
Rights need to be believed in or held to, but that belief or holding is not something with a solid 
rational foundation. 
 
People no longer believe in "ultimate" foundations; they no longer dream of essences.  If what 
remains instead is the inability or impotence to act, then there has been an unequivocal loss: Only 
philosophers in their classrooms can afford the luxury of not taking practical decisions; not so the 
man in the street, the politician, the head of state. (Pera 2006, p.19) 
 
In this case HRE might rightly be called a form of ‘secular’ metaphysical moral education, driven 
by pragmatic need.  Rights are not true but simply useful or effective.  Whether this kind of 
pragmatic belief is resilient enough for the demands of moral decision-making, especially when 
presented with unpalatable options, is unclear.  The lack of convictions runs counter to what is 
observed amongst human rights activists. Those who campaign passionately for human rights and 
against the violations of those rights seem motivated by a more powerful and fundamental 
conviction than a pragmatic belief in effectiveness.  The belief is sustained by a profound sense of 
justice or righteousness, moral outrage or human compassion in the face of human suffering; in 
short a meaning-giving narrative or framework that is philosophical, ideological, religious, 
spiritual or metaphysical in origin.  
 
Richard Rorty, responding to the difficulty in establishing a solid foundation for human rights, 
argued that the search for this foundation be put aside: 
 
It would be more efficient to do so, because it would let us concentrate our energies on 
manipulating sentiments, on sentimental education.  That sort of education sufficiently acquaints 
people of different kinds with one another so that they are less tempted to think of those different 
from themselves as only quasi-human.  The goal of this manipulation of sentiment is to expand the 
reference of the term ‘our kind of people’ and ‘people like us.’ (Rorty 1993, pp.122!3) 
 
For Rorty a key focus of moral philosophy should be the person who is morally impeccable in 
many ways, but largely indifferent to the suffering of those he or she considers sub-human, those 
not recognized as beings ‘like us’.  Rorty’s position seems to reflect the position (consciously 
adopted or otherwise) within human rights education and the human rights movement as a whole.  
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Yet in appealing to a sense of the universal human, Rorty assumes a unity of humanity that is in 
effect a foundation. 
 
Whether Rorty or Finnis is correct, each in different ways questions the legitimacy of human 
rights as a sole basis for moral education.  Theories of natural rights point elsewhere to the 
foundation, human nature, which requires theological or philosophical explanation.  Rorty’s 
decision to put aside the quest for a foundation and accept they are soft ideas for manipulating 
sentiment weakens the idea that human rights can firmly stand on their own. 
 
(iii) Rights are not the only important moral ideas: The philosophical question of the existence of 
human rights is an important one for HRE, but the broad scope of HRE is not about rights alone.  
It includes peace education, education for democratic participation, education for sustainability 
and the promotion of tolerance, understanding and friendship between people of different 
religions and races.  These other areas are not inextricably linked with human rights and could be 
linked to other notions of shared values, such as the idea of dignity that the drafters of the UDHR 
included for this purpose.  Human rights do not exhaust the spectrum of moral debate and other 
moral ideas offer insights.  To make human rights the central aspect or foundation for moral 
education is contentious.  Kennedy has observed: 
 
[T]here may be something to the claim that human rights has so dominated the imaginative space 
of emancipation that alternatives can now only be thought, perhaps unhelpfully, as negations of 
what human rights asserts—passion to its reason, local to its global, etc. (Kennedy 2001, p.108)  
 
If HRE is the underpinning philosophy of education, then presumably human rights are the 
foundational framework that supersede and devalue other moral ingredients.  But Raz argues, ‘if 
morality has a foundation then it must surely also include duties, goals and virtues, etc.’ (Raz 
1986, p.193). 
 
Education in rights is education in the rights of others as well as the self, and therefore must 
incorporate recognition of the rights of others and a duty to uphold them.  Duties and 
responsibilities were identified in the UDHR in Articles 29 and 30: 
 
(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his 
personality is possible. 
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as 
are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights 
 43 
and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the 
general welfare in a democratic society. 
(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles 
of the United Nations. (UN General Assembly 1948, Article 29) 
 
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any 
right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights 
and freedoms set forth herein. (Ibid. Article 30) 
 
The inalienability professed in the Preamble to the UDHR is tempered by the logical necessity to 
recognize that rights confer some social obligations.  They must be held in balance.  This raises 
philosophical questions related to rights and their correlative duties, which become more evident 
when an analysis of rights reveals some are privileges, some claims, some powers and some 
immunities (Hohfeld 1964).  A right for one to be able to do a thing and a right to be protected 
from having a thing done against one will have differing kinds of correlative expectation.  This 
raises a degree of complexity about rights and a number of unreconciled debates (Jones 1995; 
Perry 1977; Sumner 1987).  Despite the existence of responsibilities and duties within rights 
discourses, human rights are criticised for encouraging an individualist outlook on moral conduct 
and failing to capture adequately the fundamental dimension of human responsibility for the other 
person.  Such views are frequently found among conservative religious sources (reported in 
Gearon 2002).  HRE has, therefore, a difficult challenge in somehow addressing both the 
freedoms and duties present in a rights system.  In addition, HRE may find it necessary to 
question rights, to place them under scrutiny, perhaps in the hope of improving them or covering 
new situations not thought of before.  Article 30 could be interpreted as suggesting this is 
prohibited, which is surely not the case. 
 
Rights themselves are not the only ideas to contend with in human rights ethics, and not 
necessarily the best ones.  They represent a minimal perspective for moral education, which needs 
to be supplemented (Fitzpatrick 2007).  Human rights are minimum standards, not maximal aims.  
Moral education should seek to develop the good person, or the person capable of making right 
decisions by some measure.  Osler and Starkey have recently suggested that human rights 
education represents a minimal approach to citizenship.  They suggest citizenship has more 
‘appropriately ambitious’ maximal aims for education, with a focus on democratic participation 
(Osler & Starkey 2005, p.87). . The argument they make is that HRE may advance some of the 
way but is not a suitable tool for moral education alone; it must be complemented.  This may be 
the case but current UN expressions of HRE include references to democratic participation. 
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This criticism can be leveled at narrow ideas of HRE, perhaps of what Tibbitts calls the Values 
and Awareness model or the Accountability models which are concerned principally with 
knowledge of rights and their application in academic or professional settings (Tibbitts 2002).  
Here the focus is ensuring the service provided does not disregard a person’s rights.  This 
approach is minimal and fails to fully capture what might be meant by the full development of the 
human personality and its dignity, a phrase found in Article 26 paragraph 2 of the UDHR.  Nor 
does it satisfy transformative models of HRE, which interpret this phrase most liberally to mean 
nothing short of a personal liberation of the imagination that in turn drives societal change.  This 
problem arises once HRE has been subsumed in some maximal project, such as citizenship 
education which Osler and Starkey are now doing, rather than interrelated with that kind of 
education at a deeper level.  This points to the blurred edges of HRE itself. 
 
If there are other important moral concepts that are necessary in the development of human 
beings, then how do they relate to human rights?  If human rights have their own legitimacy 
independent of these other threads then such threads cannot be significant for HRE, and yet such 
an account seems unlikely. 
 
(iv) The object of human rights and human development: Human rights thinking is orientated 
around an anthropocentric mode of ethics.  The subject of morality is the human person in human 
rights thinking.  If rights are advocated as the principal or exclusive mode of moral thinking, then 
the subject of rights is a critical element in the equation.  While the most recent definitions of 
HRE include sustainable development in their definition, in practice HRE does not lend itself 
easily to environmental ethics.  All rights are linked to human beings or groups of humans, and 
exclude natural objects though attempts have been made to address this (Stone 1972).  The 
increasing recognition of the danger of anthropocentric-thinking can be linked to fears about 
environmental destruction.  However the threats of climate change and global warming are 
related to future generations and moral obligations to those groups.  It is possible to develop a 
rights based perspective on the environment, though it remains only of instrumental value to 
human beings (Feinberg 1974) rather than a perspective which offers intrinsic value to the 
environment.  Regarding future generations, Feinberg articulates the issue.  Can we be bound by 
rights claims of future generations?  These are potential people who may or may not ever exist.  
We cannot be sure they will ever be actual, in the way a foetus does exist.  Rights that transfer 
generationally are difficult to respond to and there are many arguments against them (Partridge 
1990), but HRE seems in practice to be exclusively concerned with human beings in the here and 
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now.  On the other hand, it could be that by cultivating certain virtues in how we treat animals 
and the environment we may also transfer those virtues to other people.  Animal rights education 
may unconsciously support human rights education.  Concern for the environment may lead to 
concern for the other person. 
 
Yet human rights is a critical issue, not just in terms of future generations and the environmental 
issues, but also in terms of abortion, where philosophical and theological debates over rights 
remain highly polarised.  In a rights framework the question of whether the foetus or embryo is a 
person or not has to be addressed before the nature of the rights conflict can be answered.  
However, there is nothing in human rights to answer the question of whether a foetus is a human 
person.  Other reference points and factors need to be reflected upon before the question of rights 
can be settled.  Human rights thinking does not seem to be able to address the question of what is 
meant by the word human.  Something more is needed to clarify this (for example see Quinn 
2007) especially as a historical problem with human rights in general is the way in which certain 
groups (notably women, slaves and people who followed a religion deemed heretical) were 
excluded from the designated subject of rights (Baxi 2003). 
 
Linked to the question of the subject of human rights, is the question of the nature of human 
development.  Education is about human development of some kind or another.  If education is to 
be based around human rights so human rights must be viewed in terms of how adequately they 
account for human flourishing.  Definitions of human rights education specifically refer to the full 
development of the human person or human personality.  However, to provide an account of this 
‘full development’ there has been a tendency to move away from rights towards other ideas.  This 
is most evident in conceptions of human development.  Thinking about human development has 
replaced rights in this regard, preferring other notions such as human capabilities.  Human 
capabilities is a more suitable idea than rights as it more adequately addresses the range of ways 
in which human development may take place (Nussbaum 1999; Sen 1999).  These ways are not 
articulated in the language of rights which tend to suggest rules and powers, rather than what it 
means to be a fully developed person.  Capabilities are more helpful as they help address the 
question of how people may flourish.  It is not necessary here to examine in detail the account 
offered by the human capabilities approach, nor the extensive literature surrounding it, but simply 
to identify that human rights have not themselves provided a strong account of human 
development, which must question their suitability as ideas to form the basis of education as a 
whole.  They have a role to play in terms of accountability but an account of education must be 
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more attentive to the full development of the human person.  HRE needs ideas other than rights to 
provide this. 
 
To what extent can an approach to teaching human rights take a critical perspective of human 
rights themselves?  While human rights are articulated in laws and agreements, they have 
changed over time.  They are in a state of development and may in future identify areas of 
suffering that require new or refined rights.  There are objections to human rights, some of which 
are noted above.  As such they are not absolute truths and should be open to critique.  Can HRE 
be both self-critical and a source of personal empowerment and transformation?  The phrase 
‘critical’ is used by educationalists writing about HRE – for instance Tibbitts suggests that 
students need to be made ‘critical consumers’ of human rights so that they may establish a 
‘critical human rights consciousness’.  However this is principally concerned with critically 
evaluating the situation, identifying a human rights dimension in what is perceived and then 
making a judgment about what to do.  It does not include ethical criticality of human rights 
themselves (Tibbitts 2002, p.164).  In their volume The Critical Pedagogy Reader (2003), 
Darder, Baltodano and Torres note the criticisms made against critical pedagogy, including those 
that suggest it is ethnocentric and reductionistic for failing to recognize particular groupings 
including subordinate cultures and women.  Historically, human rights have sometimes failed to 
recognize suffering, or have been written in such a way as to exclude groups (Baxi 2003).   
Human rights declarations have had to change over time to recognize particular groups and 
specific rights initiatives (See Gearon 2003b, pp.115ff.).  The moral scope of human rights has 
been enlarged to apply to all human beings and then specific groups who have specific 
vulnerabilities.  This suggests an ongoing need for HRE to be self-aware and self-critical, so that 
newly identified groups who suffer may be included. 
 
(v) Legalistic approaches to human rights and effective pedagogy:  Treating human rights as 
uncontested absolutes has implications for pedagogy as it may lead to a legalistic form of HRE.  
HRE has legalistic forms which are prominent in law schools (Rowe 1992) and some national 
curricula as Chapter Two demonstrates.  This approach is also common in the Values and 
Awareness model of HRE which advocates human rights as common shared values, and also the 
Accountability model prominent in professional training where specific rights regimes need to be 
understood so that the practice of professional responsibility in acknowledgment of these rights 
can be undertaken (Tibbitts 2002).  This is not surprising as the challenge of negotiating rights 
conflicts when dealing with difficult moral decisions welcomes the precision and sophistication 
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of a legalistic approach.  Legalistic forms of HRE are focused on human rights monitoring 
procedures, court cases, codes of ethics and the weighing and balancing of different principles.  
The audience of this form consists of lawyers, human rights advocates and monitors and 
professional groups, especially those working with vulnerable groups.  Civil servants, medical 
professionals and journalists are also a key audience.  While personal change is not an explicit 
goal, the establishing of professional responsibility is a key aim with a view that this can bring 
about social change.  Learners are directly or indirectly associated with the guarantee of human 
rights through their professional roles: ‘For other professional groups, educational programs 
sensitize them about the nature of human rights violations and potentials within their professional 
role, not only to prevent abuses but to promote respect for human dignity.’ (Ibid. p.165)  This is 
illustrated in Andreopoulos’ discussion of the work of a Human Dignity and Policing course at 
the John Jay College of Criminal Justice of the City University of New York which attempts to, 
‘imbue police practice with a heightened understanding of human dignity’ as an innate quality 
possessed by all human beings (Andreopoulos 2002).  HRE can be conceived as a legalistic form 
of moral education. 
 
However, concerns regarding appropriate methodologies for human rights education were raised 
in a report on the Decade of Human Rights (OHCHR 2004) where such legalistic approaches 
were found also in schools: 
 
This is also stressed in relation to the school system, since in some countries formal education is 
traditionally knowledge based, and this approach alone is not conducive to attitudinal changes which 
are the objective of human rights education efforts.  Accordingly, some governments highlighted the 
need for research on educational methodologies as well as evaluation tools and impact assessment. 
(OHCHR 2004, para.25) 
 
A critical issue was identified in what was called a ‘lamentable lack of synergy between jurists 
and pedagogists, as well as the lack of coordination between Governments and NGOs’ (Ibid. 
para.26).  Tensions arose from combining a legalistic approach to the moral authority of human 
rights with a transformative and democratic pedagogy.  A rights based curriculum that empowers 
and frees does not sit easily with a legalistic pedagogical approach focused on individual and 
state behaviour constraints.  A legalistic approach tends towards a conception of learning that 
sees knowledge in propositional terms, and something to be transferred to the learner who 
remains static in this process.  This reflects the universalist declaratory drive in HRE and 
didactive moral education.  It contrasts with contextual understandings in which recognition of 
difference is important, and with transformative conceptions of education. 
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Arguably, legalistic understandings of moral behaviour do not empower those suffering 
oppression.  Bauman suggests that treating morality as a form of legal code undermines the 
capacity by which a person may learn to take responsibility for his or her own moral decision 
making (Bauman 1993, 1994, 1995).  It places responsibility in an expert field occupied by the 
legalists who must be turned to for advice.  This discourages the development of decision 
capability for the moment when moral dilemmas are actually faced.  Moral decisions frequently 
need to be made when there is no external authority present who can unpick the complexities of 
the situation.  Legalistic approaches might actually undermine human capacity to act morally by 
encouraging the sense that to be moral requires a sophisticated and rational understanding of the 
rights regimes.  Bauman draws heavily from Levinas in his thinking on moral responsibility, 
including the notion that moral responses are pre-rational.  This also challenges the kind of moral 
education produced by a legalistic approach that focuses on a rational understanding of the 
technicalities of rights.  It also raises questions about the kind of education involved.  Sharon 
Sliwinski has developed these thoughts with Hannah Arendt’s notion of ‘thinking without a 
banister’ (Sliwinski 2005).  Sliwinski argues that human rights education should attend to ethical 
responsibility that occurs apart from the rational aims of knowledge, rather than seeking to be an 
instrumentalised moralised method for securing the future.  Human rights judgements tend to be 
made from a position the person does not occupy at the moment of moral decision.  We might 
think we are providing the learner with moral stabilisers, but such stabilisers undermine the 
capacity to respond morally.  Knowledge of rights does not equate to the will power, character or 
virtues needed to act on them.  It does not provide a guide as to how to apply rights to new 
contexts and it presumes a vantage point on the situation that the actor does not hold (for instance 
when dealing with a rights issue where there are conflicts of rights which may not be easily 
discernable in the moment requiring action).  Sliwinski’s proposal overturns a fundamental 
element of HRE, the claim that it will bring about a human rights culture. 
 
Legalistic approaches to HRE are not necessarily going to lead to any of the transformative 
effects central to HRE.  Knowledge of rights in itself need not inform behaviour to others or 
enhance the appreciation of a person’s own situation.  Rights presented in terms of the domestic 
and legal documents fail to capture the context which the individual is living in and therefore may 
not correctly identify the aspects of life that need change.  Legalistic approaches also tend to 
enhance the status of the institutions, the structures, judiciary and national law makers, to a high 
level of importance in the delivery and maintenance of rights.  For Douzinas, this is the result of a 
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utopian hope to create a society where no one is despised or degraded, but this has allowed 
governments to usurp this hope and submerge it in treaties and conventions which dismember and 
reassemble people in synthetic entities-carriers of rights (Douzinas 2000a).  Human rights exist to 
protect individuals from the state, but there is a danger, especially in state controlled curricula, 
that HRE will in fact curtail that protection by distortions of human rights in the hands of national 
governments. 
 
Societal transformation involves individual change.  HRE suggests that individual moral 
education is necessary to realize the social and global human rights project. Laski, writing at the 
time of the UDHR observed, ‘Nor can human rights be made effective in the absence of an 
educational system which makes possible the full use by the citizen of his instructed judgment.’ 
(Laski in UNESCO 1948, para. 18, 77)  Laski sees HRE as having an instrumental and 
prescriptive influence on pupils’ sense of citizenship and moral judgement.  He believes it confers 
a moral compass.  HRE is not simply focused on acquiring knowledge of human rights, but an 
active embracing of rights as a framework of values.  This approach to HRE is common in recent 
efforts to develop school programmes (UNHCR 2005; UNICEF 2008).  Curricula models of HRE 
in formal schooling and public campaigns are commonly conceived in a values and human rights 
awareness model, also known as a philosophical-historical approach (Tibbitts 2002).  It looks at 
the history of human rights documents and instruments and global human rights issues.  It is 
focused on children and the general public and seeks to establish a cultural consensus over values 
and legitimises human rights frameworks to inform those values but Tibbitts argues that personal 
transformation is not assured or likely with this kind of pedagogical approach. 
 
If HRE is to rest authority exclusively on human rights, treating them as unquestionable 
absolutes, this will tend towards an authoritarian and legalistic approach to moral education 
which is at variance with the vision of human rights as a liberating force.  To pursue it, 
philosophical objections must be set aside and that is questionable for an educational project.  A 
stronger case would have to be made for the effectiveness of such an approach, and such a case is 
not yet evident.  There are dynamics within HRE that suggest a rather different role for religion 
than those outlined in Part One.  These dynamics address some of these criticisms. 
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Part Four: Enduring roles for religion in HRE 
 
HRE literature contains a different set of dynamic relationships that give significant roles to 
religion.  Here religion is variously described as the grounding or basis for HRE, as an important 
element recognized within HRE and as something interconnected with HRE in distinct ways.  
These dynamics overlap one another. 
 
(i) Human rights education grounded in religion: The early rights movements, that produced 
declarations and bills of human rights prior to the twentieth century, did not refer to education.  
At the time of the drafting of the UDHR this almost complete absence was noted.  Education was 
not seen as an instrument for promoting rights despite being one condition essential to their 
realization and proper use (Kandel 1948, p.231).  Kandel, writing in June 1947, observes that it 
might be that education was taken for granted as a human right and essential for human rights, but 
he doubts it.  The rights of man declarations of the past had expressed the presence of ‘theoretical 
equality’ while covering an ‘actual inequality.’  In more recent times, Baxi (2003) sees this 
distinction as a feature of the modern rights period (pre-twentieth century) in which significant 
groups were excluded from being the subject of rights and their suffering largely disregarded by 
governments and nation states (Ibid.).  The omission of education from declarations of human 
rights represents a political and inter-governmental failure, or unwillingness to consider seriously 
the implementation of these declarations prior to the UDHR.  However it would be a mistake to 
see HRE as an entirely twentieth century phenomena.  Earlier educational movements grounded 
in religion share traits with HRE. 
 
In the 1960s there was a trend of looking back to earlier movements and sources as predecessors 
of the human rights and human rights education movement.  In 1969 UNESCO published a 
collection of diverse theological and philosophical sources edited by Hersch (UNESCO 1969).  In 
gathering the sources together the collection formed an anthology drawn from many meaning-
giving narratives.  It gave credence to the possibility that the foundational values of human rights, 
and dignity in particular, were spread widely and not found in a single ideological basis.  In 
frequently identifying sacred texts it also alluded to religion as providing some basis for human 
rights.  Scanlon’s documentary history (1965) pointed to pre-modern international education 
movements.  His work contains texts from the seventeenth to the twentieth century up until the 
formation of UNESCO.  The documents from the pre-war era reflect attempts to develop ideas 
and institutions that later came to be a part of the contemporary concept of HRE.  Prominent in 
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Scanlon’s collection and noted also by Buergenthal and Torney-Purta (1982) in their history of 
international education, is the work of a seventeenth century churchman, John Amos Comenius 
(1592!1670) who proposed an international Pansorpic College for furthering peace!A College of 
Light.  His works were republished by UNESCO in 1957 and again in extract form in 1965 
(Comenius 1965, p.33).  John Amos Comenius proposed a school system promoting justice and 
peace for all.  He was a Christian leader, a Bishop in the Moravian Church.  His conception of 
this international education was Christian in origin and linked to the idea of building God’s 
Kingdom on Earth; a duty of a follower of Christ.  He wrote that through the College of Light 
‘will come the fulfillment of so many prayers and supplications addressed to God the Father by 
the whole church for so many ages: “Thy kingdom come, thy will be done, in earth as it is in 
Heaven.”’ (Ibid. p.52)  At the same time he expressed a clear concern that there was a project of 
mutual tolerance, ‘for everyone to allow all other men to express their own views openly and 
enjoy in peace what is theirs by right.’ (Comenius quoted in UNESCO 1969, p.250)  He was 
particularly concerned about the impact of differences of opinion leading to hatred and 
oppression.  This leads to division in the human race: ‘But now, when man is divorced from man, 
when man is incapable of tolerating his neighbour, when one man is raving against another, what 
we are witnessing is the veritable downfall of humanity.’ (Ibid.)  He envisaged the collaborative 
endeavour for inhumanity to make way for humanity as an educational enterprise to discover, 
‘what is best, and to that end to bring into agreement their sentiments, their aspirations and their 
actions.  This we shall call conciliation.’ (Ibid.)  He envisaged an educational and intercultural 
project through which alignment could be established between different groups on that which is 
best.  While he does not speak of dignity, he expresses concern for the well-being of humanity, 
peace and conciliation.  Comenius was a visionary who believed that education could be used to 
change cultural and moral attitudes.  Themes he identified were later to be re-articulated as HRE.  
Comenius envisaged the educational imperative for intercultural discussion in the common search 
for establishing how human beings should treat one another.  He seems to have been struck by the 
destruction brought about by division, and the humiliation and inhumanity of human beings. 
 
The College of Light aimed to educate the children of Europe to live peaceably together, ‘each in 
his own sphere should promote the well-being of the human race as best he can.’ (Ibid.)  The 
concern for human dignity is implicit, though the phrase used is well-being.  Comenius saw a 
value in intercultural dialogue with those who are different.  Religion was a more dominating 
force in European politics at that time and it would have been surprising if it had not been cited in 
the rationale underpinning education, but Comenius stands out for his attitude towards tolerance 
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and understanding, attitudes inspired by his faith.  Religion might have been thought of as an 
obstacle to such an endeavour at this time in Europe, but Comenius saw it differently.  His 
educational vision frames religion as a source.  There is no evidence of organisations for 
international education actually being established in the pre-modern era so this is a vision never 
realized. 
 
In later times with the rise of the Enlightenment movement, less explicitly theological expressions 
of international education can be found, though they revealed a sense of the importance of 
diversity.  In post-Napoleonic times a number of Europeans were engaged in peace education, 
including Marc Antoine Jullien, Hermann Molkenboer and the Hungarian Francis Kemeny 
(Heater 2004, p.244).  Kemeny expressed ideas about the presence and complementarity of 
internationalism and nationalism in all cultures.  Kemeny’s educational vision was developed.  It 
included institutions and strategies to bring about his ideas in terms of supporting and developing 
teachers, international agreements about education and statements about the rights of man.  
Kemeny advocated textbooks to eliminate hatred and racism.  Ahead of his time, he identified 
key themes that came to exist in the modern human rights education era: inter-governmental 
organisations, idealistic common statements, training and development for practitioners and 
resources that expressed the values of the ideals. 
 
There are examples of educational movements with echoes of the later HRE movement in 
operation by the turn of the twentieth century.  School Peace Leagues were founded and these 
stressed the peace and harmony and duties owed to humanity.  The aim of the British School 
Peace League was: 
 
To promote through the schools, international peace, arbitration, and friendship; to study, in 
meetings and conferences, the problems of racial relationships and the best means of eliminating 
prejudice; to study the history of the international peace movement; to promote, through lessons in 
civics, the development of a rational and humane national life and patriotism, and a sense of the 
corresponding duties to humanity. (Scanlon 1965, pp.7!8) 
 
The ethics of this movement stressed responsibilities rather than rights, but these responsibilities 
were international and intercultural, rather than national and tribal.  This was conceived as a civic 
duty prior to the formation of the UN. 
 
Though there were peace education initiatives after the first world war (Scanlon 1965), HRE can 
properly be said to have been created in the UDHR (Kendal in UNESCO 1948, p.232).  The 
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vision found in the international education movement was associated with human rights in the 
UDHR. 
 
It is with the formation of the United Nations, UNESCO and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights at the end of World War Two that Human Rights Education as a phrase is coined.  
Rights gained an educational dimension.  The formation of the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in 1945 is a key step in the inauguration of the 
modern HRE period.  It marked the culmination of years of work by preceding international 
organisations and pioneers in international education and was and remains a key driving 
organisation for HRE (Scanlon 1965).  In origin it was dedicated to an open educational agenda 
for mutual understanding and to prepare children for the responsibilities of freedom (OHCHR 
1999).  It encouraged open access to knowledge for the good of living with liberty and declared 
that education is indispensable for dignity, ‘Education of humanity for justice and liberty and 
peace are indispensable to the dignity of man and constitute a sacred duty which all the nations 
must fulfill’ (UNESCO 1945) for, ‘wars begin in the minds of men, and it is in the minds of men 
that the defences of peace must be constructed’ (OHCHR 1999).  Education was determined to be 
a key tool in the project to avoid further humiliation and the denigration of human beings.  
Education has an instrumental purpose for establishing a world in which the freedom and peace 
essential for human dignity is to be maintained.  The responsibility for member states to provide 
education is a grave one!a sacred duty.  It is of the utmost importance to the very dignity of man.  
The provision of education is a necessity for human beings to live in peace.  These aims use 
language that is religious: sacred, dignity, though particular religions and theologies themselves 
were not referred to at this point.  It is difficult to know what is meant by this religious language.  
It conjures a sense of a duty to the divine, though in this context no divinity is named in contrast 
to the explicit Christian context of Comenius.  
 
The references to religious texts and religiously motivated movements in the past went further 
than the international agreements themselves but pointed to an association that people made when 
they read the words within those documents.  It is unlikely that those of a religious persuasion did 
not make such associations though a grounding of human rights raises its own difficulties: 
 
For the human rights movement, universal human rights cannot rest on theistic foundations.  Such 
supports are not available, or acceptable, to those who cannot share theistic assumptions … In the 
end, and at bottom, for the human rights movement insistence on the nontheistic foundations of 
the contemporary human rights idea reflects a quest for universal acceptance and universal 
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commitment to a common moral intuition articulated in specific agreed-upon-terms. (Henkin 
1998, p.238) 
 
Henkin’s argument is that not everyone shares religious beliefs and since the idea of human rights 
is universal, its success depends on secularity and rationality for it to be publicly accessible.  
Otherwise, those who do not hold religious belief will have no grounds for a commitment to 
human rights.  The grounding for human rights must therefore be universal, he suggests. 
 
However, others argue that religion provides some essential role for human rights (Tinder 2003, 
Perry 2007).  Perry (1998, 2007) suggests that human rights are incoherent without some kind of 
belief because human rights claim that the human being has inherent worth and is inviolable.  
This is the language of the sacred and such language, according to Perry, requires religion.  If 
human rights are based on a claim that human beings are inviolable, then what is this inviolability 
based on?  Perry suggests that at this point some religious doctrine, some meaning giving 
narrative, needs to be offered such as 1 John 4.8 and 16, and the doctrines of Christian love 
behind such texts. 
 
A further psychological argument for the necessity of religion is made.  The world, according to 
the postsecular thesis, retains a religious presence.  Religion unites people around certain values 
that reach beyond allegiances to self-interest or family/tribe interest.  They create a sense of moral 
responsibility for others who are not of one’s own stock and kin, in ways more effective than trust 
in human rights alone: 
 
The Problem concerns the step from altruism within a family to the proclamation of universal 
human rights.  The latter, as a principle, has arrived relatively late in human civilisation.  Its 
constant violation also raises doubts about its justification or explanation merely in terms of 
biological adaptation.  That it has been violated in the name of so many tribal gods remains one of 
the principle reasons why the secular moralist refuses to countenance a theistic premise in the 
presentation of a humanitarian ethic.  There has, however, never been an easier way of getting 
from the brotherhood of brothers to the brotherhood of man than via an affirmation of the 
fatherhood of God.  Many would say that Freud has cost the twentieth century the luxury of that 
promise.  But whether belief in the supreme worth of every human life, and the action such an 
ideal requires, can be sustained without reference to the transcendent, is an area unlikely to be laid 
to rest. (Brooke 1991, pp.346!7) 
 
Brooke observes that it continues to be difficult to universalise the moral feelings we should have 
for those who are not close to us without reference to a universal authority, such as God.  If this 
continues to be the case we must question whether or not a text such as the UDHR could ever 
have the hold over people’s imaginations that religion exerts without some reference to deeply 
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held beliefs.  For those who have such commitments, they must surely be likely to integrate a 
universal call to common humanity with their religious commitments.  Actively disassociating 
human rights from such belief systems could distance religious believers from them.  Baxi argues 
that HRE constitutes a plural alternative to theologically based forms of education (Baxi 2006).  It 
is more suited for a secular world; but here he means a plural world, not an anti- or unreligious 
one.  
 
If human rights need to be grounded on some kind of ideology, philosophy or theology, those 
who do not hold to any such worldview need to reflect on this if they wish to keep human rights 
and maintain integrity. 
 
Of course religion could limit the extent of moral consideration for others of a different or no 
religion, in contrast to the arguments of Brooke.  Arguments might be advanced to challenge the 
belief that Christianity provides a strong moral doctrine.  However, the difficulty to establish a 
universally acceptable non religious foundation for human rights is well known (Rorty 1993), as 
is the fact that many different religions are able to see human rights as things they could support 
(Maritain, 1948).  An argument against religious morality becomes at the same time an argument 
against human rights. 
 
 
(ii) Recognition of religion in HRE: Recognition of the importance of the religious dimension in 
culture has grown in UN declarations.  Over the course of the twentieth century a growing sense 
of the importance of plurality and diversity seems to have influenced HRE documents, resulting 
from a more pronounced post-colonial awareness.  Although human rights have taken a 
prominent global position as opposed to the rights era of previous centuries which was conceived 
in national terms, the universal status of human rights are challenged by another feature of the 
global reality!moral pluralism or even relativism.  The universality of a single declaration of 
human rights for everyone, has been surpassed by particular concerns for group-rights including 
women’s rights, indigenous peoples’ rights and children. 
 
The 1974 UNESCO Recommendation Concerning Education related to Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms broadens the idea of human rights education to include personal 
capacities, attitudes and knowledge with a specific interest in intercultural understanding.  It 
suggests strategies for the development of these different aspects of the human person.  It 
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associated the full development of the person with their cultural context and infers that 
understanding of and sympathy towards those cultural forms is necessary for HRE to be possible.  
By 1993 the Vienna Declaration (UN General Assembly 1993) maintained the more inclusive and 
communitarian construction of human rights education.  Specific attention is given to ‘respect for 
the value and diversity of their cultures and identities’ (UN General Assembly 1993). 
 
The 1995 Declaration of Principles on Tolerance (UNESCO 1995b) argued that education 
(presumably of a particular kind) is most effective at preventing intolerance.  It must begin by 
teaching people their shared rights and freedoms, so that they may be respected, and must 
promote the will to protect those of others.  Education for tolerance is an urgent imperative 
requiring systematic and rational tolerance teaching methods to address cultural, social, 
economic, political and religious sources of intolerance and the major roots of violence and 
exclusion.  Education policies and programmes should both contribute to development of 
understanding, solidarity and tolerance among individuals as well as among ethnic, social, 
cultural, religious and linguistic groups and nations.  It must also develop capacities for 
independent judgement, critical thinking and ethical reasoning. 
 
Tarrow (1992) has observed that human rights recognizes the particular contexts within which 
values are formed and that this must be acknowledged in HRE: 
 
[D]ifferent societies define rights in terms of their own historical experience, their values systems 
and the political and economic realities of the current era.  Thus the form and content of human 
rights education will depend on the values into which societies wish to socialize their children. 
(Ibid. p.22) 
 
The UN Decade of Human Rights Education (1995!2004) reaffirmed these dual obligations of 
respect for cultural difference and the formation of a universal culture.  These apparently 
divergent aims are sought to be justified by the recognition that individual needs differ, and that 
some groups of people are particularly vulnerable and are in particular need of protection:  
 
[H]uman rights education and information contribute to a concept of development consistent with 
the dignity of women and men of all ages which takes into account particularly vulnerable 
segments of society such as children, youth, older persons, indigenous people, minorities, rural 
and urban poor, migrant workers, refugees, persons with human immunodeficiency virus/acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome and disabled persons. (OHCHR 1994, p.1) 
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However this also extends to encouraging or supporting different ways of living in terms not 
solely understood as vulnerability.  The Declaration of the 44th session of the UNESCO 
International Conference on Education (UNESCO 1994) sought to establish in educational 
institutions an atmosphere which will make them ‘ideal places for the exercise of tolerance, 
respect for human rights, the practice of democracy and learning about the diversity and wealth of 
cultural identities;’ (Ibid. Article 2.2) develop curricula and resources for educating ‘caring and 
responsible citizens, open to other cultures, able to appreciate the value of freedom, respectful of 
human dignity and differences, and able to prevent conflicts or resolve them by non-violent 
means.’ (Ibid. Article 2.4)  It recommends retraining teachers and others towards professional 
ethics, moral education, cultural diversity and international standards of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms with the intention that education is transformed ‘into the practice of 
tolerance and solidarity, respect for human rights, democracy and peace.’ (Ibid. Article 3.2) 
Moral education is both education in universal rights, and the encouragement of tolerance of 
difference. 
 
A UNESCO medium term strategy document, acknowledging the process of globalisation and 
dialogue between civilisations, noted that equality of dignity is afforded to cultures and 
civilisations, and that cultural heritage should be safeguarded (UNESCO 2002, pp.135!7).  
Dignity is also afforded to cultures, not just individual human persons.  In HRE, this is a 
precondition to foster mutual understanding and peace among and between people on the one 
hand, and to reject any type of extremism.  Paradoxically, the globalisation process has often led 
to disbelief and distrust, which are fertile grounds on which terrorism and intolerance can thrive.  
The phrase ‘dialogue between civilisations’ seems to acknowledge the debate triggered by 
Huntington (1993, 1996) which gathered strength after the attack on the World Trade Centre and 
led to increased concern that cultural and religious identities will be the primary cause of conflict 
in the post cold war world (Sacks 2002). 
 
The universalist claim that cultural values, and especially moral norms, are not historically and 
territorially bound rests uneasily against the view that values are context bound and based in local 
meaning-giving narratives (MacIntyre 1981).  Douzinas notes that both perspectives can lead to 
excess (2000a, 2000b, 2002).  The danger of an unbound universalism is imperialism and moral 
arrogance, which in turn can legitimise oppression and domination.  On the other hand cultural 
relativism and communitarianism can be used in the justification of particular deviations from 
moral codes to commit atrocities.  In a post-colonial context this dilemma is made more difficult 
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to resolve.  Some argue there are specifically Asian values and conceptions of rights which differ 
from western conceptions leading to different cultural conceptions of human rights (Chan 1999; 
Othman 1999; Wang 2002) while others think this is simply a cloak for the justification of moral 
abuses (Christie 1995; Christie & Denny 2001).  Some suggest that human rights can be found in 
other cultures, not simply western philosophy (Chun 2001) but others are sceptical that anything 
other than a liberal democratic orientation will not provide the necessary freedoms and liberties 
(Donnelly 1982). 
 
Related concerns are evident from a report on the Decade of Human Rights Education (OHCHR 
2004), which expressed concern for the dignity and rights of women in particular, with regards to 
a lack of focus on the issue of women’s human rights (Ibid. para. 24).  The rights of women and 
respect for cultural systems may come into conflict with what is considered dignified for a 
women.  Some cultural expressions could be considered a belittling of the dignity of women from 
other perspectives. 
 
This tension challenges HRE.  How does a school that serves a diverse and plural society balance 
these two objectives and trajectories?  HRE was conceived on a global scale, but schools serve 
local communities with particular cultures and traditions.  The Declaration on the Principles of 
Tolerance (UNESCO 1995b) urges there to be social science research in education for tolerance, 
human rights and non-violence including teacher training, curricula, the content of textbooks and 
lessons, and other educational materials including new educational technologies.  This declaration 
draws together the ongoing ideas of difference and dignity and reflects a much greater awareness 
of the challenge in harmonising both ideas around the central moral framework of human rights 
using the concept of tolerance (of diverse groups) and themes of criticality by promoting 
capacities of independent judgement, critical thinking and ethical reasoning.  Criticality can be a 
challenge to culture when it raises questions that challenge cultural practices and attitudes. 
 
Taylor’s argument for a politics of recognition captures this trend.  Noting that societies are 
becoming increasingly multicultural with increased migration he questions the idea that one 
culture should impose itself on others.  The result is that minority cultures will diminish and 
vanish.  Whether a culture is recognized or not recognized influences a person’s identity.  The 
failure to recognize a culture causes damage to an individual or group.  Human beings need some 
kind of recognition and all human beings deserve equal recognition. Taylor writes: 
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Equal recognition is not just the appropriate mode for a healthy democratic society.  Its refusal can 
inflict damage on those who are denied it … The projection of an inferior or demeaning image on 
another can actually distort and oppress, to the extent that the image is internalized. (Taylor 1994, 
p.36)  
 
Equal recognition can mean one of two things.  It can mean universalism – the sense that 
everyone has equal worth, equal rights and entitlements and equal citizenship.  It can also relate 
to difference, building on the idea of individual identity.  Every person should be recognized for 
his or her particular identity.  An individual should not be assimilated in such a way that leads to 
a loss of distinctiveness and peculiarities.  The politics of difference: 
 
asks that we give acknowledgement and status to something that is not universally shared.  Or, 
otherwise put, we give due acknowledgement only to what is universally present – everyone has 
an identity – through recognizing what is peculiar to each.  The universal demand powers an 
acknowledgement of specificity. (Ibid. p.39) 
 
HRE cannot simply be seen as an uncritical form of multicultural education for in so doing it may 
never recognize suffering cloaked by the impression of traditional culture and bring about change.   
Not all particularities could or should be valorized.  Nor can it be an imperialist universalism that 
blindly asserts a totalitarian morality that might equally fail to notice important and valuable yet 
different expressions of how to live.  Postmodern thinkers such as Bauman have reflected on this 
issue and provide insights that might contribute to a more critically aware conception of HRE 
(Bauman 1993, 1994, 1995, 2001). 
 
Taylor has reflected on this in a critique of Kantian liberalism, which he argues fails to 
adequately incorporate the politics of recognition.  He asserts that liberalist philosophy ignores 
the fundamentally dialogical character of human life and the reality that individual identity comes 
to fullness only in interaction with the world and with ‘significant others.’  He is concerned about 
producing a hegemonic culture, which constricts the identity of the person by overriding people’s 
values and alienating minority groups (Taylor 1994).  These politics of recognition are expressed 
in the 1997 Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generation towards Future 
Generations, which strengthened the status of group rights and cultural distinctiveness in Article 
7 (cultural diversity and cultural heritage), and states: 
 
With due respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the present generations should take 
care to preserve the cultural diversity of humankind.  The present generations have the 
responsibility to identify, protect and safeguard the tangible and intangible cultural heritage and to 
transmit this common heritage to future generations. (UNESCO 1997, Article 7) 
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Bauman has noted that plurality of lifestyles, which he refers to as findings, has a value in that the 
more findings there are, the better the chance that no alternative is overlooked (Bauman 2001).  It 
is as though we must experiment with living in many different ways to find the best ways of life.  
They are not all of equal value but their value can only be established through long dialogue in 
which all voices may be heard.  Recognition of cultural variety is the beginning of the discussion 
of shared human values.  Habermas argues, ‘A correctly understood theory of rights requires a 
politics of recognition that protects the integrity of the individual in the life contexts in which his 
or her identity is formed.’ (Habermas 1994, p.113)  Bauman argues that for a politics of 
recognition to be possible, a universality of citizenship is a preliminary condition and that the 
universality of humanity is the horizon that all politics of recognition should orientate towards: 
 
Universality of humanity does not stand in opposition to the pluralism of the forms of human life; 
but the test of truly universal humanity is its ability to accommodate pluralism and make pluralism 
serve the cause of humanity – to enable and to encourage ongoing discussion about the shared 
conception of the good. (Bauman 2001, p.140) 
 
Bauman argues that rights have an expression in this cause of humanity: 
 
If there is to be a community in the world of individuals, it can only be (and it needs to be) a 
community woven together from sharing and mutual care; a community of concern and 
responsibility for the equal right to be human and the equal ability to act on that right. (Ibid. 
pp.149!50) 
 
HRE could be conceived as the promotion of the universality of humanity through sharing and 
mutual care and an encouragement in the skills, capacities and opportunities for an ongoing 
discussion about suffering and how the worth of the human person translates into specific ways of 
acting or living.  This is rather different from legislative forms of HRE.  Agreement and progress 
in that discussion may be more likely to encourage, promote and secure human rights than a 
simple rehearsing of and advocation for those rights, which a simplistic declarationist notion of 
HRE might be thought to be concerned about.  A critical HRE might also be sensitive to other 
ways in which human rights are limited in that they do not encompass all of the ways of thinking 
about morality. 
 
HRE needs a critical consciousness to be able to negotiate this divergence.  The existence of 
rights declarations for specific groups (women’s rights, children’s rights, rights of indigenous 
peoples) suggests that the UN has taken a route sensitive to different group needs.  In recognizing 
the specific conditions of certain groups, there is an acceptance that historical context is part of 
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the engagement with understanding the implications of human rights (Osler & Starkey 2010, 
pp.94!95).  Religious particularity is a feature of the cultural diversity, which human rights now 
contends with, as well as universalisability through its moral code claims. 
 
(iii) Religion interconnected with HRE: Theology and pedagogy can be seen to have similarities 
with each other, and may even inform one another.  HRE is often presented as something that 
should be personally liberating and empowering, rather than simply a tool for the inculcation of 
values and ethical beliefs.  HRE is commonly described as learning about and learning for or in 
human rights (Lohrenscheit 2002).  Learning about human rights includes knowledge of the 
origin, history and relevance of human rights and human rights documents and instruments and a 
focus on human rights controversies.  Learning for or in human rights aims at an empowered and 
active individual.  This means coming to understand one’s own needs and the influence of 
cultural, social and political power structures so that empowered subjects can participate in the 
transformation of society on the basis of human rights.  This aspect of HRE has parallels with 
Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Freire 1970; Lohrenscheit 2006).  It is moral 
education with an aim, not just of individual moral transformation but global societal revolution. 
 
When understood as transformation, HRE is psychological-sociological.  Tibbitts suggests that in 
practice this aspect is found in non-formal and informal education (Tibbitts 2002).  It is focused 
on topics such as women’s development, community development and minority rights.  It is 
focused on vulnerable populations, victims of abuse and trauma and post-conflict societies.  It 
looks to establish personal empowerment leading to personal, community and society change. 
Meintjes argues that human rights education directed toward the empowerment of participants is 
‘unique as a pedagogical objective and differs markedly from the goals of other areas of 
conventionally defined education.’ (Meintjes 1997, p.65)  As noted above, this form of HRE 
owes much to developments in South America in the educational influence of Paulo Freire.  
These in turn emerged at the same time as the liberation theology movement which has many 
familiar conceptual dimensions (Baxi 2006).  The emphasis on the liberating influence of HRE in 
the initial UN documents has developed with powerful resonances in the field of transformative 
education.  Liberation theology highlights the importance of social as well as spiritual 
transformation. 
 
Freire (1970) observed that the oppressed adapt to the structure of domination and become 
immersed and resigned to it.  They are inhibited from waging the struggle for freedom and 
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incapable of running the risks it requires.  Realization of this situation was for Freire a critical 
discovery and a perception of their reality of oppression.  Freire wrote of the importance for a 
person to move from a naïve awareness, which does not deal with the problems, to a critical 
awareness which explores the problems and is open to new ideas.  The process of conscientisation 
is essential to this process in which the person rejects the oppressive consciousness within, gains 
an awareness of the situation and finds his or her own language.  From this psychological position 
the person becomes less dependent and can commit to transformation and the building of society. 
 
This educational methodology was understood in theological terms by liberation theologian 
Gustavo Gutierrez.  Gutierrez observes that critical awareness is not a ‘state reached once and for 
all’ but rather a ‘permanent effort of man who seeks to situate himself in time and space, to 
exercise his creative potential, and to assume his responsibilities.’ (Gutierrez 1973, p.92)  The 
Protestant theologian Moltmann, writing on the ecumenical dialogue surrounding human rights, 
describes this in terms of self-actualisation of human essence and coming into truth (Moltmann 
1984).  Baxi (2006) has recently acknowledged these roots, calling HRE a secular or multi-
religious form of liberation theology that recognizes that there are some theological roots to HRE.  
The distinction between secular as anti-religious and secular as multi-religious is important. 
 
Mature human rights cultures are rooted in a permanent ability to engage with violations of 
human rights and the consequent suffering.  HRE requires the formation of networks, institution-
building, resource redirection and social and political mobilisation to address the ‘life-projects of 
the violated and create capacities to overturn obstacles to the exercise and enjoyment of human 
rights.’ (Baxi 2006, p.15)  Echoing Gutierrez, Baxi goes on, ‘It is, in a true sense, a continual 
collective search for the plenitude of life, for meaning that confirms individual and collective 
dignity, and for the resources for human coexistence.’ (Ibid.)  The searching dimension of HRE is 
important as competition between rights claims are a reality (Sher 1984), such as between the 
right to privacy and the right to information, or the right to self expression and the right to live 
happily and peacefully.  Steiner argues that genuine rights should never come into conflict 
(Steiner 1994).  The multiplication of rights distorts the picture.  Genuine rights, such as the right 
to life, have been joined by other interests that are not rights, such as the right to health care.  The 
existence of such conflict suggests that these rights are not genuine rights.  Waldron argues that 
rights conflicts might be resolved but it is not a tidy or straightforward process (Waldron 1989).  
The just exercise of rights is more complex than might first be thought.  This is not because of 
difficulties that emerge from exceptional moral circumstances but quite ordinary situations.  
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Basic rights such as free speech must be exercised with diligence away from incitement to hatred.  
There are strongly held political views which are, nevertheless, deeply unpopular with the 
majority.  If HRE is to be successful in the promotion of rights as a practical resource to help 
moral decision making it must also negotiate competing rights claims as these are essential to the 
exercise of rights. 
 
Rights deliberation and negotiation is a complex field.  I may believe I am doing the best for 
another person but may mistakenly disregard the rights of others.  For example the workers in the 
Catholic Adoption Agencies believed that they were legitimately doing the best for the children 
they found homes and parents for, but the UK Government came to a different legal conclusion 
(Beckford 2010).  Perhaps HRE should encourage an understanding of these deliberations 
between competing rights claims, though this requires a more precise legalistic understanding of 
rights and suggests a legalistic approach to moral education and moral behaviour.  The 
application of rights and the negotiation of rights conflicts draw on other values, and other 
beliefs, and so a more detailed enquiry into the applications of rights would necessarily lead back 
to meaning-giving systems, ‘[H]uman rights studies help students understand why rights such as 
freedom of religion and belief are fundamental to human existence in an interconnected world.’ 
(Doorn-Harder 2007, p.105) 
 
HRE is firmly linked to ideas of personal and societal transformation as much as education about 
philosophy of the history of human rights.  This transformative dimension is more attuned to the 
educational processes and the importance of conscientisation, constant scrutiny of life in the 
common search for the human flourishing.  It is less certain that the current perspective of life and 
suffering is complete and fully understood, and more practical for coping with the inevitable 
tensions between local differences and how they may be rooted in meaning-giving narratives and 
shared universal values. 
 
Learning to live together: An Intercultural and Interfaith Programme for Ethics Education  
(Miyamoto 2008) is an example of an HRE resource that takes a participatory approach.  It draws 
on the experience of educators and scholars from different religious, spiritual and secular 
traditions, international organisations, NGOs, educational institutions and children, who all share 
a vision of ethics education, ‘in an effort to realize the right of the child to full and healthy 
physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development, as well as the right of the child to 
education, as set out in the Convention on the Rights of the Child.’ (Ibid. ix)  This resource was 
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produced to promote co-operation between people of different religions, engaging scholars, 
pedagogues and educators from different religious and secular traditions: 
 
Learning to Live Together is guided by an overall pledge to safeguard human dignity.  Its aims are 
to strengthen children’s commitment to justice, respect for human rights, and to build harmonious 
relationships between individuals and within societies. (Ibid. p.1)  
 
There are interconnections between religion and conceptions of societal reform found in 
education.  
 
(iv) Religious groups supporting effective HRE: Religion might be characterized as supporting 
patriarchy or other hegemonic structures, but it can equally be linked with attempts to usurp or 
challenge political power, providing social structures that support the interests of wider social 
transformation.  In discussions about the effectiveness of formal and non-formal models of HRE, 
religion has been identified as playing a significant role beyond the confines of formal education. 
 
Meintjes has observed that non-formal education projects lack resources and recognition and 
depend on support from voluntary and charitable resources.  In addition the informal approach to 
HRE provides an unsystematic form of pedagogy (Meintjes 1997, p.76).  HRE can only become 
more effective if it is incorporated into a systematic format or if the target group already have a 
developed orientation such as critical consciousness.  This in turn makes the effectiveness of 
HRE dependent on the pedagogy and educational institutional structures.  It is not enough to 
dwell on the nobility (or otherwise) of the human rights or the ambitions of the HRE project.  
This might suggest a more centrally controlled curriculum and approach to teaching, as is offered 
by state controlled formal education.  However if HRE is dependent on state support, funding and 
direction a further concern emerges.  Human rights were principally conceived to protect 
individuals from the state and Rendel notes that ‘part of the teaching of human rights must be 
concerned with pointing out to students the defects of their own country’ (Rendel 1992, p.159).  
HRE under the control of the state may be directed away from areas of human rights abuses 
within the state itself. 
 
Among non-formal and informal educational programmes there have been some compelling 
accounts of the impact of the kind of transformative project in an area closely related to HRE.  
These may not describe themselves as HRE and may not refer in declarationist terms to the 
UDHR.  They are, however, marked by a concern for justice and development.  Mado Spiegler 
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(2006) comments that there was no social revolution during the hyperinflation in 1989 in 
Argentina and Uruguay, despite the suffering it caused.  Instead a extensive social network was 
developed providing social solidarity in slum areas, which enabled people to help each other and 
to handle the problems they faced, ‘there was a certain degree of organisation, ranging from 
common kitchen gardens, collective purchasing, to solidarity through church organisations, etc.’ 
(Spiegler 2006, p.161)  Many of these, she argues, were associated with religion and in particular 
liberation theology which prompted increased activism in the church, and led to the formation of 
thousands of basic communities.  She notes: 
 
In 1997, the ninth meeting of Brazilian Catholic base communities brought together upward of 
2000 delegates from 240 of Brazil's 255 dioceses.  Also participating were 65 delegates from other 
Latin American countries, and 56 of Brazil's 278 active bishops, dozens of representatives of 
Protestant Churches, and representatives from 33 indigenous peoples. (Ibid. p.162) 
 
Spiegler observes that these kinds of movements tend to be unobserved by the outside (i.e. non-
religious and/or governmental) audiences yet represent a form of personal and societal movement 
that is genuinely transformative, even if it is not the kind of social revolution some (especially 
those opposed to religion) would wish to see.  This account is not of itself evidence for the 
effectiveness of human rights education in its transformative model but it is an important 
indicator of where evidence may be found.  Thinkers and activists in HRE have become 
increasingly interested in this kind of expression of human rights, for instance as shown in the 
special edition of the Journal of Intercultural Education with its focus on Transformative HRE 
(Tibbitts 2005).  This reflects a combining of Mezirow (instrumental in initiating the theoretical 
field of transformative learning), alongside Freire’s conception of critical consciousness (Ibid. 
p.110).  Examples of non-formal and informal projects which show rather more promising impact 
can be found in Turkey (Ilkkaracan & Amado 2005), Argentina (Chiarotti 2005) and many other 
countries (Nazzari et al. 2005).  These are marked by locally determined features and adopt forms 
affected by local culture and religion. 
 
There is evidence from a number of sources that HRE has value and is effective in a number of 
different forms.  Added to this is the considerable inter-governmental and non-governmental 
support for and interest in HRE.  Despite theoretical and practical challenges associated with 
HRE, it would seem to have merit. 
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Conclusion 
 
As non-religious secularity is not an inevitable outcome of modernity, and societies sometimes 
become religious in new and different ways, religious contributions to human rights education 
take on a greater significance, particularly as the aim for friendship and understanding between 
religious groups is a component of HRE.  Recognition of religion and its significance for many 
aspects of HRE seems a minimal position.  An interconnected understanding of religion and 
rights is particularly important in HRE, given the theological and pedagogical connections.  
While religious foundations will be opposed by secularists, it is difficult to disregard the evidence 
that HRE projects are often religiously understood and activists are motivated by religion.  
Henkins’ challenge to attempts to base human rights on religious foundations can be countered by 
an argument that they may be based on multiple justifications.  Basing human rights on a plurality 
of justifications is more achievable in a plural religious world and more realistic in light of the 
failure of the secularisation thesis.  These arguments support an inclusive model of HRE that is 
aware of religious and theological interconnections with human rights, rather than one that is 
secularist and/or one that disregards religious dimensions.   
 
A religiously inclusive approach to HRE allows for a more adequate exploration of the 
connections between beliefs and philosophies and human rights.  Human rights are not rationally 
indisputable and as an educational enterprise it would be problematic for HRE to suggest they 
were.  As Keet puts it: 
 
HRE often portrays human rights articulations as unproblematic and beyond contestation.  It is 
questionable whether this approach can be regarded as educational because it certainly exhibits, as 
do many other educational forms, anti-educational potential. (Keet 2007, Ch. 1, p.8) 
 
HRE is situated within a number of critical tensions.  On the one hand it promotes the notion of a 
common culture or rights, yet at the same time seeks to respect individual and cultural difference, 
through the pluralisation of rights declarations focused on specific groups and the promotion of 
tolerance and understanding of diversity.  In line with these two divergent impulses, HRE takes 
shape along diverging pedagogical lines.  Legalistic forms of HRE adopt a knowledge transfer 
idea of learning where rights knowledge is propositional, passed from the community to the 
individual, as a tool for socialisation and continuity.  Legalistic HRE may be viewed as morally 
conservative, emphasising behaviour boundaries and limitations, acting in a role that legitimises 
and delegitimises actions.  Authority for moral behaviour rests with the rights themselves.  Here 
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the challenge is how to ensure HRE is radical enough to improve society – to recognize suffering 
that may be socially accepted or ignored. 
 
Transformative forms of HRE are centred on individual and societal change.  The person is 
viewed as an agent of change, rather than continuity, someone who can evolve in fundamental 
ways contributing to wider community and societal change.  The change required is liberation 
and freedom from injustice and suffering.  For society the structures of life are moved from forms 
that are unjust to forms that are just.  Here authority rests in the new way in which the individual 
perceives the world around them, rather than rights themselves.  Their agency is bound to the 
need to change or be changed themselves, and their responsibility to change society.  Here the 
challenge is to ensure HRE is not so unfettered as to become reinterpreted or misinterpreted for 
any ends.  A further challenge rests in the question of who authorises the change and what kind of 
change is approved. 
 
Interpretations of HRE portray the relationship with religion variously.  On the one hand there are 
difficulties with religious differences and the rights clashes resulting from religious issues.  This 
may encourage a tendency to see the morals of religion as things that must be validated by human 
rights, or indeed human rights as a replacement for religious values and narratives.  However the 
more one leans towards this interpretation the more one must address the philosophical 
challenges to human rights.  For rights to be an authority in themselves as central ideas in moral 
education, they must have some robustness and integrity.  On the other hand there are 
interpretations of human rights that see religion as more closely associated with rights.  Religious 
sources provide a grounding for human rights for some.  There is a sense in the literature that 
religion needs to be recognized as a significant feature of cultural life and that some good can 
come from allowing for a plurality of approaches to life.  This inevitably leads to difficult 
questions about the two diverging desires, one for universalism and the other tolerance of 
difference, but it also reframes the educational endeavour from one which sees HRE as some kind 
of transfer of normative and abstract knowledge, to one which might be more interested in the 
discussion between different ways of flourishing in life.  There are also some compelling reasons 
for seeing religion as having important conceptual parallels with HRE especially in the form of 
liberation theology and the links with critical literacy and transformative education. 
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This review reveals a range of interpretations in the treatments of religion by human rights 
education.  It is a complex and interconnected picture against which, in Chapter Two, we can 
consider the examination of the place of human rights in the English secondary curriculum. 
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Chapter Two 
Human rights and the English curriculum 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) encouraged signatories to promote human 
rights as a central aim of education.  In recent years there has been a change in emphasis in the 
English curriculum aims, from a general inclusion of rights and responsibilities in the moral 
education of children, towards the specific commitment to human rights (QCA 2007b).  This 
chapter examines the place of human rights in English secondary school curriculum 
documentation in the light of these aims and the international declarations.  It focuses specifically 
on Religious education (RE) and Citizenship education (CE) though human rights have 
previously featured in different curriculum areas such as history, and personal, social, health 
education.  The chapter provides a regional curriculum perspective to complement the perspective 
of inter-governmental agreements and educational literature in Chapter 1.  Along with Chapter 1, 
it provides a setting within which the main conceptual study of dignity is located and a context 
for which a re-imagined form of HRE will be proposed in Chapter 7. 
 
The chapter researches three areas. Part One: The aims of the curriculum and moral education 
examines references to rights and the worth of a human person in National Curriculum (QCA 
2007b) documents and whole school approaches to human rights.  Part Two: Religious Education 
examines the place of rights in the RE curriculum.  Here, there are three sources for this 
curriculum: the non-statutory national guidance documentation for RE, a sample of 42 of the 151 
statutory local agreed syllabuses and the GCSE Religious Studies specifications of the four exam 
boards.  The sample was taken of local authorities from across all geographical corners of 
England and includes urban, rural and mixed areas.  The results of the survey show that human 
rights receive widely differing treatments in RE reflecting different messages and interpretations 
about the link between rights and religion.  Part Three: Citizenship Education explores the place 
of rights in National Curriculum (QCA 2007b) documents and GCSE exam specifications for 
Citizenship education or Citizenship Studies.  Rights are a major focus of CE, in some cases 
defining the subject.  CE has become the home of human rights as a topic in the curriculum in the 
last decade.  Part Four: Religion, plurality and dialogue discusses the findings of the review and 
relates them to the findings of Chapter 1.  It suggests the treatment of human rights is spread 
across RE and CE with little awareness of, or direction towards the important connections 
between beliefs and philosophies and human rights issues and structures.  This is inconsistent 
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with the professed aim of the curriculum.  The chapter concludes that important insights on 
human rights could be gained if these two curriculum areas were related.  Some bridging between 
the subjects would provide a more holistic human rights education, and would more appropriately 
reflect the connections between religion and rights.  This complements other arguments for better 
integration and collaboration (Jackson 2003). 
 
This approach does not reveal what kind of teaching of human rights is actually taking place in 
classrooms.  Empirical research into the schemes of work, lessons themselves and investigations 
of pupils and teachers on a statistically significant scale would be needed for this.  However 
curriculum documents are important indicators of the intended trajectory of the curriculum and 
reflect policy makers’ perspectives of the subject areas and the kind of learning they seek to 
encourage.  They will reveal the extent to which initiatives and trends observed at the inter-
governmental level are reflected in a regional setting. 
 
 
Part One: The aims of the curriculum and moral education 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) expressed a commitment to a range of human 
rights that was more expansive than rights declarations of earlier centuries (Klug 2000).  It 
expressed moral obligations to which the signatories pledged themselves to aspire (Hunt 2007, 
p.204).  They are advanced in international agreements defining a moral standard and articles on 
education state that education should in part be focused on the promotion of these rights.  The 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN General Assembly 1989), of which the UK is a 
signatory, states that education should be directed to, ‘the development of respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United 
Nations.’ (Ibid. Article 29) 
 
English curriculum documents have in the past refrained from articulating a vision of moral 
education that is similar to aims of HRE expressed in the international agreements.  After the UK 
signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), consideration was given to the place of 
moral education.  Sir Ron Dearing, chairman of the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority 
(SCAA) published a discussion paper which suggested that school values should include respect 
for the rights and property of others (SCAA 1995, p.5).  Rights and responsibilities have a general 
moral sense and form part of the scope of moral education.  However, the emphasis of human 
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rights and fundamental freedoms found in the international documents was not evident in school 
curriculum guidance.  A few years later the Ofsted Spiritual Moral Social Cultural (SMSC) 
Guidance for Schools encouraged schools to give opportunities to pupils across the curriculum to 
explore and develop moral concepts and values and these included personal rights and 
responsibilities (Ofsted 2003, p.17).  This document reflects a strengthened status for rights.  
Rights are advanced as concepts that should be valued and appreciated as an indication of social 
awareness (Ibid. p.20).  Education about rights is an important component of moral education 
alongside some other important moral values that are mentioned including truth, freedom, justice, 
law and collective effort for the common good. 
 
Prior to the new curriculum of 2007, one stated aim of education expressed in curriculum 
documents referred to rights (DfES/QCA 1999) as part of children’s spiritual, moral, social and 
cultural development.  The curriculum should help pupils understand their responsibilities and 
rights and promote their self-esteem and emotional wellbeing.  It should support them in forming 
relationships, based on respect for themselves and for others, and should develop their ability to 
relate to others and work for the common good.  These aims of the National Curriculum refer to 
the general moral idea of rights and responsibilities but did not contain the specific commitment 
to the universal human rights of the twentieth century.  They referred to wellbeing, rather than 
using the term dignity that is found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 
 
The new secondary curriculum (QCA 2007b) states that all young people should become 
confident individuals who are able to live safe, healthy and fulfilling lives and have a sense of 
self-worth and personal identity.  A change of tone is then expressed; young people should 
become responsible citizens who make a positive contribution to society, challenge injustice, be 
committed to human rights and strive to live peaceably with others.  This new language was 
framed in the terms of the Children Act (2004) and the policy Every Child Matters: Change for 
Children (DFES 2004).  It reflects closely many aspects of human rights education: the 
commitment to human rights and justice, peace education and a sense of self-worth (QCA 
2007b).  The phrase sense of self-worth is found in the international human rights documents, for 
example Article 40 of the CRC (UN General Assembly 1989), although the phrase sense of 
dignity, which accompanies worth in the CRC, is omitted.  It may have been because of some of 
the word’s ambiguities (see Chapter 3) or because it was felt to be too closely linked with certain 
philosophies or theologies (see Chapter 4).  This omission mirrors a downplaying of the term in 
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HRE (see Chapter 5).  Self-worth is a different concept to that of dignity.  It is closer to self-
respect than the inherent worth that is linked to dignity, which later chapters will explore. 
In the English curriculum it is no longer the case that children should understand that rights and 
responsibilities are important moral ideas along with many others, but that human rights 
constitute a clear priority and a leading idea over and above others.  This new stance is more 
overtly aligned to international human rights language, and may reflect the wider shift of the UK 
government towards articulating human rights in public life, seen in the Human Rights Act 
(1998), the establishment of a Human Rights Commission and individual examples such as the 
Civil Partnership Act.  Two school initiatives that use human rights to define the ethos of a school 
have been reported in the 2009 Human Rights Inquiry (Equality and Human Rights Commission 
2009).  Firstly, UNICEF’s Rights Respecting Schools scheme (UNICEF 2008) seeks to raise pupil 
achievement and improve the quality of their life.  They study the CRC as a guide for living.  The 
inquiry reported that over 500 schools across the UK registered with the project and that the 
University of Sussex evaluated the scheme in 2008 and found improved behaviour and self-
esteem and some improvements in learning (Equality and Human Rights Commission 2009, 
p.59).  Secondly, Hampshire County Council ran a pilot of the scheme called Rights, Respect and 
Responsibility involving 380 primary schools and 48 secondary schools in the county (Covell & 
Howe 2005).  Some schools have reported significant reductions in bullying and other behaviour 
improvements (Equality and Human Rights Commission 2009, p.60).  These projects are about 
the whole school ethos as well as the kind of curriculum being taught in lessons or subjects and it 
is not clear whether the changes are down to human rights education per se, or other ethos 
nurturing activities. 
This trend in promoting human rights is recent.  The idea of HRE expressed in the UDHR (1948) 
has taken almost half a century to be reflected in documents describing the aims of English 
education.  Historically there may have been a sense in the UK that the international declarations 
on human rights were something needed to guide other states rather than the UK itself.  An 
English reticence about human rights was evident in the debates surrounding the 1998 Human 
Rights Act (Gordon et al. 1996) and a backlash against human rights in the media and among the 
public (Clapham 2007, p.2). 
 
There are two curricula areas where human rights are prominent: religious education (RE) has a 
focus on religious ideas about the importance of human dignity or worth and the links between 
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religious beliefs and attitudes to issues related to rights; citizenship education (CE) focuses more 
on the human rights institutions, legal systems and rights in relation to global issues. 
 
 
Part Two: Religious education 
 
 Religion and human rights 
 
Religious studies overlaps human rights studies in complex and multiple ways so the inclusion of 
human rights in the study of religion is appropriate (Hackett 2004; King 2005).  Universal rights 
can be seen as an expression of a shared moral vision.  They offer a possible point of convergence 
or a basis for some kind of shared values system that overlaps different moral theologies and 
philosophies (Kung 1991, 1996; Runzo 2003).  Religion may offer a strong foundation for human 
rights (Perry 1998) and the inclusion of human rights in the study of religion increases the 
likelihood of religion providing strength to the deployment of human rights concepts (Perry 
2007).  The inclusion of human rights in courses on world religions may counterbalance the 
polarisation that exists between different moral messages of different religions (Doorn-Harder 
2007).  They have the potential to lead to profound transformations of human consciousness and 
culture by lifting the perspective from a single religious tradition to a focus on shared human 
experiences (King 2005).  For example, acknowledging the right to religious freedom entails a 
realization of the importance of a common acceptance or tolerance of religious diversity.  
Recognition of rights can lead to an awareness of deeply shared values. 
 
This moral argument for the inclusion of rights in the study of religion is challenged when rights 
feature as focal points of tension with religion.  The relationship between rights and religion 
attracts considerable discussion and dispute (Bucar 2005; Ghanea-Hercock 2010; Ghanea-
Hercock et al. 2007).  Religion can be used to oppress or hurt others (Baum 1975) and is said to 
diametrically oppose human rights (Philips 2007).  Stern (2006) suggests that while this reality 
can make RE teachers feel it is problematic to explore rights, these tensions reveal important 
questions worthy of study in RE.  The importance of the links between the two are so significant 
that their inclusion is necessary if RE is to be a more complete picture of how religion inter-reacts 
in the world (Gearon 2002).  Stern affirms that, ‘There is no question that religions are related to 
human rights.’ (2006, p.80)  The important interactions between religion and rights education 
underscore the importance of religious educators being involved in research (Ibid. p.94).  This is 
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demonstrated by Guyette (2009) who has surveyed many possible affinities between RE and 
human rights education. 
 
 
 Human rights in the RE curricula 
 
The RE curricula for English community secondary schools are found in a range of different 
national and local documents that set out the aims, principles, concepts and subject content for a 
curriculum.  These are used to develop schemes of work for lesson planning.  They shed light on 
the intentions, understandings and priorities of the authors of the curriculum.  References to 
rights, human rights, worth and dignity in those documents were examined. 
 
National Framework: RE in England has no statutory national curriculum.  Each local authority 
(LA) produces a statutory agreed syllabus for use in community schools and non-religious 
academies.  The syllabus is formed by an Agreed Syllabus Conference (ASC) and monitored by a 
Standing Advisory Council for Religious Education (SACRE).  In 2004 a non-statutory National 
Framework for Religious Education (QCA/DfES 2004) (NFRE) was published giving guidance 
to SACREs and ASCs.  The guidance is not legally prescriptive though it has the backing of 
many religious and professional RE groups.  The NFRE states that RE supports the second aim of 
the National Curriculum (QCA 2007b) (prior to 2007) of promoting pupils’ spiritual, moral, 
social and cultural development and preparing all pupils for the opportunities, responsibilities and 
experiences of life.  A key contribution here surrounds the idea of a pupil’s self-worth: 
 
A central concern of religious education is the promotion of each pupil’s self-worth.  A 
sense of self-worth helps pupils to reflect on their uniqueness as human beings, share 
their feelings and emotions with others and appreciate the importance of forming and 
maintaining positive relationships. (QCA/DfES 2004, p.9) 
 
RE helps pupils to recognize their own uniqueness as human beings and affirms their self-worth 
(Ibid. p.13).  It has a contribution to play in supporting children's moral development and rights 
education through an exploration of rights, responsibilities and duties (Ibid. pp.14!15) to 
cultivate recognition of such ideas (Ibid. p.30).  Rights here are linked both to an idea of civic 
responsibility and personal moral conduct.  Beliefs influence attitudes or approaches to human 
rights and pupils should explore ‘what religions and beliefs say about human rights and 
responsibilities, social justice and citizenship.’ (Ibid. p.29)  Matters of human rights are relevant 
to the RE curriculum area and the moral development of pupils.  The non-statutory guidance 
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encourages learning that recognizes the importance of the link between religious worldviews and 
human rights perspectives.  The levels of attainment that pupils are expected to progress through 
do not refer directly to human rights, but they do refer to the use of a range of religious and 
philosophical language to analyse religious beliefs, values and commitments.  The levels refer to 
pupils gaining an understanding of the influence of culture and history on religion, and the 
influence of religion on communities and societies.  They also include analyses of different 
interpretations of sources (Ibid. pp.36!37) and in all of these areas rights could feature.  
However, there are no references to key international human rights organisations or declarations, 
or specifically non-religious philosophical or historical traditions in human rights.  RE is viewed 
as providing only indirect support for human rights education. 
 
Human rights in Agreed Syllabuses: Through a reading of 42 of the 151 Agreed Syllabuses 
(covering 51 local authorities as some cover combined regions), a range of approaches to the 
place of human rights in statutory RE syllabuses may be noted.  This number represents 
approximately one third of all English RE syllabuses and includes rural and urban regions, 
including examples from the north, midlands, east, southeast and west of England, and the most 
highly populated local authority area, Birmingham.  The reading was intended to identify the key 
themes present in the curricula, and it is the plurality and diversity of those themes which are the 
most significant features. 
 
One theme reflected the language of the NFRE in the ASCs’ own account of the aims of the 
curriculum and the scope of the content.  Many referred to the NFRE suggestion that RE 
supported moral education and citizenship in the area of the development of rights and 
responsibilities.  They also included the teaching of religious responses to human rights issues 
(for example Bristol 2005; Coventry 2007; Herefordshire 2006; Kingston upon Hull, East Riding 
of Yorkshire, North East Lincolnshire and North Lincolnshire 2005; Merton 2002; Thurrock 
2009; Wakefield 2007). 
 
A second theme was the inclusion of strong statements about the importance of RE for supporting 
pupils’ sense of self-worth and helping them recognize their own uniqueness (Herefordshire 
2006; Kingston upon Thames 2007; Thurrock 2009; Wakefield 2007; West Sussex 2008).  Others 
made no reference to worth (Redbridge 2008; Shropshire County and the Borough of Telford and 
Wrekin 2004; West Sussex 2008). 
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In terms of content, considerable variety is evident.  Rights, though not human rights, were found 
as a structural element of study in one example (Kent 2007), which uses rights and 
responsibilities as a term for the moral dimension of religion.  Luton (2004) encourages the study 
of the UDHR and Herefordshire (2006) includes the exploration of how Buddhist beliefs and 
values encourage Buddhist including Aung San Suu Kyi or the Dalai Lama in standing up for 
human rights.  On the other hand Birmingham (2007) made no reference to human rights 
although it does seek to support pupils having dispositions of respect for the dignity of all human 
beings (Ibid. p.10). 
 
Within the agreed syllabuses, religion is related to human rights in diverse ways making it unclear 
how effectively they may support the curriculum aim of a commitment to human rights. 
 
Human Rights in GCSE Religious Studies: GCSE is a major feature of religious education in Key 
Stage 4 (years 10 and 11) with over 182,000 students following a course in 2009 (BBC News 
Online 2009b).  Human rights is a feature of the subject specifications of the four main exam 
boards for English schools: AQA, OCR, EDEXCEL and WJEC.  They each offer specifications 
for religious studies with optional modules covering different combinations of religion, ethics and 
philosophy and giving different degrees of significance to human rights. 
 
Each exam board offers one route with a greater focus on human rights and another with little or 
no focus on this topic.  The AQA GCSE Specification for Religious Studies B (2008b) has a topic 
area entitled Religion and Human Rights.  This requires students to be familiar with religious 
attitudes to law and human rights and the impact of religion and rights.  It includes a study of 
human rights declarations, organisations that campaign for human rights and case studies related 
to human rights (Ibid. pp.8!9).  Human rights are a substantive component of this specification, 
which is of an ethical and multi-religious character.  EDEXCEL also has a specification with a 
focus on Religion, Rights and Responsibilities which links religious sources to human rights 
across a range of issues: medical, scientific and political.  This links rights to parables and 
teachings in the Bible, providing an opportunity for substantive linking between Christian 
traditions and human rights (EDEXCEL 2008, p.46).  OCR has a trial specification, Religious 
Studies C (Religion and Belief in Today’s World) (OCR 2009a), which addresses issues of 
religion and human rights through examples of violations of human rights and the (negative) 
impact of religion on personal freedom.  It lists freedom of speech in Denmark and the cartoons 
depicting Muhammad, ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia and persecutions of minority 
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Christians as topics for study.  It also explores issues linking religion and rights including same 
sex marriages and employment law and religious observance (Ibid. p.14). It does not refer to 
ways in which religion might have a positive impact on human rights. This differs from the other 
treatments of human rights in that it focuses directly on recent and particularly controversial 
example issues in response to recommendations in a 2007 Ofsted report (2007).  Religious 
Studies B (WJEC 2010a) addresses human rights, including the life of a believer who has 
campaigned for human rights, and asks questions about who should have human rights, how 
people can get justice and what motivates people to seek such justice for others.  It also examines 
the concept of dignity with reference to whether people should be treated equally. 
 
Each exam board has specification ‘routes’ with more modest treatments of human rights.  AQA 
GCSE Specification for Religious Studies A (2008a) gives systematic treatment of single religions 
and their ethical systems (options include Christianity and Christianity: Ethics, for example).  It 
does not specify human rights as a topic, but does explore the ethical issues which religious 
believers see as right to life issues.  The OCR specification Religious Studies A (World Religions) 
(OCR 2009b) gives cursory attention to human rights as a small element of one section.  The 
specification Religious Studies A (WJEC 2010b) includes brief reflection on the value of the 
human being and issues of justice and rights.  The specification Religious Studies B (Philosophy 
and/or Applied Ethics) (OCR 2009c) does not cover human rights in a substantive way. 
 
Students taking GCSE Religious Studies may therefore follow courses which include substantive 
treatments of human rights.  Four approaches can be identified: 
 
1. The study of rights in association with religious beliefs in right to life issues: this refers 
to issues such as abortion and euthanasia where believers may refer to ideas about the 
right to life in support of their attitudes to such issues.  It is frequently linked to ideas 
about the sanctity of dignity of human life. 
2. The study of human rights documents including the UDHR. 
3. The study of human rights advocacy including the role of Non-Government 
Organisations: this might be in terms of charities campaigning against poverty and for 
fair trade, but might also include specific human rights groups such as Amnesty 
International. 
4. The study of recent human rights issues related to religion: these include both issues of 
religious freedom, religious persecution, and also conflicts between religion and the right 
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to free expression. 
 
There are also routes of study which only explore human rights in as far as they examine issues 
which are seen in right to life terms and there are options with little or no reference to human or 
moral rights. 
 
 
 Diverse approaches to human rights in RE 
 
At the national non-statutory level, RE is seen as playing an important role in relation to human 
rights in terms of supporting children’s moral development through the link between religious 
beliefs and rights and responsibilities.  This rationale is found in many cases at a local statutory 
level but approaches differ widely.  As a consequence, pupils may deduce many different things 
about the relationship between rights and religion through RE in England: 
  
• Human rights are a significant component of study and include international declarations 
and specific incidents related to religion and human rights. 
• Human rights are consistent with religious moral responses. 
• A commitment to the worth of the human person at the foundational level, as a key value 
that religion offers (though the phrase human dignity is seldom used). 
• What is important is how religions influence believers in their approach to human rights. 
• Rights offer a framework for understanding religious moral conduct. 
• Moral rights, rather than human rights per se, are important in the area of right to life issues 
and religions have particular views on a number of human rights issues that differ from 
those of others. 
• Human rights are not a noteworthy element in the study of religion. 
• Human rights constitute or reflect a secular worldview (in one case an agreed syllabus 
listed them as a secular worldview). 
 
Some of these approaches imply a division or conflict between religion and human rights; others 
present a blurred boundary with significant overlap, while others still suggest no value to the 
study of human rights in RE.  The National Curriculum (QCA 2007b) aim of encouraging pupils 
to be committed to human rights is supported more strongly by some of these approaches than 
others.  Curricula differences mean pupils are unlikely to encounter the full range of different 
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approaches and links between religion and human rights in RE.  Pupils may learn that human 
rights express shared values that many different religions support, or that it constitutes a non-
religious secular worldview or an ethical alternative to religion.  They may learn that the issue is 
characterised as a conflict between ideas or that it reflects a convergence among different peoples 
who share a desire to eradicate injustice.  The factors influencing a pupil’s experience will be 
their locality, and the school choice of exam board.  This seems arbitrary.  Absent from 
curriculum documents is the suggestion that theology may offer a foundation or basis for human 
rights. 
 
It may be difficult for Agreed Syllabus Conferences to fully align RE in support of human rights.  
There is a sense that individual rights do not adequately reflect religious notions of ethical 
behaviour that may more often be seen in terms of duty; for instance religious responsibilities are 
sometimes placed oppositionally to secular rights (Runzo 2003).  Among Christians there are 
debates about whether human rights are adequately supported in the Old Testament and concerns, 
also shared by Muslims, that human rights do not acknowledge God as the ultimate source 
(Soulen & Woodhead 2006; Traer 1998).  Pagels writes that the concept of human rights, ‘does 
not occur in ancient rabbinic Judaism,’ (Pagels 1979, p.4) and Henkin observes, ‘Judaism knows 
not rights but duties, and at bottom, all duties are to God.’ (Henkin 1976, p.473)  Human rights 
seem to detract from the sense of religious duty and responsibility that is such a key feature of 
many religions. 
 
It is not just curriculum organisation that may affect how the relationship between religion and 
rights is presented and explored.  Approaches to religious education differ in ways that colour 
responses to human rights.  Pedagogies that draw on theology (such as Copley 2005 and Wright 
2000) may query the value of human rights in RE if the preferred theology is critical of rights 
thinking.  Ethnographic or educational approaches to RE (Grimmitt 2000; Jackson 1997, 2004) 
may see greater validity in their inclusion, given the widespread political and legal acceptance of 
rights.  However, religious stances on human rights seem to be in a period of transition and in 
some traditions changes in attitudes to rights are clearly evident.  For example, the Catholic 
Church originally saw rights as an alien idea (Langan 1998) but they have become widely 
accepted as things grounded in the theology of the dignity of the human person (Coleman 1984), 
even though they still have critics (Pell 2003).  Langan (1998) has observed a rich theological 
diversity of a dozen different conceptualisations: 
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1. Theology as a foundation 
2. Theology as motivation 
3. Theology as prophet denouncing the evils of suffering 
4. Theology as stating general norms to which specific norms (e.g. the role of women in 
religious leadership) should be subordinated 
5. Theology setting practical agendas through institutional support 
6. Theology as particularist and exclusivist opposing the universalism of rights 
7. Theology as universalist (in seeking salvation for all) to the particularism of (western) 
human rights 
8. Theology as providing an opportunity to transcend their own interests (which rights focus 
on) 
9. Theology as an umpire to judge how to use the ‘trumps’ of human rights 
10. Theology as a communitarian argument to contrast with the libertarian vision of rights 
11. Theology as offering a supernaturalist individualism (through individual salvation) 
12. Theology as opposed to a rationalist communitarianism of rights governed communities 
13. Theology as reflection, to human rights realization 
(Ibid. p.252) 
 
Thus the relationships between rights and religion are complex and multifarious. Langan’s list 
challenges any simplistic account of this relationship in school curricula. 
 
What appears in the GCSE specification or the local agreed syllabuses may be due to an implicit 
preferred conceptualisation of the link between human rights and religion.  The composition of 
different religious, professional and political representatives will colour responses to the language 
of the new curriculum or the NFRE with its leaning towards human rights.  The particular 
theological views of the traditions represented, or even the particular denominations within those 
traditions, may determine whether human rights are warmed to as valuable content for the 
curriculum, or viewed sceptically as alien ideas pushing out more justifiable theological concepts.  
This in turn has implications for how RE contributes to community cohesion and the extent to 
which the curriculum can reflect the more controversial religious topics linked to rights.  While in 
general terms the exam specifications reflect a similar range to the agreed syllabuses and non 
statutory documents, there does seem to be a stronger emphasis on human rights as an area to be 
studied in the RE GCSE documents than either of the curricula sources.  Though this cannot be 
argued too strongly, there is a suggestion of two forces resisting a study of rights and religion in 
RE: a theological conservatism which limits human rights from a main focus in LAS, and a 
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national political wish to locate rights within citizenship education (CE). 
 
 
Part Three: Citizenship education 
 
Since 2000 citizenship education (CE) in secondary schools has been a compulsory feature of the 
National Curriculum as a subject in its own right, though it existed as a theme of the curriculum 
before then (Banks 2007).  Human rights are a major feature of CE alongside responsibilities and 
duties.  CE addresses issues relating to, ‘social justice, human rights, community cohesion and 
global interdependence, and encourages pupils to challenge injustice, inequalities and 
discrimination’ (QCA 2007a, p.27).  It provides an opportunity for students to explore different 
kinds of rights, obligations and responsibilities including political, legal, human, social, civic and 
moral.  In CE, pupils, ‘explore contested areas surrounding rights and responsibilities, for 
example the checks and balances needed in relation to freedom of speech in the context of threats 
from extremism and terrorism’ (Ibid. p.29).  Pupils are encouraged to explore topical issues as a 
way of engaging with values and principles underpinning human rights, and the idea of equality is 
the key principle referred to (QCA 2007a). 
 
Just over 96,000 students sat a Citizenship GCSE in 2009 (BBC News Online 2009a).  GCSE 
papers explore rights issues, the historical struggle for freedom, the rights and responsibilities of 
citizens, political, legal and human rights and rights conflicts (AQA 2008c).  Campaigning groups 
are studied (EDEXCEL 2009), as are the role of the international organisations (OCR 2009d).  
Philosophical ideas of rights are not mentioned in any of the GCSE specifications and there is a 
tendency to see religion in terms of rights conflicts. 
 
The politics, philosophy, theology and criticality of human rights in CE 
 
CE is attentive to the application of human rights to issues, the international and local human 
rights structure and some of the more contentious rights issues.  It is not concerned with the 
philosophical or historical development of human rights or moral rights.  The emphasis on the 
legal dimension of human rights is much greater than the political debates about human rights, 
which are not specifically included beyond reference to rights conflict.  There is a significant 
debate in political theory and philosophy in which the idea of human rights is questioned (Etzioni 
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1993; MacIntyre 1995).  It might be thought that such theoretical debates are too complex for 
pupils studying at GCSE level, but there are examples of similar degrees of complexity in 
Religious Studies GCSE.  For example in the area of euthanasia there are examples of pupils 
engaging with conceptual subtleties.  On the one hand, there are those who see the right to life as 
primarily about autonomy and the freedom to choose the time and nature of death.  On the other, 
there are those who see the right to life and a limitation on human power over life and death 
because of the sanctity of life and the authority of God.  The conflicts between individual rights 
and community responsibilities, or natural rights and contractual rights should present no greater 
complexity. 
 
The absence of a specific recognition of the plurality of theories of rights and the emphasis on 
transformation in global issues make a potent mix for a post-colonial era.  An acknowledgement 
of different conceptualisations of rights might temper simplistic applications of unquestioned 
western liberal norms to other parts of the world (Gearon 2002). 
 
There is little reference to religious rationalisations or approaches to human rights in CE 
curriculum documents.  They do not refer to religion as a basis for the support of human rights, 
either in terms of a foundational doctrine or as a spur to campaigning against social justice.  Nor 
does it engage with some of the religious opposition to human rights, for instance from those who 
see human rights as a western secular idea opposed to non-western religious convictions or 
philosophies (Wang 2002). 
 
These issues seem to be particularly important if claims about the universality of human rights are 
to be taken seriously and if the HRE aim of understanding and friendship between different 
religious cultural groups is to be approached with any integrity. 
 
CE seems not to be centrally concerned with the foundation concepts which underpin 
international rationalisations of human rights, such as dignity, or the different philosophical and 
religious discourses surrounding rights.  It avoids a philosophical approach to the study of rights, 
so underlying or implicit philosophies are unacknowledged.  Perhaps the most obvious one is the 
constant linking, and arguably tempering, of rights with responsibilities.  The phrase rights and 
responsibilities is commonly found in religious conceptualisations of human rights (Runzo 2003) 
and communitarian ideas of rights (Etzioni 1993) where the sense of duty to others may be 
considered a priority over and above individual rights.  It could be argued that the linking simply 
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reflects the idea that a right infers a responsibility to acknowledge it, but the constant coupling 
gives equivalence to the concepts and implies inseparability.  Rights are afforded to individuals to 
restore power imbalances where suffering is experienced.  In international expressions of human 
rights such the UDHR, rights are universal and not conditional on the moral conduct of the 
individual.  You do not get the right because you respect the rights of others, you get it because 
you have an inherent worth, or dignity (UN General Assembly 1948, Preamble and Article 1).  
The association with responsibilities seems to diminish the power imbalance often found in 
human rights issues.  There are numerous examples of categories of people who do not have 
much power to respect the rights of others.  Small children or sick or elderly people have equal 
rights but they do not have equal responsibilities, and they may deserve priority consideration.  
Those in positions of power and wealth, it could be argued, have greater responsibilities than 
those who are enslaved or in absolute poverty.  Dignity is unearned (Debes 2009). 
 
The complexity and plurality of theoretical understandings of human rights appears to be absent 
from the curriculum.  They are presented in declaratory terms, taking the shape of a set of 
unquestioned absolutes.  This is a feature of human rights education more widely (Keet 2007) but 
it is strengthened in CE by the emphasis on legal accountability and behaviour in the workplace. 
 
 
Part Four: Religion, plurality and dialogue 
 
RE curricula encourage an understanding that beliefs are associated with rights, and influence 
attitudes to human rights and certain rights issues.  The provision is not standardised because 
schools have considerable choice about which GCSEs to follow and the RE curriculum is 
determined either by the particular Local Agreed Syllabus (LAS) or the Governors in the case of 
some schools.  A variety of different theological, philosophical or ethical understandings of the 
relationships between religion and human rights are expressed across the diverse curricula.  The 
extent to which RE supports the National Curriculum (QCA 2007b) aim of engendering a 
commitment to human rights is difficult to ascertain given this variety.  None of the individual 
curriculum documents reflected the nature, breadth or significance of the different relationships 
between religion and rights included.  Pupils may engage with some aspects of human rights but 
not others.  They may explore religious advocates of human rights or attitudes to rights issues.  It 
is less likely that they will study theological accounts of human rights. 
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The possible religious foundations, influences and interconnections with human rights and HRE 
could be more clearly acknowledged.  Separating the teaching of the application of rights (RE) 
from the explanations of rights institutions and documents (CE), by locating them in the two 
subjects, fails to adequately appreciate interconnections between one and the other.  This 
interconnection is apparent in issues where debates about human rights are important.  For 
instance, questions about the status of the embryo in medical ethics may by answered from a 
religious perspectives of rights, which in turn is based on theological understandings of the 
human person.  Others come to it from a politically informed philosophical perspective.  
Religious beliefs have some bearing on professional duties, as indicated by the right doctors have 
to not participate in abortions on conscientious grounds.  These issues involve theological, 
political and legal considerations about the balance of acceptable civic and professional 
responsibilities and the significance of conscientious ethical action and religious beliefs.  There 
is, therefore, a need to rethink the division of human rights across these two subject areas. 
 
One way of approaching human rights in RE is to view it as offering a common auditorium for 
discourse about rights.  Common here means inclusive of all and accessible to all.  The hope here 
is that a common auditorium is a cohesion enhancing element allowing for differently conceived 
moral principles to be engaged and examined within a common framework.  The question about 
the place of religion and philosophy in HRE is stimulated by issues to do with the rights of 
recognition (Taylor 1994), the right for different cultural, ethnic or religious groups to be 
included in notions of society.  It is also stimulated by the idea that dialogue between civilisations 
is an important component of peace and reconciliation building (Kung 1991, 1996; Runzo 2003).  
The common auditorium accepts plurality in engaging with human rights dialogue.  In this case 
human rights are seen from different religious and philosophical perspectives to inform moral 
behaviour.  The many ideas and values that form a basis for human rights: justice, equality, 
democracy and dignity are understood through different religious and philosophical perspectives 
and through the experience of different contexts.  Human rights viewed in this way could be an 
important focus for interfaith dialogue and study in the curriculum.  This would need to go further 
than giving human rights an auditing role against which religions could be measured.  Such an 
auditorium could be thought of as a space for encouraging discussion and conversation to explore 
these matters. 
 
The necessity of including a plurality of approaches is seen as an important component for CE.  
Banks has argued that approaches to citizenship that discount diversity and promote 
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assimilationist conceptions of human rights are ineffective in a transformed twenty-first century 
world (Banks 2007, 2009).  Peter Figueroa (2000, 2004) has suggested that citizenship requires a, 
‘critical, questioning, but appreciative, approach toward one's own beliefs and values, as well as 
respect for, and a critical, questioning approach toward the beliefs and values of others.’ (2004, 
p.227)  Multiple perspectives of human rights would therefore be an important feature of studying 
human rights, though it is not within the scope of CE curriculum documents. 
 
RE may have a more distinctive role to play in teaching human rights if the aim was understood 
in terms of a commitment to multi-perspectival and interfaith dialogue about human rights, rather 
than a commitment to human rights per se.  Such an approach is encouraged by those who are 
critical of exclusively western ideas of human rights.  Baxi has argued that a plurality of voices is 
a key component of contemporary human rights discourse.  It overcomes the tendency from the 
past of discounting the perspectives of non-western civilisations and using rights to identify 
which groups should be excluded from moral consideration (Baxi 2003).  The somewhat 
declaratory treatment of human rights in the CE curriculum does not make reference to different 
notions of human rights, different philosophies of human rights, and the RE curricula do not 
provide coverage of human rights in sufficient complexity. 
 
By including a plurality of voices in the human rights conversation it is more likely that 
unidentified examples of suffering can be revealed, rather than concealed.  Such an approach 
could be articulated in the local statutory curriculum documents if it was felt that RE should be 
more strongly committed to promoting human rights dialogue, and if it was felt religion could be 
seen as a promoter of human rights.  It would recognize the insight that human rights are formed 
in particular cultural, philosophical and religious contexts.  It would, however, be a challenge to 
the idea that human rights are fixed, complete and not open to discussion.  The kind of moral 
education envisaged by a commitment to human rights changes according to whether plural 
perspectives and dialogue are encouraged, or whether the principal aim is the transmission of 
moral norms as standards to be adhered to. 
 
A plural perspective encourages dialogue in exploring human rights and the values underpinning 
them.  Dialogue is a central element to religious traditions.  This includes both dialogue between 
people of different religious beliefs and those of no religious beliefs  (Stern 2007, p.63).  
Dialogue emphasizes the need to explore and examine reasons.  It has been argued that there 
should be a greater integration of religion in the overall goals of education (Jackson 2007; 
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OSCE/ODIHR 2007).  In the NFRE (QCA 2007c) children are encouraged to explore different 
kinds of rights and obligations and how these affect both individuals and communities.  They 
investigate ways in which rights can compete and conflict and should consider people from 
different religious, cultural and philosophical groups, who can express a range of convictions on 
religious and moral issues (Ibid. p.267).  
 
There is scope in RE for both exploring religious polemic and practical co-operation; how 
members of religious communities co-operate on areas of common concern, such as areas of 
injustice, the alleviation of suffering and the application of compassion, as well as the distinctive 
theological understandings of the values at stake.  Theological rivalry and practical co-operation 
play important parts in interfaith dialogue (Lindholm & Eidsvag 2004, pp.59!60). 
 
However, in envisaging HRE as a conversation or dialogue, the inclusive plurality could descend 
into unchecked relativism, undermining all of the values thought to inspire human rights.  
Something else is needed to try to ground the conversation so that it does not become entirely 
untethered.  One key value underpinning human rights is the concept of human dignity.  It is one 
that is found in many religious traditions and also the UDHR (D'Arcy May 2006; Duffy & 
Gambatese 1999; Kamali 2002; Kraynak 2003; Novak 1998; Shultziner 2006) and while it 
remains disputed by some (Bagaric & Allan 2006; Macklin 2003), it has important implications 
for approaches to human rights issues (Schulman & Merrill 2008).  Sharma argues that the 
concept of dignity, the professed foundation of human rights in the UDHR, offers a focus for 
interfaith dialogue about the foundations of human rights (Sharma 2002).  For example, consider 
the Christian idea that human beings reflect the image of God and the image of Christ, or the 
Muslim idea that human beings are vice regents of God.  Rather than representing human rights 
as a secular system, it could be envisaged within RE in plural terms.  RE can encompass religious 
narratives and explanations for the significance of the idea of dignity and how it, along with other 
doctrines, informs attitudes and approaches to issues of human rights.  This could lend religious 
insights to the references to self-worth which are common in the aims of the curriculum as they 
are defined in national and local curriculum documents. 
 
If a commitment to human rights dialogue is an important element in a child’s religious education 
and if religion plays an important role in helping people universalise more feelings, four 
developments are recommended: (1) the interconnection between different religious traditions, 
different meaning-giving narratives and human rights should be clearly identified in a more 
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joined up approach to human rights in RE and CE; (2) multi-perspectival and interfaith dialogue 
about human rights should be a key process in the approach to human rights; (3) the deeper 
concepts that lie beneath much of human rights discourse in religion should be explored, with 
particular attention given to the concept of the dignity of the human person; and above all, (4) 
unquestioning declaratory approaches to human rights education, and exclusively western 
conceptualisations of human rights need to be challenged. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter critically reviews the place of human rights in English curriculum documentation for 
secondary schools in the 11!16 age range.  It observes an increasing commitment to human rights 
and a sense of self-worth as key features of the moral education of children.  In religious 
education, the non-statutory NFRE contains references to human rights and acknowledges the 
link between religious narratives and values to attitudes on human rights issues.  However the 
statutory local agreed syllabuses have widely differing approaches to the inclusion of human 
rights and different attitudes towards it.  For some, rights are an essential element of religious 
ethics, but for others human rights are not examined or reflect a secular worldview.  Citizenship 
education is more clearly committed to human rights but the treatment it gives is principally in 
terms of legal structures and issues of injustice.  Theological or philosophical foundations of 
rights are not examined.  The application of rights to issues is divided, with moral issues located 
in RE and civic and global issues more prominent in CE (though some such as poverty and 
conflict exist in both). 
 
Human rights education is located in these two curriculum areas with values and beliefs treated in 
one and structures and laws in the other.  The separation of these elements in the curricula 
produces unhelpful dislocations.  Values and beliefs play an important part in motivating 
affinities or tensions within human rights structures.  Human rights concerns arise from 
experiences of suffering and strong sentimental responses of solidarity.  There are very important 
connections between our moral responses to those in need and the systems which seek to reduce 
such suffering.  This curriculum division reflects a pattern in approaches to HRE found 
elsewhere, some of which seem to be inclusive of religious dimensions, and others which 
articulate an exclusion of religion.  The argument about whether religion is a force for good in 
human rights and whether it detracts from them is acted out within these educational settings.  
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The consequence for the curriculum is that important insights on human rights may be lost from 
pupil learning.  There are compelling reasons to embrace a pluralistic approach that includes a 
range of different approaches to human rights, rather than an exclusive one which articulates or 
advocates a single philosophy of human rights.  In a postsecular society where religion has been 
transformed, rather than removed, by secularisation, HRE must reflect this new context.  This 
reality is recognized in intercultural education projects which are increasingly reflecting religious 
diversity and inter-religious education.  CE and RE have reasons to collaborate in general terms 
for, as Jackson (2003) argues, an understanding of religion offers insights into debates about the 
nation state, culture, ethnicity and identity, as well as the individual experience of pupils in a 
context of social plurality (Ibid. pp.22!23).  This chapter has demonstrated that collaborative and 
inter-disciplinary approaches also help provide understanding in human rights education 
particularly if the curriculum that encourages dialogue around and between the plural 
perspectives on human rights and the values that underpin them. 
 
However, critical questions about the nature of the values that underpin human rights need to be 
addressed.  Is there a central idea around which a consensus may be established?  Chapters 3 and 
4 look at the prominence and meanings of dignity and how it may offer a focus for such a 
consensus.  The second question is whether this value has meaning within human rights 
education; this is the focus of the concept analysis in Chapter 5.  The third question is whether 
those values should be seen in exclusive or inclusive terms and whether there should be a 
plurality of understandings or a universal understanding; this question is the focus of Chapter 6.  
Finally, we may ask what a curriculum based on this idea might look like; this is the focus of 
Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 3 
The importance of dignity for human rights 
 
Human rights contain many concepts: equality, brotherhood, respect, fundamental freedoms, 
diversity and tolerance.  This thesis identifies dignity as a concept for analysis in its relationship 
to human rights and HRE.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) affords dignity a 
position of particular foundational importance on which rights are based, ‘Whereas recognition of 
the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is 
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.’ (Preamble)  The term appears in many 
subsequent human rights agreements but it is also an idea that has achieved considerable 
influence beyond the UDHR.  It is a focal point of interest in theological and philosophical 
discourses and it is found in human rights law and national constitutions as well as medical and 
biological ethics debates.  At the same time it is an elusive concept, sometimes discarded, yet 
frequently revisited as an idea that encapsulates the mystery of the nature and worth of the human 
person, ‘In each of us there dwells a mystery, and that mystery is the human personality.  We 
know that an essential characteristic of any civilisation worthy of the name is respect and feeling 
for the dignity of the human person.’ (Maritain 1943, p.5) 
 
There are two aims of this chapter: first to analyse the concept of dignity in the UDHR and other 
human rights documents; second to analyse the current ‘dignity discourse’ across a range of fields 
including law, medicine, philosophy and theology. 
 
It is not intended to provide a full survey of all cultural references to dignity here.  Nor is the 
focus of this chapter the meaning of the concept (the subject of Chapter 5).  Rather, the chapter 
discusses important signposts to those references and arguments and more importantly, it 
establishes that dignity is a prevalent idea in the contemporary cultural consciousness.  If dignity 
has an important place in human rights then arguably it should have an important place in human 
rights education (the focus of Chapter 6).  This is one of the core arguments of this thesis. 
 
The chapter is formed of five sections.  Each section is based on an interpretation of the status or 
nature of dignity found in the dignity discourses.  The first section, Dignity and the cultural 
milieu of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, examines the common view that the 
concept of dignity is a defining idea of the modern era.  It focuses on the presence of the concept 
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within the UDHR (1948), as a foundational feature of human rights in that document.  This 
distinguishes the UDHR from other earlier declarations that made no reference to dignity as a 
foundation.  The second section, An undefined foundation, examines the question of the lack of 
definition of dignity in the UDHR.  The dignity of the human person has taken on the form of a 
commonly held belief and is sometimes presented as a position of consensus for many different 
theological, philosophical and ideological positions.  The third section, An unsatisfactory 
ambiguity, critically reviews criticisms of the concept.  Dignity may be a widely held belief but it 
is also critically contested, viewed with suspicion and scepticism, and by some, seen as a weak or 
even dangerous idea.  Despite the problems or difficulties with the concept of dignity, this 
examination finds important reasons to persist with the concept.  The fourth section Enduring 
qualities, critically considers the arguments for retaining dignity as an important idea, given its 
widespread acceptance, recognizable form, and importance as a potential tool for averting 
barbarism.  The fifth section, The primacy of dignity, identifies the preoccupation that many 
scholars in different disciplines have with dignity, including law, medicine, philosophy and 
theology.  In this thesis the argument that dignity endures as a primary moral concept is 
advanced. 
 
The limitations of the chapter are that it cannot comprehensively consider in depth all arguments 
against dignity, as a purely philosophical thesis might seek to do.  Instead it serves as a measure 
of its presence in human rights documents and critical discourses in many disciplines, theoretical 
and practical.  If this presence is strong enough then it can be said with confidence that dignity is 
an important idea within human rights education. 
 
 
Part One: Dignity and the cultural milieu of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
The idea that every human person possesses an inherent dignity is a feature of the modern era. 
Taylor describes it as the primary intuition of Western moral consciousness (Taylor 1989).  It is 
one of the moral beliefs, notions or intuitions that cluster around the sense that the human being 
should be respected and that the prohibitions and obligations that this imposes on us are grave.  
Henkins refers to it in intrinsic terms when he suggests, ‘there is now a working consensus that 
every man and woman, between birth and death, counts, and has a claim to an irreducible core of 
integrity and dignity.’ (Henkin 1990, xi & p.193)  Goldewijk writes that a concern for dignity in 
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economic, social and cultural rights points to the ‘transformation of humiliating and 
dehumanizing realities.’  (Goldewijk et al. 2002, p.4) Goldewijk writes: 
 
Dignity is inherent to each and every person simply because of his or her being human. As such, 
dignity is a category of being, not just of having. Indeed, human dignity cannot be limited to 
something that people ‘have’; it must first of all be seen as belonging to their being. Human 
dignity does not come from status, nationality, ethnicity or any human accomplishment. Whereas 
your dignity can be severely damaged no one can take your dignity away from you – not if you are 
poor or belong to an ethnic minority or are physically or mentally disabled. (Ibid. p.6)  
 
There is a phenomenological character of Goldewijk's analysis. He grounds dignity in history and 
human experience. Dignity is a central maxim of the modern moral milieu, which has become so 
generally and widely recognized as a feature of contemporary human life that it requires no 
independent support for people to adhere to it, ‘No other ideal seems so clearly accepted as a 
universal social good.’ (Schachter 1983, p.848)  It is an idea that permeates all aspects of human 
existence, a prism through which experience is interpreted and identified, ‘the sense of dignity is 
woven into this modern notion of the importance of ordinary life.’ (Taylor 1989, pp.15!16)  It is 
a concept that has imprinted itself widely upon modern consciousness and is one which is related 
to human rights in important ways, thus: 
 
[R]eligion, traditional societies, socialism, developers, will find, I believe, that their values and 
goals, even along their particular path, depend on individual dignity and fulfillment, and in a 
modern world have to be firmly supported by the idea of human rights. (Henkin 1990, p.193) 
 
Schachter, Henkin and Taylor perceive dignity to be a widely held, foundational, essential and 
culturally embedded idea that needs no further support.  The association with human rights is 
modern.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights not only establishes, in Henkin’s words, an 
age of rights (Henkin 1990), but makes particular use of the idea of dignity.  Though the UDHR 
is situated in a line of declarations that date to earlier times, including the 1689 English Bill of 
Rights, Thomas Paine’s 1781 Rights of Man and the French 1789 Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and of the Citizen (Hayden 2001), it is unlike them in its use of dignity.  No predecessor 
makes specific reference to dignity (Klug 2000).  ‘[W]hile the struggle to assure a life of dignity 
is probably as old as human society itself, reliance on human rights as a mechanism to realize that 
dignity is a relatively recent development.’ (Donnelly & Howard 1987, p.1) 
 
Earlier declarations were often influenced by or based on notions of natural law with links to 
religious beliefs (Finnis 1980), but the UDHR makes dignity a central foundation.  Its presence is 
interpreted as a step away from a reliance on a defined theological or philosophical rationale and 
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it is a term which some claim can stand alone without divine assistance (cf. Mahoney 2008, 
p.145).  Klug writes: 
 
[T]he concept of dignity replaced the idea of god or nature as the foundation of ‘inalienable 
rights.’  This completed the transition from ‘natural rights’ to ‘human rights’; a term which did not 
come into common usage until this time … No longer was a higher being or pre-existing state of 
nature cited as the source of fundamental rights.  Rights were to be accorded to all human beings 
without distinction because of the essential dignity of all humanity. (Klug 2000, p.101) 
 
However, it is not clear that the inclusion of dignity relieves the need for there to be any 
theoretical rationale to understand the idea or explain how the idea justifies rights, or more 
simply, how rights can be justified at all.  Dignity, though a central moral maxim, is also a 
mysterious idea that is given meaning through theological and philosophical frameworks 
(Maritain 1943; Tinder 2003).  In the UDHR it seems to have no religious connotation.  The 
modern inclusion of dignity in human rights declarations can be seen to distance human rights 
from a particular theoretical justification. 
 
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights mentions dignity in five places: twice in the 
Preamble and then in Articles 1, 22, and 23 paragraph 3.  Like eighteenth century declarations 
such as the French Declaration of 1789 (Hunt 2007, p.204), the Preamble gives an explanation of 
why it is necessary to have these human rights, but unlike them, dignity features prominently: 
 
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of 
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. 
… 
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and 
women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom. (UN General Assembly 1948, Preamble) 
 
Dignity has to be recognized, the declaration proclaims, and recognition in the second paragraph 
of the preamble involves ‘faith’ in the idea of dignity and worth, as well as the idea that human 
beings have these things.  There is no rationalistic or natural basis for dignity offered.  Secondly, 
recognition of faith in dignity is the foundation for the ultimate aims of human rights, namely 
freedom, justice and peace (Dicke 2002, p.118).  Faith in human dignity leads to a moral 
obligation.  Thirdly, dignity is owned by every human person.  Dignity is held or found within 
every human being without qualification.  The notion of equality, which is also a key idea of 
human rights, is about the equal dignity that human beings possess.  Dicke concludes, ‘dignity is 
an expression of the unity of humankind’ (Ibid. p.114).  This includes both a unity of the common 
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acclamation and belief that human beings have dignity, and also that all human beings are united 
in having this dignity.  At the very outset of the UDHR dignity is prominently placed with a 
newly articulated foundational role that universalises the equal status of all people and confirms a 
belief that this is a status of great worth.  The equality of rights and freedoms are based on the 
universality of human worth. 
 
Faith in dignity is ‘reaffirmed’ in the Preamble, suggesting that the character of dignity is pre-
existing, independent of any external attribution or conferment resulting from the proclamation of 
the UDHR (Grant 2007, p.3).  Both Dicke and Morsink see here a reference to the political 
experience of the atrocities of World War Two (Dicke 2002; Morsink 1999).  After those 
atrocities, dignity needs to be reaffirmed even if no philosophical or theological explanation of 
such dignity can easily be given.  Political motivation was strong enough to sidestep the issue of 
agreement over theoretical rationale.  In addition to this political and experiential dimension, it is 
notable that dignity is linked with freedom, reason and conscience, ‘All human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights.  They are endowed with reason and conscience and should 
act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.’ (UN General Assembly 1948, Article 1)  
These are ideas that are found in enlightenment, medieval and ancient sources on dignity and 
equality (See Chapter 4).  Dicke thinks the emphasis on the moral dimension of humanity rather 
than rationality alone follows in the wake of Kant and Rousseau, ‘[T]he Declaration is not based 
on a concept of man as a being that is able to produce culture by way of its technical reason, but 
rather refers to moral reasoning as establishing equality among human beings and thus giving the 
unity of mankind its ethical and moral meaning.’ (Dicke 2002, p.117) 
 
By inference human beings are born free in a political and historical sense, rather than free by 
nature, as eighteenth century declarations held with their emphasis on natural law.  The UDHR 
does not therefore stem directly from a single tradition or philosophical perspective.  There is a 
plurality of influences.  Ideas of freedom, reason, morality (conscience) and prescriptive action 
guiding behaviour are all linked to dignity, though the nature of that link is not made clear. 
 
Dignity is mentioned in the social rights of Articles 22 and 23.  Article 22 refers to the economic, 
social and cultural rights that are ‘indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his 
personality.’ (UN General Assembly 1948)  The social and cultural dimensions of life in some 
way reflect elements of human dignity.  In Article 22 rights are essential for the dignity of the 
human being and for the development of that human being.  However, Article 23 refers to the 
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‘right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence 
worthy of human dignity.’  Here the development of the human being is necessitated by dignity 
and if that quality of human life is not met, it should be brought about through state intervention.  
There is something about the conditions in which human beings live, and the extent to which 
these conditions encourage or discourage human development, that reflects or fails to reflect 
dignity.  The inclusion of social and cultural rights is an additional way in which the UDHR 
differs from previous rights declarations.  Social and cultural life are linked in some way to the 
intrinsic worth. 
 
The development of the human personality, which Article 22 links with dignity, is also found in 
Article 26, which suggests that, ‘Education shall be directed to the full development of the human 
personality.’ (Ibid.)  This establishes the sense that dignity is recognized through the presence of 
certain conditions in working, cultural, social and political life.  By implication, if those 
conditions are not met then dignity is not recognized and the human personality not fully 
developed.  There is some implication here of a relationship between human dignity and the 
human person.  The presence of dignity plays an important role in reflecting the interconnected 
nature of social, economic, political and civic rights, ‘Just as you cannot worship at the temple of 
liberty if you have nothing to eat, so if you want to protest about people going hungry in a land of 
plenty you need to have freedom of expression.’ (Singh 1997, p.54)  The idea of the full 
development of the human personality seems to encapsulate a wide range of expressions of 
human flourishing as illustrated by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum and their work on the 
capabilities approach to human development (Nussbaum 1999; Sen 1985, 1993). 
 
The UDHR presents itself as a principal tool for defending and advancing human dignity for 
everyone, not simply a nation’s citizens, with the intention of creating a moral purpose for all 
humankind (Klug 2000, p.100).  It has a supra-national ambition.  Mary Robinson, UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, described it as ‘the international keystone of human dignity’ 
(1998, p.253), arguing that, ‘its universal vocation to protect the dignity of every human being 
has captured the imagination of humanity.’ (Ibid. p.257)  The UDHR marks the advent of the 
contemporary human rights era, crystallising 150 years of struggle for rights, arising at that 
moment as a particular result of increasing pressure throughout the Second World War from 
many different parts of the world (Arieli 2002, p.1; Hunt 2007, pp.202ff; Morsink 1999, pp.1ff).  
The UDHR acted as a source of moral inspiration for the other human rights documents and 
conventions that followed (Langley 1999, xi.).  Today the contemporary human rights movement 
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is a global phenomenon and individuals use the declaration as a starting point for articulating the 
needs they have (Devine et al. 1999, p.59), though this does not imply that the human rights 
declarations and treaties have made a decisive impact.  Some argue the UDHR and subsequent 
conventions are ineffective, ‘in view of state sovereignty, states' responsibility for implementing 
human rights, and the absence of UN enforcement mechanisms.’ (Pollis & Schwab 2000, p.6; cf. 
Flood 1998 and Hathaway 2002, pp.1935ff)  The declaration both marks the beginning of the 
current human rights era and remains important currency in, and a moral inspiration for, the 
human rights discussions that pervade this era, even though later documents, such as the 
European Convention on Human Rights may be attributed with having established the most 
effective system for the international protection of human rights (Simpson 2001). 
 
In the twentieth century dignity forms a foundation for human rights.  This distinguishes the 
contemporary rights movement from earlier ones.  The UDHR is the first declaration to do this 
(Klug 2000), and in some sense distances human rights from previous links to God which took 
the form of links to natural law.  Dignity occurs in earlier rights discourses but not in the same 
way and without the same degree of importance.  Thomas Paine does mention dignity when he 
writes, ‘When I contemplate the natural dignity of man … I become irritated at the attempt to 
govern mankind by force and fraud.’ (quoted in Clapham 2007, p.9)  However it is likely that the 
kind of dignity to which Paine refers is closer to social standing than the individual worth 
indicated by the modern conception.  Through the association of dignity, social and cultural rights 
are bound to civic and political rights; the full development of the human person is an expressly 
acknowledged aim.  In this sense the UDHR is a developmental and therefore educational human 
rights declaration. 
 
Dignity is not simply found in the UDHR, but can be seen to influence a number of later 
declarations and many national constitutions.  Before the UDHR only a handful of countries 
mentioned dignity in their constitutions but since it dozens have done so.  The Finnish 
constitution, the Constitution of South Africa, the German Constitution, the Brazilian 
Constitution, the Angolan Constitution and many more all use the term dignity (Bagaric & Allan 
2006).  The UDHR provides the starting point for a discussion on dignity in human rights because 
of this influence and importance. 
 
The idea has some legal significance offering a language for judges to express the common core 
of beliefs, when dealing with issues related to the application of rights, especially in cases of 
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conflict between rights, the interpretation of rights or the generation of new rights (Carozza 2008; 
Grant 2007; McCrudden 2008; O'Connell 2008).  Despite the idea’s powerful cultural currency, 
however, it has a mysterious nature, and is undefined in the UDHR.  It is a non-empirical 
category which calls others into question and it does not entirely break the link with religious and 
philosophical traditions, though by not mentioning them by name might allow a wider range of 
theoretical narratives to be included in providing a rationale for human rights. 
 
 
Part Two: An undefined foundation 
 
The omission of a precise definition or explanation of dignity and its function as a foundation of 
human rights in the UDHR was deliberate.  Maritain commented at the time of drafting the 
UDHR that there was considerable difficulty in achieving agreement over a specified religious or 
philosophical foundation (UNESCO 1948).  The emphasis was given to agreeing on rights, not 
agreeing on the reasons for rights: 
 
[W]e adopt a practical viewpoint and concern ourselves no longer with seeking the basis and 
philosophic significance of human rights but only their statement and enumeration, we have 
before us an entirely different picture … not only is agreement possible between the members of 
opposing philosophic schools, but … the operative factors in any historical introduction to a joint 
assertion of human rights are less the schools of philosophy themselves than currents of thought 
… where the principal part has been played by the lessons of experience and history. (Maritain 
1948, vi) 
 
The drafters prioritised the political and pragmatic imperative of responding to a perceived need 
in the light of the experience of the horrors of the war.  They were not able, or did not have time 
to develop a deeper theoretical alignment of theologies and philosophies, which Maritain refers to 
as ‘currents of thought.’  It was more important to make a universal declaration to which all could 
attest.  Criticism about the lack of definition needs to be set against this historical context.  There 
was, however, some broad sense given to the idea at the time.  This was indicated by René 
Cassin, French legal scholar and later Nobel Prize laureate, who worked as one of Eleanor 
Roosevelt’s team on the drafting of the UDHR (Ishay 2004).  Cassin identified within the UDHR 
four foundation blocks of the declaration: dignity, liberty, equality and brotherhood, terms which 
are all mentioned in Article 1.  He suggested that the heading of dignity referred to common 
values shared by all individuals that crossed religious and cultural boundaries (Ibid. p.222).  The 
idea that human dignity has intrinsic worth is found across different philosophical or religious 
traditions (Falconer 1986) and this is acknowledged in Hersch’s work with UNESCO (UNESCO 
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1969), which presents dignity as a concept present in different civilisations and a basis for human 
rights.  Louis Henkin maintains the view that dignity is a unifying foundation for human rights, 
‘religion, traditional societies, socialism, developers, will find, I believe, that their values and 
goals, even along their particular path, depend on individual dignity and fulfillment and in a 
modern world have to be firmly supported by the idea of human rights.’ (Henkin 1990, p.193)  
Paul Gordon Lauren (1998) agrees, arguing that all major religions express the belief that human 
beings have an inherent dignity: 
 
All of the major religions of the world seek in one way or another to speak to the issue of human 
responsibility to others.  Despite their vast differences, complex contradictions, internal paradoxes, 
cultural variations, and susceptibility to conflicting interpretation and fierce argumentation, all of 
the great religious traditions share a universal interest in addressing the integrity, worth, and 
dignity of all persons and consequently, the duty toward other people who suffer without 
distinction. (Lauren 1998, p.5) 
 
If these general comments about the ways in which religious traditions speak about the idea of 
dignity are accepted, they can only be so in provisional terms.  The question how do religious 
traditions speak about the idea of dignity must then be answered.  Setting that aside for the 
moment, if the claims about dignity in the UDHR are taken seriously, they occupy an essential 
space in the human rights artifice.  Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan summarised the 
central claim about dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international 
declarations when he said, ‘Human rights assert the dignity of each and every human being, and 
the inviolability of the individual’s rights.  They belong inherently to each person, each individual 
and are not conferred by or subject to any governmental authority.’ (Annan quoted in The Star 
1998) 
 
The place given to the concept in the UDHR is fundamental for human rights.  There is an 
association between a human being’s dignity and the inviolability of their rights.  People have 
rights because of their dignity, and that dignity and the rights that flow from it are inherent to 
each person.  Inherent dignity leads to inviolable rights.  Dignity is declared to exist and is 
recognized in human experience, but that is the only justification or proof given in support of the 
declaration.  It is an assertion, a claim or a belief that the signatories profess faith in.  The UDHR 
attaches no philosophical proofs to the idea. 
 
From dignity comes the assertion that a human being matters enough to change behaviour; that a 
human being matters so much, and in such a way, that no authority can justly ignore or disregard 
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it.  In his own summary, Kofi Annan recalls the motivation for human rights in the UDHR.  It is 
to protect individuals from their governments; to protect the individual from the power of the 
many or the majority.  Human dignity is a way of expressing a reason for that protection.  The 
good of the many or the state cannot be used to lightly set aside the moral significance of an 
individual.  Though not articulated, there is a parallel here with the philosophical challenge of 
Kant to utilitarianism.  Kant, with his emphasis on the treatment of a person always as an end, as 
well as a means, and his idea of universal moral norms, is a challenge to utilitarian thinking 
which seeks the greatest good for the greatest number. 
 
There has been some concern about rights inflation which has undermined the legitimacy of 
rights, that is that they now extend far beyond what was originally thought to be essential.  It is 
important to note that in many parts of the world, many millions of people live in situations that 
recall the experience that motivated the move to establish the UDHR over 60 years ago (cf 
Gorvin 2010).  For this reason dignity can be called, ‘the single most important principle which 
underpins the Universal Declaration.’ (Alston 1998, p.30) 
 
 
Part Three: An unsatisfactory ambiguity 
 
There are a number of criticisms that challenge the suitability of dignity.  If human rights are so 
important, the absence of an explained foundation is problematic.  Dignity is seen as polemical, 
vague, difficult to use practically, a weak defense against moral atrocities or inappropriately 
religious.  It may be helpful from the point of view of uniting people but perhaps that union is on 
false premises.  Others argue there are alternative concepts to dignity that are better.  These 
criticisms are significant and therefore merit expansion. 
 
(i) It undermines the existence of human rights: While dignity might have some meaning that 
could be discovered, it might equally not exist at all.  If dignity cannot be demonstrated to have a 
clear meaning, human rights as a whole are undermined.  Peter Singer sees dignity as one of a 
number of ideas introduced when reasons or arguments are lacking (Singer 1986).  It covers a gap 
that is produced once belief in God or natural law has been abandoned as a foundation.  It is 
something that cannot reasonably be defended.  MacIntyre suggests that it ends up being 
defended in much the same way that unicorns and witches could be defended (MacIntyre 1995).  
If human rights are important, then arguably they should rest on firmer grounds than dignity 
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provides.  Dignity’s weakness undermines the moral and philosophical integrity of human rights, 
and detracts from their power and importance.  Some conclude from this that such an imprecise 
term which lacks logical integrity should be replaced (Statman 2000).  
 
(ii) A concept that is polemical, rather than substantial: Dignity is a concept that works on both 
sides of arguments.  This suggests it has a polemical or perhaps emotive nature, rather than any 
substantial meaning.  For example, opponents of euthanasia argue that intentionally ending a 
person’s life does not uphold his or her dignity (Beyleveld & Brownsword 2001).  Conversely, 
supporters argue that death with dignity means allowing people to choose the time and nature of 
their life in some cases (Dworkin 1993).  Schulman (2008) illustrates this with the example of an 
elderly patient, diagnosed with early Alzheimer’s disease and inevitable decline into dementia 
and dependency (Ibid. p.4).  Should he or she stop taking heart medicine and opt for a quicker 
less distressing end?  Dignity can be used to inform three contradictory moral options.  It could be 
argued that it is permissible for the patient to quicken the end as a more digniﬁed and humane 
way, which forgoes the personal pain and family burden that he will become.  Alternatively this is 
wrong on account that shortening life is incompatible with the dignity owed to human life.  Or, 
out of ‘respect for the dignity and autonomy of all persons’ (not just the patient) the personal 
choice should be deferred to a competent authority irrespective of how the patient decides.  Each 
answer makes an appeal to human dignity, but the conclusions differ.  Deploying the argument 
for the dignity of the human person is an attempt to add ethical gravity to each side.  It has the 
effect of empowering arguments but does not help resolve differences.  A concept that cannot do 
this has little value to ethical decision making. 
 
(iii) An unclear concept cannot be put to good use: How can an unclear concept be of any 
practical use?  An idea that has no clear boundary, no clear definition or clarification, can be used 
in open ended ways to damaging effects.  It can be evoked to cover other ideas or beliefs which 
may or may not have merit, ‘As a legal or philosophical concept it is without bounds and 
ultimately is one incapable of explaining or justifying any narrower interests… it is a notion that 
is used by academics, judges, and legislators when rational justifications have been exhausted.’ 
(Bagaric & Allen 2006, p.260)  Even supporters of the concept such as Ronald Dworkin describe 
it as vague (Dworkin 1993).  Schachter observes, ‘it is not entirely satisfying to accept the idea 
that human dignity cannot be defined or analysed in general terms.’ (1983, p.849)  Such a 
situation might mean that the idea could cover almost any imaginable ethical position, a ‘gut 
reaction’ or a view of that which is socially desirable (O’Connell 2008, p.3). 
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(iv) A vague idea does not provide a robust defense against moral atrocities: Without a 
definition, there is a risk of a specious use of the concept, and we may not be able to draw 
specific implications for appropriate conduct (Schachter 1983, p.849).  If dignity is contentious 
and vague (Donnelly 2003), then it cannot provide a robust defense against the moral atrocities 
that human rights have sought to eradicate.  Ruth Macklin (2003) has called dignity a slogan, a 
useless concept which means no more than respect for the person or their autonomy, ‘In the 
absence of criteria that can enable us to know just when dignity is violated, the concept remains 
hopelessly vague.’ (Macklin 2003, p.1420) 
 
(v) An inappropriately religious idea: Some argue that dignity covertly draws in religious ideas 
which have been put to inappropriate use in secular literature and medical ethics.  Macklin (Ibid.) 
sees dignity as an indication that a religious, especially Roman Catholic notion, has crept into 
debates where such theological ideas have no warrant.  A concept with origins in Christian and 
Jewish traditions offers little to satisfy modern secular requirements (Bagaric & Allan 2006). 
 
(vi) Alternatives are better: Notions such as human rationality or autonomy are quite adequate 
without needing the dressing of dignity.  Macklin (2003) thinks dignity can be eliminated without 
any loss of content, as respect for the rational thought and autonomy of the person adequately 
describes the scope of the content of dignity. 
 
According to its critics, dignity is variously discarded for being intellectually barren, an 
inadequate foundation for human rights, or perhaps one indicator that their status is 
philosophically problematic.  Dignity is difficult to use practically to resolve differences, and it is 
potentially dangerous to rely upon to defend against moral atrocities.  It is an inappropriate 
theological idea out of place in a secular age for which more suitable alternatives can be found.  
Many of these claims depend upon the assertion that the idea is vague and unclear.  To fully test 
the veracity of these criticisms an examination of the concept is necessary and is undertaken in 
Chapter 4.  There are those, however, who see in the idea a number of enduring qualities. 
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Part Four: Enduring qualities 
 
Ultimately these criticisms of dignity do not appear to provide satisfactory reasons to abandon it 
altogether and there are many advocates of it.  It captures a mysterious quality of the human 
person, provides a point of consensus and can be recognized in human experiences.  It is a 
complex idea that restrains human behaviour and, were it to be put aside, would need to be 
replaced with another idea. 
 
(i) A mysterious concept captures the mysterious nature of human life: The human person is not 
easily defined and explained in philosophical or scientific terms, ‘It is not a precise concept, in 
the way that “electron” or “haemoglobin” are precise.  Nor is it merely conventional, in the way 
that “metre” or “gallon” are conventional.’ (Churchland 2008, p.100)  It has a mysterious nature 
and Kraynak observes, ‘the mystery of the human soul as the basis of human dignity implies a 
certain reverence and awe before the unknown and unknowable causes of human existence in the 
partly rational but mysterious universe.’ (Kraynak 2008, p.79) 
 
There are important philosophical questions to ask about the idea, but the dignity of the human 
person is difficult to define comprehensively, given that it rests in the complexity of the human 
being.  Human being and person are not terms that can be treated in a simplistic way.  The 
mysterious nature of human life and human experience is not a reason to disregard or devalue the 
person.  Moral decision making benefits from being subtly informed by ideas which capture the 
mysterious nature of life, experience, reflection, even consciousness, rather than those which seek 
to explain it away.  The fact that dignity may touch on deeper mysteries of life is not in and of 
itself a reason to abandon the idea but could in fact be an argument to pursue a deeper 
understanding.  Much more needs to be explored in the ways in which the human person is 
mysterious, and such explorations would need to consider the nature of consciousness, the mind, 
the nature of reflection and the human sense experience.  All of these factors seem important to 
understanding the moral dimension of the human person. 
 
(ii) Dignity is a point of consensus for many: The accusation that dignity is inappropriately 
Christian misses the observation that many people, religious and secular, find it useful.  It has, to 
borrow Nickel’s comment about rights, a determinate meaning that has gained widespread 
international acceptance (Nickel 2007, p.2).  Those who drafted the UDHR came from different 
theological and philosophical backgrounds and chose not to define dignity because of those 
 102 
different traditions.  Nevertheless they were able to agree on its inclusion.  The political and 
collegial nature of the formation of the UDHR is a reason for leaving the term undefined.  In such 
statements: 
 
[T]he meaning, content, and foundations of human dignity are never explicitly defined.  Instead, the 
affirmation of human dignity in these documents reflects a political consensus among groups that 
may well have quite different beliefs about what human dignity means, where it comes from, and 
what it entails.  In effect, ‘human dignity’ serves here as a placeholder for ‘whatever it is about 
human beings that entitles them to basic human rights and freedoms.’ (Schulman 2008, p.13) 
 
The absence of such a definition in the UDHR should not be used as an argument against dignity.  
To do so is to fail to take account of the political reality of seeking consensus among people of 
different religious and philosophical backgrounds.  It was left undefined for the purpose of 
achieving consensus, not because people felt it had no meaning.  This is a more inclusive 
approach which recognizes that there are many discourses of dignity just as there are many 
discourses of human rights (Baxi 2003).  Taking an exclusivist approach in what purports to be a 
universal declaration would simply have been impractical.  Such a course would suggest a final 
fully formed answer to the question of human moral significance had been achieved.  The 
implications of exclusive and inclusive notions of dignity for HRE are explored in Chapter 6. 
 
(iii) Dignity is a recognizable phenomenon: Dignity, though a difficult idea, is something which 
ordinary people can recognize in their human experience, both in their own lives and the lives of 
others, ‘When it has been invoked in concrete situations, it has generally been assumed that a 
violation of human dignity can be recognized even if the abstract term cannot be defined.  “I 
know it when I see it even if I cannot tell you what it is”.’ (Schachter 1983, p.849)  Dignity is not 
found in a gland and may present difficulties for scientists but it seems to be a moral value that 
can be observed or intuited in some way, ‘Step into any classroom, and after a few moments’ 
observation you will be able to tell whether the teacher is treating the students with respect or as 
raw materials to be stamped or manipulated.’ (Edel 1969, p.243)  Edel argues there is a large 
mass of phenomena that can be identified in the study of human dignity including the social and 
historical experience of mass movements, especially where human exploitation is concerned such 
as in slavery.  There is something about humanity that means that when atrocities are committed 
against people, the response against those atrocities touches some deep beliefs about human 
beings. 
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(iv) Dignity is a powerful restraint on dehumanisation: Dignity is an important moral metre and 
its removal is unlikely to lead to moral improvement.  Glover’s Moral History of the Twentieth 
Century argues that dignity has a role in actually preventing evil (Glover 1999).  He repeatedly 
demonstrates through studies of historical incidents that the denial of the dignity of the human 
person is a pre-requisite for their humiliation.  This denial of dignity manifests itself as the 
distancing and dehumanising which was necessary in conflicts in Viet Nam, the concentration 
camps, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for soldiers to commit acts of war and brutality.  This illustrates 
what happens when dignity is sublimated.  Glover identifies dignity as one of the moral resources 
of humanity.  His is not a work of theoretical ethics, but an observational study of dozens of first 
hand accounts of human behaviour in conflicts throughout the twentieth century, including many 
associated with the barbarism that inspired the UDHR itself.  Glover sees the recognition of 
dignity as a human response found in the core of humanity. It is also one that, as empirical 
evidence of inhumanity suggests, is not always there, but should be.  Recognition of human 
dignity is a necessary feature of human psychology.  Far from weakening moral protections, 
human inclination towards the recognition of dignity acts as a powerful restraint on barbarism 
(Glover 1999, p.23).  In close combat, human responses to the enemy that acknowledge the 
humanity of the enemy must be neutralised.  The enemy must be seen as no longer human but 
practically an animal.  The dehumanisation of the other is required for the soldier to act with 
brutality.  It is a psychological necessity to treat the other as though they were not human.  Glover 
gives examples of how the sudden accidental recognition of humanity can make it impossible for 
one person to continue humiliating another.  In one case, a South African policeman was 
brutalising school girls and beating them, when one lost a shoe.  Instinctively, following his 
upbringing, the policeman picked up the girl’s shoe and in so doing had recognized her as a 
person.  He could not go on to beat her with his stick any more and so left her.  Glover describes 
these moments as the breakthrough of sympathy, the breakthrough of recognition of the other 
person (Ibid.). 
 
It is possible that acts of violence to be committed with a sincere sense of compassion for the 
other, such as when a comrade kills a fellow soldier fallen in battle and suffering terribly from 
fatal injuries with no hope of treatment.  However, Glover’s argument is not that violent acts 
causing death could not be carried out without a moral sense of compassion, but rather that there 
are multiple examples of the organised distancing of the victims to enable acts of war and 
brutality to be carried out.  Furthermore, this process then led soldiers to go far beyond the 
necessities of warfare in their brutality, contributing to a century of massive civilian casualties. 
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(v) Human dignity is a complex idea and alternatives are not necessarily better: The dignity of 
the human person captures much more than notions of humiliation, rationality, autonomy, or 
respect alone!ideas which may be used in place of dignity.  Ideas such as rationality and 
autonomy are unhelpfully narrow.  Medical ethics deal with life where rationality and autonomy 
may be lessened or absent, as in foetuses and newborn babies, elderly people suffering dementia, 
or those who have lost capacities due to brain or nerve injury.  Reducing dignity to one of these 
ideas would allow for some persons, including especially vulnerable persons, to be excluded from 
having dignity.  Yet dignity is referred to within debates about medical ethics.  Dignity requires a 
response which recognizes the moral significance of the human person in a way which other 
concepts do not.  Respect is one way of describing the moral response to dignity but it does not 
actually replace dignity.  Dignity points to something about the status of the human being that has 
implications for how we should treat a person.  Respect describes the treatment, rather than the 
status.  It is justified by dignity. 
 
(vi) Dignity is a useful construct for further exploration: Edel (1969) establishes a rationale for 
the further analysis and investigation of dignity.  He believes human dignity is an ethical 
construct that may have a realistic interpretation and has sufficient indices to identify phenomena, 
‘It is increasingly becoming pertinent to problems of individual as against impersonal treatment 
in a large-scale and highly organized society with growing powers of controlling!and 
crushing!the individual.’ (Edel 1969, p.240)  This phenomenon lends weight to the argument to 
retain the concept and it is more in keeping with the use of the concept in the UDHR, which, as 
we have already noted above, has political and historical slant, rather than a specified 
philosophical one. 
 
The dignity of the human person is a phrase that encapsulates the mysteriousness of human 
experience.  Despite this, or perhaps because of it, many people from widely differing 
backgrounds, religious and secular, find it expresses meaning or significance.  It is something that 
people observe in their experience of life, and in its absence there is suffering, humiliation and 
death.  Human dignity is a quality which, when recognized, prevents acts of atrocity from taking 
place.  It is more inclusive than other terms such as autonomy and rationality and is, at the very 
least, a useful construct that requires further examination. 
 
 
 105 
Part Five: The primacy of dignity 
  
At this point the criticisms and defences of dignity have been noted.  Dignity is not an easy 
concept to put aside, nor one that is readily understood.  The balance of argument is, in this 
author’s judgement, enough to merit its retention as a useful and important idea.  A further 
argument for this is its prominence more generally as a popular starting point for discussing 
human rights, as well as a concept that stands in its own right.  There is widespread interest in 
human dignity.   
 
The intention here is not to analyze the detail of those specific discourses and the individual 
contributions within those discourses here, which would be both impractical and highly 
diversified.  More important at this stage is the recognition of the range of interest in the concept 
as a significant indicator of its importance within and across these differing fields.  Dignity   
attracts interest in many disciplines as is evident from many collections of essays from over 80 
scholars in recent years (most within the current decade).  These collections provide a snapshot of 
the breadth of interest in dignity.  For law, see Kretzmer, D. and Klein, E. (eds.) (2002) The 
Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse.  Two theological collections are 
Kraynak, R. and Tinder, G. (eds.) (2003) In Defense of Human Dignity: Essays for our Times, 
and Soulen, R. and Woodhead, L. (2006) God and Human Dignity.  In philosophy there is Dillon, 
R. (ed.) (1993) Dignity, Character and Self-Respect, and an inter-disciplinary example is Malpas, 
J. and Lickiss, N. (eds.) (2008) The Idea of Human Dignity: a conversation.  In medical ethics, 
see Schulman, A. and Merrill, T. W. (2008) Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned 
by the President's Council on Bioethics. 
 
Arieli (2002), Cancik (2002), Miguel (2002), Kraynak (2008), Lewis (2008) and Sulmasy (2008) 
have traced aspects of the historical evolution of the concept charting its development from the 
earliest stages of western civilisation in antiquity, Judeo-Christian, philosophical and later 
sociological thought.  While there are broad similarities in the historical account, important 
differences of opinion have emerged in tracing the historical route of the evolution of the concept 
and the role the different sources of dignity have in the contemporary concept.  Kretzmer and 
Klein (2002) examine the concept’s legal presence in differing jurisdictions (German and Israeli), 
while Green, Chalmers and Ida Ryuichi, Davis and Tate (all 2008) examine the concept in aspects 
of law (international or criminal) and Starck (2002) traces philosophical and theological 
influences on constitutional developments.  Jackson (2003), Macklin (2003), Christakis, 
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Coulehan, Hacker and Tattersall (all 2008) have previously sought to apply dignity in issues of 
medical ethics.  A whole host of scholars from different disciplinary backgrounds contributed 
papers on dignity to a major anthology in 2008.
1
  Philosophical discourses are diversified.  
Kantian conceptions of dignity gain attention from Meyer (1987, 1989, 2002) and Shell (2003, 
2008).  Some have focused on the question of whether dignity is liberal western or non-western 
(Donnelly 1982; Donnelly & Howard 1987; Mitchell et al. 1987).  Many have explored respect as 
a way of coming to understand dignity, including Schachter (1983), Hill, Boxill, Telfer, Rawls, 
Deigh, Taylor, Darwell, Massey, Thomas, Moody-Adams and Dillon (all in Dillon (ed.) 1995).  
Neuhaus and Nussbaum have also explored dignity as a political concept (both 2008).  
 
Dignity has an important position in contemporary theological discussion, but this is reserved for 
Chapter Four. Beyond exclusively Christian theology, there are examples from other religious 
traditions suggesting that dignity is a concept of significance in many religious narratives.  Peter 
Ochs, writing from a Jewish perspective, explores the notion of redeeming indignity as a triadic 
relation of the agent of redemption, the condition of indignity and God’s redeeming world (Ochs 
2006).  Mohammad Hasgim Kamali, writing from an Islamic perspective, also argues that, 
‘Human rights are a manifestation of human dignity’ and that rights and liberties that are inherent 
in humanity are all rooted in human dignity (2002, ix).  Nancy Martin, from her perspective of the 
Hindu tradition, notes that the traditions that surrounded the bhakti saints present an alternative 
value system that honours the dignity of all, and challenges the valuation of individuals on the 
basis of material wealth or social standing (Martin 2002). 
 
Within the last decade dignity has proved to be a concept of significant interest to scholars in law, 
philosophy, theology, politics and medicine and this survey is by no means exhaustive.  Dignity 
attracts transdisciplinary interest.  It seems to have meaning in different contexts.  Jeff Malpas 
and Norelle Lickiss (2008) have argued to this effect.  They write: 
 
It seems hardly possible that the idea of dignity … could be approached adequately other than in 
such a multidisciplinary and ‘conversational’ manner – the idea does not fit easily into any particular 
disciplinary framework, it is called upon by lawyers, physicians, philosophers, and historians, it 
                                                
1
 Schulman, Davis, Dennett, Kraynak, Churchland, Rolston, Rubin, Bostrom, Neuhaus, Lawler, 
Meilaender, Kass, Shell, Nussbaum, Gerlenter, Lee and George, Wiethman, Sulmasy, Dresser and 
Pellegrinon all contributed substantive essays to an anthology entitled Human Dignity and Bioethics (edited 
by Schulman) which were commissioned by the US President’s Council on Bioethics. The Council, which 
had been established in 2001, had frequently come to reflect on the concept of dignity and there were many 
requests for clarification of the term. As a result this diverse group of scholars were drawn together to give 
a sense of the breadth of meanings which included biological, theological and philosophical viewpoints. 
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arises as a key concept in different contexts and with different intentions, and yet it is also a concept 
that remains in common usage even if sometimes imbued with varying meanings and connotations. 
(Ibid. p.1) 
  
Beyond simply providing an adequate approach, there is a suggestion that it offers the most 
appropriate starting point for human rights discourse.  Arvid Sharma, a scholar of Indian studies 
and Hinduism, gives three reasons for this (Sharma 2002).  Firstly, Sharma draws on Ninian 
Smart and Shivesh Thakur’s suggestion that it may be possible for different cultures to come to 
the same conclusion about rights from different routes (Smart & Thakur 1993).  He suggests that 
dignity may offer a way of bridging the secular and religious realm by offering a point of 
convergence for views coming from both secular and religious positions.  Second, dignity allows 
one to clarify the concept of human rights by focusing on both the individual person and the 
identity that is ‘coterminous with all human beings.’ (Ibid. p.74)  Third, dignity offers us a 
possibility to better understand the relationship between religion and rights and why some 
religious conceptions of dignity lead to differing conclusions about the nature of the application 
of human rights. 
 
Similarly in legal discourses, dignity is seen as a concept that offers a vital space for the 
opportunity to share reason with one another in a common enterprise.  It is: 
 
an occasion for exchanging reasoned and substantive judgements across cultural and geographic 
divides about the meaning of human flourishing, what it requires of us in justice, and how it can be 
variously understood and protected in communities constituted by their commitment to a common 
good.  What reasons can I give you to care about and commit yourself to human rights?  Why should 
we recognize the authenticity of these demands of dignity as opposed to others?  What is the basis 
for regarding a particular thing as both good for me and good for others like me, both within the 
communities to which I belong and across their boundaries? (Carozza 2008, p.8) 
 
Exploring dignity provides an opportunity for transnational and trans-cultural dialogue, which in 
turn can lead to deeper and more provocative reflection on the breadth of human experience.   
That such profound enquiry is possible and can be encouraged in RE is well established (Stern, 
2003, 2006, 2007).  Dignity offers a focal point and a signpost for exploring human rights, 
drawing on diverse experiences in different disciplinary domains and drawing on diverse cultural 
and religious interpretations.  It is a concept that bridges cultures and fields of enquiry.  If the 
concept of dignity is best understood taking account of the different disciplines that engage with 
it, and if the concept is central to human rights discourse, then it follows that human rights 
education should be reflective of those multiple discourses. 
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The idea of the dignity of the human person attracts considerable interest from a wide range of 
scholars in law, medicine, philosophy, politics and theology.  It is a concept which is based on 
people’s views and beliefs about what is to be human, and what that entails, which is then applied 
in their public life, ‘Ultimately, the fundamental questions in law and ethics will be shaped by 
what we think it means to be human and what we understand to be the ethical obligations owed to 
the human person.’ (Pellegrino 2008, xii) 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter analysed the concept of dignity in the UDHR.  In doing so it has revealed that 
dignity merits further exploration as a concept of primary moral importance, in particular for 
human rights.  It established that dignity has a position of principle importance in the UDHR as a 
foundational idea and that this is a modern feature of human rights.  It is an idea in a tension 
between a need for ideological conceptual clarity and a contrasting need for pragmatic vagueness.  
The lack of definition distances human rights from the frameworks or narratives of particular 
religious or philosophical traditions.  Had the UDHR identified a specific justification, it may not 
have garnered such wide-ranging support and so the pragmatic political requirement for a more 
acceptable basis has left the declaration with a concept of dignity that is undefined.  The absence 
of a precise definition attracts the criticism that it is rhetorical and of little substance.  It seems 
less substantive than the rights that it is supposed to justify.  However the lack of definition also 
leaves a dialogical space for an ongoing discourse about its meaning.  That is to say it is a focus 
worthy of further enquiry.  The case, advanced by some, that it is not worthy of continuing 
examination is weak.  The ambiguity of the term in the UDHR is in part a product of political 
necessity, a placeholder that provides a point of agreement and a signpost for further discussion 
from different ideologies, philosophies and theologies.  There is a great deal of interest in 
engaging with that discussion across a range of disciplines and fields.  It is a mistake to conclude 
that the undefined status leaves it without any meaning.  Rather it acknowledges that people from 
different backgrounds should come together and discuss the worth of human person.  This in 
itself is an additional argument for examining the concept.  The UDHR has not ended deliberation 
about rights, but stimulated it.  This undefined quality of dignity makes it possible for human 
rights to be dynamic and dialogic.  It steers away from the absoluteness that is feared by some as 
enforcing a western legislative structure on peoples and cultures that have evolved through 
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different contexts.  This context invites an educational approach that is dialogical and 
exploratory, something explored in later chapters (6 and 7). 
 
The lack of definition reflects the mystery of the human person and has continued to inspire 
scholars from many disciplines to use it as a starting point for further understanding and 
clarification.  Nevertheless, this is a relatively weak defense of dignity.  For it to be able to be a 
foundation or justification for human rights, more is needed.  Unchecked debate and discussion 
might otherwise lead to a concept which veers widely in meaning from discussion to discussion, 
may not provide support for human rights, and may even undermine them.  This chapter’s select 
survey of recent scholarly interest in dignity throws light on a number of sources, philosophical 
and religious, which have influenced the contemporary concept of dignity.  These sources offer 
possible meanings the concept might have, and imply boundaries such a concept needs for it to 
function as a foundation for human rights.  Chapter 4 undertakes such consideration.  Chapter 5 
considers the presence of the idea of dignity in human rights education, given that the concept has 
been demonstrated to be of importance in medical ethics, law, theology and philosophy and is 
absent from the HRE debate. 
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Chapter 4 
Philosophical and theological sources of dignity 
 
Chapter Three has charted the range of contemporary discourse surrounding dignity.  While the 
concept of dignity in the UDHR lacks clarity, in the contemporary era it has attracted a peak of 
interest, coinciding with the rise of human rights.  Scholars have undertaken systematic 
treatments of the idea of dignity in western thought in relation to human rights and there are also 
non-western treatments
3
.  These provide a backdrop against which the contemporary concept can 
be interpreted and understood.  There are two aims of this chapter: firstly, to undertake a 
historical conceptual analysis of the different meanings found in key historical sources and 
secondly, to understand the interpretative frameworks and meanings used to explore dignity.   
 
The chapter is formed of four parts.  The first part considers recent reviews of the history of 
dignity to provide some markers before a selection of sources are considered in more detail.  This 
is important as it reveals how different organising frameworks are used to interpret the 
development of the concept and it also spotlights sources that are commonly cited. 
 
Some modern scholars find importance in all of the early sources while others identify a single 
source of significance.  Some map the developments dispassionately observing differences and 
similarities with the contemporary concept without passing comment on significance.  
Contemporary writers use different frameworks to draw meaning out of the early sources.  These 
are prominent: 
 
• Dignity is interpreted relationally by its interaction to other ordering ideas; 
• Dignity is interpreted through a conceptual typology; 
• Dignity is understood as a contextualised and self-contained historical notion. 
 
                                                
3
 For the use of dignity in Islam see for example Mohammad Hasim Kamali (2002) The Dignity of Man: 
An Islamic Perspective (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society) and Chandra Muzaffar (2002) Rights Religion 
and Reform: Enhancing human dignity through spiritual and moral transformation (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon). For Hinduism see Coward, Lipner and Young (1989) Hindu Ethics: Purity, Abortion 
and Euthansasia (Albany: SUNY). For Buddhism see Peter Harvey (2000) An Introduction to Buddhist 
Ethics (Cambridge: CUP)  
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The next three parts each take a different source of dignity that is prominent in current debates, 
and reflect distinctive positions and stages in the development of the idea.  The three principal 
sources are drawn from Antiquity (principally Cicero), a Christian context (a broad category 
requiring further definition) and an Enlightenment context (Immanuel Kant).  Part Five: 
Reflecting on ancient and modern relates the different ideas of dignity found within the three 
sources to the idea of dignity within the UDHR. 
 
The chapter concludes that the contemporary understanding of dignity draws on a number of 
different ideas within the sources, rather than a single source or idea.  This is taken to be a quality 
of the concept, even if it does raise further questions for exploration.  Dignity is a compound 
concept.  It also concludes that frameworks provide a useful tool for exploring the historical 
sources of dignity, and that an adapted framework may be suitable for an understanding of 
contemporary sources.  Such a framework can account for the relationships between different 
elements of the concept, and acknowledge that tensions are held between those elements. 
 
 
Part One: Approaches to the history of dignity 
 
Historical sources have been reviewed using frameworks of different kinds, interpreting the 
significance of the sources for the modern idea of dignity in different ways.  Here, three are 
considered: Mette Lebech (2004), Daniel Sulmasy (2008), and Carlos Miguel (2002).  They are 
chosen partly because they are recent, partly because they have different intentions and take 
different approaches in what they aim to achieve through the review and partly because they 
provide different disciplinary perspectives from law (Miguel), theology-philosophy (Lebech) and 
bioethics (Sulmasy). 
 
(i) Mette Lebech: Mette Lebech (2004) draws on Taylor's (1989) use of conceptual frameworks.  
Dignity can be understood as an idea that has developed through several stages to reach the 
UDHR and the conventions that followed.  This approach is inspired by his idea of ‘moral 
frameworks’.  The presuppositions or conventions of the framework can be classified as ethical, 
political and metaphysical.  Ethical conventions involve virtue, status, rights and duty; political 
conventions involve the nature of law and society; and metaphysical conventions concern the 
place and destiny of the human being in relation to nature and the divine.  Within each stage, 
specific time related conventions apply and specific logical possibilities are exemplified creating 
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a particular contextual framework though which dignity is understood.  These frameworks change 
from time to time as patterns of social organisation develop.  New understandings of social status 
influence what things are valued and the conventions that define a way of living.  As a result 
these frameworks constitute shared worldviews.  For Lebech the variety of sources with their 
different formulations and understanding of dignity reveal a complex multidimensional quality. 
 
Lebech outlines four stages in the development of the idea of human dignity:  
 
• The cosmo-centric framework of Antiquity, which explains human dignity on the basis of 
nature and is exemplified by Cicero; 
• The Christi-centric framework of the Middle Ages, which explains human dignity in 
relation to Jesus Christ, illustrated by Thomas Aquinas; 
• The logo-centric framework of Modernity explaining human dignity as a tributary to 
reason, found in Kant; 
• The polis-centred framework of Postmodernity, which explains human dignity in relation 
to social acceptability, found in Mary Wollenstonecraft. 
 
Lebech's overarching view is that each of these ways of accounting for human dignity can be 
understood as a source of the idea as it appears in the UDHR.  The contemporary concept is a 
complex construct that draws on several sources. 
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Table 1 Lebech’s stages of development 
Period Basis of dignity Grounding Exemplifying 
thinker 
Antiquity Cosmo-centric explains human 
dignity on the basis 
of nature 
Cicero 
Middle Ages Christi-centric explains human 
dignity in relation to 
Jesus Christ 
Thomas Aquinas 
Modernity Logo-centric explains human 
dignity as a tributary 
to reason 
Kant 
Postmodern Polis-centred  explains human 
dignity in relation to 
social acceptability 
Mary Wollenstonecraft 
 
 
Lebech concludes that the frameworks agree that human dignity is the fundamental value of 
human beings but each framework understands it to be conditioned by different features of human 
reality: human nature; God-relatedness; the faculty of reason; or recognition within society.  Each 
conception understands the human to consist of different elements.  Each understands the value of 
the human to consist in different aspects of its being.  The frameworks all hold that the value of 
the human being pertains to the individual human, rather than its nature, faith, reason or status.  
They all hold that human dignity pertains to the human being and the experiential knowledge that 
the human being has. 
 
Lebech is arguing for cohesion between the different frameworks she identifies.  She sees the 
contemporary concept as a blend, an integrated idea inclusive of Christian and other sources.  For 
her the multiplicity of perspectives provides a rounded conception of dignity that does form the 
moral basis for moral action and human rights.  Ultimately she holds that dignity is a 
multidimensional foundation and the principal moral factor.  She does not seek to fully explain 
the connections or conflicts between the different notions of dignity, but, like Miguel, recognizes 
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their existence.  Her analysis suggests that conceptual understanding requires contextual 
understanding of a meaning-giving narrative. 
 
(ii) Daniel Sulmasy: Daniel Sulmasy offers a different typology.  Like Lebech, he identifies 
Greek and Roman antiquity and moral philosophy, especially Kantian moral philosophy, as 
important sources.  Within those three milieu, different senses of dignity emerge: attributed 
dignity, intrinsic dignity and inflorescent dignity (Sulmasy 2008).  It is through these 
classifications that Sulmasy views the historical sources.  He identifies thinkers or sources which 
exemplify each classification. 
 
Table 2. Sulmasy’s characterising typology 
Period Type Definition Exemplifying 
thinker 
Antiquity  Attributed 
dignity 
the worth of value 
conferred on others by acts 
of attribution 
Cicero 
Moral 
Philosophy  
Intrinsic dignity the worth or value a person 
has by virtue of being 
human, rather than any 
social position, ability or 
skill 
Kant 
Moral 
Philosophy 
Inflorescent 
dignity 
the way people are 
flourishing and developing 
in all aspects of their  
humanity 
Not given by 
Sulmasy but 
Amartya Sen and 
Martha Nussbaum 
are examples 
 
 
Sulmasy’s first category is attributive dignity.  Attributive dignity refers to the worth conferred on 
others by acts of attribution.  Sulmasy’s second category is intrinsic dignity.  It means the worth a 
person has by virtue of being human, rather than any social position, ability or skill.  It is not 
conferred or created by human action.  It is pre-rational.  It is asymmetrically related to attributive 
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dignity and, for Sulmasy, it offers the most convincing basis for a moral foundation for rights.  
Sulmasy’s third category is inflorescent dignity; the way people flourish and develop in all areas 
of their humanity.  This flourishing is consistent with and expressive of their intrinsic dignity.  
This kind of dignity is influenced by human actions, those of the self and others, in that the extent 
to which dignity can flourish depends upon the willingness of others and the self to let it flourish. 
 
Sulmasy is also seeking a moral foundation in dignity but he is more content to discard some 
perspectives of dignity in favour of others.  His analysis is less concerned with delineating subtle 
differences within single sources, but rather seeks to identify the main ideas that characterise 
separate sources.  Ultimately, it is his aim to select the most suitable conceptualisation for a moral 
foundation for human rights that is most closely aligned to the UDHR.  Sulmasy’s analysis leaves 
open the question of the relationship between an intrinsic notion of dignity and how that extends 
into the social context.  A foundational idea of dignity cannot be attributive and yet the extent to 
which that dignity is recognized and allowed to flourish depends on social recognition.  The ways 
in which dignity might flourish seem particularly close to human rights, or as Sen and Nussbaum 
formulate it, human capabilities (Nussbaum 1999).  Indeed Sulmasy himself seems open to the 
reality that the link between the inherent and the social is important and needs delineating 
(Sulmasy 2008). 
 
(iii) Carlos Miguel: Carlos Miguel (2002) has undertaken a survey of many historical sources of 
dignity from which he has identified diverse views on the grounding, subject, and degrees of 
dignity.  He provides an analysis but, unlike Sulmasy, he is not aiming to identify a particular 
moral foundation, and unlike Lebech, he does not try to rationalise his findings into a coherent 
whole.  His intention is to review the sources dispassionately and compare them with the notion 
found in the UDHR. 
 
Miguel observes that there is a major division between the positions in terms of the grounding of 
dignity.  He divides the sources into those that are theologically grounded and those that are 
naturally grounded and then identifies delineations within those groups, sometimes revealing that 
individual authors or sources take multiple positions.  Having a common natural ground means 
little, as many different natural grounds are offered.  The subject of dignity varies within each 
ground.  Dignity is attributed to every human being from some whose idea is naturally grounded 
and some whose idea is theologically grounded.  Equally, there are examples of dignity being 
offered to a narrow range of people from both theologically and naturally grounded positions: 
 116 
dignity maybe attributed only to those baptized, only to those morally good enough and only 
those of certain social status.  Finally, the extent of that dignity varies within both groups.  
Theologically grounded terms espouse equal dignity for everyone, on the one hand, and delineate 
between potential (for the unbaptized) and realized (for the baptized) dignity on the other.  
Naturally grounded terms espouse dignity as unique or having several degrees. 
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Theological 
Grounding 
Saint Leo the 
Great, some 
Catholic 
theological texts, 
Manetti, Pérez de 
Oliva, Boaistuau 
certain high 
social or 
political 
position  
Roman Law, 
Kant 
a moral 
integrity 
 
Roman Law, 
Aquinas, 
Hume, Kant, 
Schiller 
a body and 
soul 
perfection  
Manetti, 
Pérez de 
Oliva, 
Boaistuau 
freedom  
 
Aquinas, 
Pico, 
Vives, 
Pérez de 
Oliva 
utility  
 
Hume 
Autonomy  
 
Kant 
Natural Grounding 
etymological sense of the word, Roman Law, Aquinas, Humanist Philosophy, Hume, Kant, Schiller, 
Hegel 
ethicity  
Hegel 
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Table 4.The Subject of Human Dignity in Miguel (2002) 
(note that some thinkers expressed multiple groundings and appear in more than one cell) 
Theologically grounded Naturally grounded 
baptized as the 
only subjects 
of human 
dignity 
dignity for  
every single 
human being 
every single 
human being  
the virtuous 
ones  
 
the ones in 
high social and 
political 
positions  
 
Saint Leo the 
Great 
Saint Leo the 
Great, Manetti,  
Pérez de Oliva, 
Boaistuau 
Pico, Vives, 
Pérez de Oliva, 
Hume, Kant 
Roman Law, 
Aquinas, Kant, 
Hegel 
Roman Law, 
Kant 
 
 
Table 5. The degrees of human dignity in Miguel (2002) 
Theologically grounded Naturally grounded 
equal amount of 
dignity for 
everyone 
a ‘fully 
accomplished’ 
dignity for baptized 
and a ‘potential’ 
dignity for the not 
yet baptized  
several degrees of 
human dignity  
a unique degree of 
dignity 
 
Saint Leo the 
Great, Manetti, 
Pérez de Oliva 
Saint Leo the Great Roman Law, 
Aquinas, Kant, 
Hegel 
Manetti, Pico, 
Vives, Pérez de 
Oliva, Boaistuau, 
Hume, Kant 
 
 
 119 
Each approach leads to quite different implications.  Miguel’s analysis is not so much concerned 
with application as relevance when compared to the contemporary concept.  He is not seeking to 
portray a single source as the essential or most suitable influence, but he provides a detailed 
analysis of the historical sources and sets them against the modern notion.  He neither argues that 
one particular source or idea offers a moral foundation, nor makes dignity a primary moral 
concept, but the collage he presents gives an important insight into the preoccupation with the 
term.  His analysis does reveal antecedents to the modern notion in ancient and medieval thought, 
and not simply the more recent Kantian conception.  The question of the status of dignity as a 
foundation is left open. 
 
To survey the history of the development of dignity across the whole of the western canon is 
beyond the scope of research in this thesis.  However, a review of these three approaches offers at 
least two broad insights to provide a sensible way forward.  All three identify Cicero, the 
Christian tradition and Kant as important contributors.  These three sources are important 
reference points, commonly referred to in the literature on dignity and so shall be the focus here.  
Both Miguel and Lebech recognize a complexity within sources.  Therefore any survey should be 
sensitive to that complexity.  Sulmasy’s typology provides a helpful way of making sense of the 
conceptual differences and their implications within and between the different sources. 
 
Taking these previous reviews into account, the sources chosen here are commonly identified in 
contemporary literature as featuring in the development of the idea.  They are grouped under 
three categories: Antiquity, Christianity and Enlightenment.  These groups are useful in as much 
as they characterise central aspects of the sources within each category and they have some linear 
relationship.  The main source from antiquity is Cicero, and significant within his thinking are 
Stoic ideas about natural law that are also found in Sophocles (1974) and Aristotle (1995).  
Cicero features in several recent reviews of dignity and provides an early snapshot of the concept.  
A shift in emphasis occurs within the Christian group, which covers a collection of authors all 
operating within a theological framework.  Thus this group spans historical periods so that 
influences are seen in contemporary Christian thinking.  While natural law grows in influence, the 
idea of the image of God and the image of Christ become key to defining the dignity of the 
human person in the twentieth century.  These doctrines remain important in the present day.  
Kant is by far the most commonly cited philosopher in the contemporary human rights literature.  
Christian perspectives of Kant vary significantly.  He is seen as a positive influence on the 
modern age by some, and a negative influence by others.  Lebech’s postmodern option illustrates 
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the significance of ongoing experience as a source for making sense of dignity.  These categories 
are not enclosed by conceptual boundaries but are porous, and ideas found in one source take on 
new but recognizably similar forms in the next. 
 
 
Part Two: Antiquity !  Cicero 
 
The term ‘dignity’ has origins in Indo-European language roots and those origins suggest the 
meaning ‘importance over others’ rather than something related to moral goodness.  This origin 
signifies an ontological statement of superiority, rather than a moral statement (Miguel 2002).  It 
implies a position of importance that should be recognized, or honoured, by others. 
 
The idea can be linked to the emergence of individualism found in the Stoic belief (in the fifth 
and fourth centuries BCE) that individuals were beings of reason that ought to be respected 
(Grant 2007).  Human beings were distinguished as superior to animals because of this feature.  
Greeks had the word !"#! (the root of axion), meaning worth or deserving.  This is related to the 
English term axiology, the theory of value.  Here too, value may be attributed because of position 
or power, rather than any moral designation.  A number of figures from the period of antiquity are 
referred to by contemporary scholars including Cicero (Miguel, Cancik and Sulmasy) and 
Aristotle (Miguel).  In The Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines !"#! as ‘a term of relation.  It 
denotes having a claim to goods external to oneself’ (1123b18).  This is Harris Rachham and 
Steven Watt’s translation (Aristotle 1996), while the collection and translation The Complete 
Works of Aristotle (Aristotle 1995) edited by Jonathan Barnes uses the word desert or deserving.  
Aristotle does not consider all human beings to have this worth or deserving by virtue of their 
humanity and human beings may be differentiated according to it.  This kind of dignity is 
recognized and rewarded by external factors for things done.  It is contingent on the behaviour of 
the human being.  This idea of dignity is linked with the idea of a universal system of rules or law 
of nature (Grant 2007).  Humans have dignity because of their standing in nature as the highest 
being.  Their place in the universe gives special significance. 
 
 Cicero, dignity and the dignity of man  
 
Cicero features prominently as an important early source (Bloch 1987; Cancik 2002; Sulmasy 
2008).  Cicero may not at first appear an obvious choice as an influence on the contemporary 
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conception of dignity, but Cancik suggests Cicero provides a formula that can be traced in later 
medieval writings such as Pufendorf (1632!1694) in the seventeenth century.  Pufendorf made 
Cicero popular again by providing an intellectual orientation (Bloch 1987).  This influence was to 
continue for some time and Cancik argues, ‘Up to the middle of this [twentieth] century, it is 
mainly the text of Cicero and a general Ciceronian tradition which bestows a certain coherence on 
the history of the formal “dignity of man”.’ (Cancik 2002, p.37)  Cicero refers to dignity in two 
ways.  There is the dignity of human nature, the status of man above all other creatures in nature, 
and there is the dignity that is shown to and recognized by others.  One is related to the other.  
Cicero uses the phrase ‘dignity of man’ in relation to the position of human beings within the 
cosmos, or divine order.  Hubert Cancik’s treatment of Cicero focuses on the ‘dignity of man’ as 
well as his general use of the word dignity.  In De Officiis 6, 106, human beings are given 
superiority over living creatures on account of the dignity of man: 
  
It is a part of every enquiry about duty always to keep in view how greatly the nature of man 
surpasses domestic animals and other beasts.  They perceive nothing except pleasure, and their every 
instinct carries them to it.  A man's mind, however, is nourished by learning and reasoning; he is 
always enquiring or acting, he is led by a delight in seeing and hearing... From this we understand 
that bodily pleasure is not sufficiently worthy of the superiority [dignitas] of man and that it should 
be scorned and rejected… If we wish to reflect on the excellence and worthiness [excellentia et 
dignitas] of our nature, we shall realize how dishonourable it is to sink into luxury and to live in a 
soft and effeminate lifestyle, but how honourable to live thriftily, strictly, with self-restraint, and 
soberly. (Cicero 1991, De officiis 1.105!6) 
 
By dignity, Cicero here refers to the superiority of human beings in relation to other animals.  
This superiority is founded on their shared ability to reason and to speak (Saastamoinen 2010, 
pp.48!9), a disputed argument today (Singer 1986, 1993).  These features establish a natural 
fellowship among all members of the human species.  As a consequence, members of the Roman 
elite (‘we’ in Cicero's vocabulary) are expected to maintain justice even toward slaves (‘the 
lowliest’). 
 
Cancik explores Cicero’s claim that dignity resides in human nature.  Human beings are born free 
and are rational by nature.  In Stoic thought, nature is rational and reason a fiery energetic 
substance in all things.  Nature is creative but acts according to rational rules and so is a 
normative prescriptive force, ‘Nature prescribes that man should help man for the only reason 
that he is human.’ (quoted in Cancik 2002, p.25)  Cicero links dignity and the unity and equality 
of human kind expressed in natural law, and also the dynamic reason with its capacity to make 
free moral decisions.  Thus the ‘dignity of man’ is part anthropological and part ethical.  It is 
 122 
based on human reason and self-control and is universal.  Cancik continues by arguing that this 
first expression of ‘dignity of man’ is not religious or theological, but political, anthropological 
and rational.  Its relationship with transcendental or divine qualities of nature would need further 
development, but for Cicero the simple, strong everyday experience of human governorship over 
animals was enough to sustain the pre-eminence and dignity of man (Cancik 2002, p.27).  Cicero 
sees dignity as a response to his experience of the world.  It is observable in everyday life and 
points to a transcendent reality.  Dignity is both tangible and intangible. 
 
In Roman times dignity was an important idea relating to the standing that commanded respect 
because of political or military achievement, and Cicero is seen as using dignity to refer mainly to 
personal honour or public standing.  Sulmasy recently restated this interpretation holding that 
Cicero defined dignity as the honourable authority of a person, which merits attention and honour 
and worthy respect.  His literal use of the word meant ‘worthiness’, but also includes a person’s 
reputation or honour. This is linked to what Cicero says (quoted above) about avoiding a dainty 
and soft lifestyle, and preferring to live life honourably, thriftily, strictly, with self-restraint, and 
soberly.  For Cicero, certain qualities or virtues should be evident in a person of dignity.  The 
dignity of human nature means it is incumbent on a person to live virtuously and this in turn 
should be recognized by others.  Sulmasy concludes, ‘for Cicero, one’s standing in the 
community ought to be based on one’s true excellence.  For him, to have dignity was to have a 
merited degree of respect from others because of one’s excellence as a human being.’ (2008, 
p.471)  This dignity, like the Greek !"#!, meant that in justice people were treated differently 
according to their dignity (excellence and standing).  Dignity is a measure of the quality of a 
person.  How that person is treated varies according to that measure, ‘justice is the habit of mind 
which gives to everyone according to desert (dignitas) while preserving the common advantage.’ 
(Cicero, De Inventione, II, 159 quoted in Sulmasy 2008)  This kind of dignity is a quality that is 
relative to standing and moral conduct, and depends upon a judgement made by others.  It is 
granted in recognition of certain conduct or behaviour.  It is relational, dependent on your action 
and the action of others.  The kind of behaviour and conduct necessary is contextualised by 
Roman culture and is relative to it.  Cicero, however, believed that this measure was not 
particular and local.  The Roman culture that he identified was thought to be universal, far from 
parochial.  But Aristotle and Cicero’s observations of how dignity is measured may well have 
differed from one another, affected by the distinctive Greek and Roman cultures of different 
times and places.  An expression or behaviour recognized as indicating dignity in one culture 
might well do the reverse in another.  This parochial expression of what some have called 
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attributive dignity is local to the social cultural norms of the time and place.  It does not offer the 
intrinsic or inherent qualities found in the contemporary idea as expressed in human rights, and 
nor is it a supranational, super-cultural concept.  It is extrinsically defined, situational and 
contingent on cultural determinations.  It is subject to change over time in response to social 
trends.  Nevertheless, recognition of dignity is important.  Dignity does require a response from 
others.  In this respect there is similarity with the contemporary notion. 
 
 Interpreting Cicero 
 
Cicero’s dignity of man is within humans, not by attribution of other people or society at large, 
but because of nature, the cosmos.  It is cosmically orientated by virtue of the position of human 
beings in the cosmos.  Consequently Mette Lebech prefers to characterise the dignity of antiquity, 
and Cicero in particular, as a Cosmo-centric account explaining human dignity through the status 
of human beings in relation to the cosmos (Lebech 2009).  In the cosmo-centric framework, 
human beings have fundamental value because of their dominion over their passions, their 
household or group, or the brute beasts.  Nature has assigned humans this superior position by 
granting them reason.  Moral dominion is also necessary and humans must pursue that through 
the development of virtue.  While it is not sufficient of itself as a characteristic of human beings, 
it can be taken as a criterion of dignity.  Dignity is objectively orientated, rather than subjectively 
determined.  In this way, there is commonality between Cicero’s idea of ‘dignity of man’ and the 
intrinsic dignity associated with Kant and contemporary human rights discourse.  It emphasizes 
the supra-human nature of designation of human dignity. 
 
Cicero did not link dignity to the idea of inviolability of human life, which modern usage does.  
In Cicero, dignity is connected with distinctively human qualities and it emerges from an 
experience of the political reality of the human being and the social designation that follows from 
this reality.  Dignity was connected to human excellence, not simply the social judgments of 
those around, as some later philosophers such as Hobbes suggested.  In The Leviathan Hobbes 
writes: 
 
The Value or DIGNITY of a man, is, as of other things, his price; that is to say, so much as would be 
given for the use of his Power; and therefore it is not absolute; but a thing dependent on the need and 
judgment of another…. The publique worth of a man, which is the Value set on him by the 
Commonwealth, is that which men commonly call DIGNITY. (Hobbes 1991, pp.63!64 cf. Sulmasy 
2008, p.427 for discussion.) 
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The social dimension of dignity, the extent to which it measures social standing, contrasts the 
position it holds in the UDHR.  Cicero combines a cosmic aspect of dignity with human 
excellence and some degree of social recognition in his conception of dignity.  The connections 
between these dimensions raises questions that are difficult to answer from a cosmic and a social 
designation: What kind of being is a human?  How do humans appropriately express their being? 
(McCrudden 2008)  Dignity in general use is close to a sense of human excellence.  It is still 
common to hear the remark that a person is not acting in a manner suitable for the dignity of the 
office the person holds. 
 
Some contemporary readers of Cicero only refer to his idea of dignity rather than the dignity of 
man.  This is understandable as this understanding of dignity is much more common in his 
writings.  Nevertheless the latter phrase shows how Cicero was influenced by prevailing Stoic 
thought, as well as Roman social thought.  The presence of these two streams of influence 
indicates that the idea exists in a plural complexity in this early source of dignity.  Miguel writes 
that in ancient times there existed a, ‘co-existence of diverse meanings of dignity.’ (Miguel 2002, 
p.2)  It also shows a tension between the universalistic traits of the dignity of man and the local 
socio-political realization of dignity. 
 
Contemporary critical responses to Cicero 
 
(i) Human excellence is an inadequate moral foundation: Human excellence provides a doubtful 
foundation for human rights that are predicated on their applicability to all, irrespective of 
personal designation or behaviour.  Human excellence may be something that is difficult to agree 
upon but more importantly, it is always likely to be variable and therefore an improbable basis for 
a moral foundation of rights that are universally held.  It is possible that human excellence is 
associated with an intrinsic notion of human dignity and rights.  Human rights define themselves 
as the recognition of human dignity.  They are warranted because human beings have dignity.  
Human excellence should include that recognition although excellence must surely reach beyond 
the minimum standards of human rights.  Human excellence, whatever it is, must surely reach to 
a maximal position if understood in terms of moral conduct. 
 
(ii) Cosmic designations are undermined by contemporary science: The argument that human 
beings are superior because of their natural position in the universe is challenged on a number of 
levels.  Firstly, evolutionary science suggests that there is no grand cosmic plan for the 
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superiority of human nature, but rather a mere accident of evolution (Rachels 1990).  Secondly, 
those who claim that freedom and reason are hallmarks of this position of superiority are 
undermined by psychological criticisms of human freedom (Skinner 1971).  Thirdly, there are 
suggestions that other life forms express degrees of sentiency that challenge the moral precedence 
of humanity over other beings (Singer 1986, 1993).  Cosmic designation is an unreliable 
foundation.  None of these elements dissuade the common desire to claim that human beings are 
special and do have some kind of specific significance but does leave open the accusation that 
dignity is attributive, rather than inherent.  Beyond non-human animals are possible claims for 
other sentient beings of a spiritual, alien, or artificial-intelligent computer nature. 
 
(iii) Social recognition is an unreliable measure of human dignity: Finally, human rights 
specifically reject any suggestion that they are conferred on a person by others, or that they vary 
according to the social recognition that is deserved.  Nevertheless, social recognition is a 
necessary response to the demands of dignity, the rights that flow from it.  The extent to which 
others recognize the rights due to a person indicates the extent to which their humanity is 
acknowledged.  For Cicero there were different levels of social recognition according to the level 
of excellence that a person achieved.  In the contemporary era the recognition remains, but 
humans are levelled to a single common rank. 
 
While Cicero seems an unlikely source for the contemporary conception of dignity in the UDHR, 
Pufendorf’s popularisation of Cicero and his own founding of equality on dignity seem to point to 
important dimensions of dignity today, in terms of the importance of striving to adequately 
recognize the requirements of dignity due to human beings.  It should be noted that not every 
scholar acknowledges this interpretation of Pufendorf’s own work (Saastamoinen 2010). 
 
 
Part Three: Christianity 
 
Dignity has an important position in contemporary theological discussion.  It has been a driving 
force in some theological traditions and also in inter-religious dialogue.  Therefore more 
consideration of that impact is warranted here.  This influence can be observed in Catholic and 
Protestant thought, as well as broader religious debate.  A selection of sources illustrates this 
trend.  Historically, Christian interest in the idea of dignity predates the modern and 
contemporary rights era.  Carlos Ruiz Miguel (2002) charts the development of the idea in the 
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work of St Leo the Great (395!461 CE), Cardinal Lotario de Conti (1160!1216), St Thomas 
Aquinas (1225!1274), and Fernan Perez de Oliva (1494!1531).  However it is in the social 
thought of Pope Leo XIII, in the nineteenth century, where contemporary Catholic interest in the 
link between rights and dignity begins.  This emerged out of a concern for workers’ rights and the 
rights of their families.  In his study Claims in Conflict, Hollenbach notes, ‘Leo’s encyclicals laid 
the groundwork for the modern Catholic theory of human rights.  Human dignity is the 
foundation of this theory.’ (Hollenbach 1979, p.49) 
 
Developments in the nineteenth century extended throughout the twentieth century.  Coleman 
(1984) notes that they were heavily influenced by the work of Maritain on human rights, who was 
to contribute to the drafting of the UDHR itself, ‘The dignity of the human person? The 
expression means nothing if it does not signify that, by virtue of the natural law, the human 
person has the right to be respected, is the subject of rights, possesses rights.’ (Maritain 1943, 
p.65)  Maritain, a Thomist scholar, associated human dignity with natural rights but there are 
other influences on Catholic theological development.  Dietrich in his study Human Rights and 
the Catholic Tradition (2007) explores the twentieth century theological development of the idea 
that human rights are assertions of human dignity.  Dietrich charts the contributions of German 
theologians and their experience of the Holocaust.  Their experience influenced the Decrees and 
Declarations of Vatican II and prominent contemporary Catholics including Cardinal Kasper, 
President of the Pontifical Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews, and most notably 
the work of Pope John Paul II.  Dietrich identifies a shift towards a theological response to 
experience as a source of inspiration for theological reflection on human dignity, found in the 
writings of Grosche, Koster and Rahner, Metz, Chenu, Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI) and 
Dorsetti (cf Dietrich 2007, pp.174!5).  The dignity of the human person is regarded as a central 
aspect of Pope John Paul II’s papacy and is an important component in Canon Law (Coughlin 
2003, 2004; Grasso 2003; Rowland 2005).  Dignity and human rights have also been prominent 
in liberation theology (Gutierrez 1973). 
 
In broader Christian theological reflection, human dignity has received considerable attention 
(Cairns 1973; Moltmann 1984) including a recent collection of essays mainly from Protestant 
perspectives edited by Soulen and Woodhead, which seek to recontextualise dignity from biblical 
perspectives centred on creation, redemption and sanctification (Soulen & Woodhead 2006).  
George Newlands has contributed to the development of a Christological perspective on human 
dignity (Newlands 2006), which he restated and developed with Richard Amesbury in their 2008 
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collaborative work, Faith and Human Rights: Christianity and the Global Struggle for Human 
Dignity (Amesbury & Newlands 2008).  They explore how Christologies contribute to the 
struggle for dignity, arguing that they should, ‘encapsulate the nature of the Christian 
understanding of the love of God, illuminating the self giving, self-dispossessing nature of divine 
reality as a pattern of human relationships.’ (Ibid. p.123)  Common to these offerings is the 
interest in grounding conception of human dignity in the Christian narrative, as opposed to 
secular philosophical traditions of dignity. 
 
There is no single Christian doctrine of dignity but rather a stream of ideas that have developed 
into differing doctrines.  This section is a selective review that seeks to draw attention to the key 
elements of the Christian idea, while acknowledging it is complex. 
 
Christian sources 
 
Though the Bible does not mention dignity, Early Church Fathers believed it pointed to the idea.  
Discussion about Christian belief in the dignity of the person appears in the first few centuries 
CE, in reflection on Old Testament text, principally Genesis 1:26ff (see also Psalm 8.5ff and 
Sirah 17.1!11) which holds that human beings are created in the image and likeness of God.  The 
meanings of image and likeness may refer to physical resemblance, mental representation or as a 
manifestation.  It was widely held that those words capture a sense of all those aspects.  Physical 
image would be too narrow alone so likeness is used, and because of Genesis 1.27b, ‘in the image 
of God he created him.  Male and female he created them’, it is clear that the full meaning of 
humankind (Adam) is realized only when there is man and woman (Erhueh 1987, p.4).  This 
image and likeness is passed down to the descendents of Adam, through the generations (Genesis 
5:1!3), and therefore the image of God is not lost after the fall (Erhueh 1987, p.8).  In the New 
Testament, the Gospels refer to Jesus Christ as having the image of God (Mt 5.48, Jn 14.9b, Jn 
1.11).  In St. Paul’s letters the doctrine is christological.  Without Christ there is no image of God 
since Christ is the perfect image of God (Col 1.15, cf 2 Cor. 4.4) and it is the purpose of every 
Christian to realize this perfect image of Christ in their entire life, which is achieved in the final 
resurrection (Ph 3.21). 
 
In Christian belief, the universe has a rational order and human beings have a special status in the 
hierarchy of that order, as a result of being made in the image and likeness of God.  The purpose 
of the human being is to reflect Christ’s image in their life. Erhueh summarises this as follows: 
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The consequence of imago doctrine in the New Testament for human dignity is easily recognizable.  
It forms the basis of universal brotherly love proclaimed by the Gospels and the Epistles… man’s 
true nature and dignity arise from the fact that he was made in the image and likeness of God at the 
time of man’s creation, and is ordained toward the realization of the perfect imago through the 
redemption and salvation brought in Jesus Christ. (Erhueh 1987, p.23) 
 
These beliefs are found in the early Christian writers.  St Ireneaus (2
nd
 century – 202 CE) writes 
‘For the glory of God is a living man’ (Against Heresies Book 4, Chapter 20,7, in Robert & 
Donaldson 1971).  Later, Lactantius (240!320 CE), the Christian apologist, spoke of the dignity 
that humans have as part of God’s creation when he states that God has made humankind as a 
sacred animal, ‘Therefore, with regard to this precept of God, there ought to be no exception at 
all; but that it is always unlawful to put to death a man, whom God willed to be a sacred animal.’ 
(Divine Institutes 6.20, in Robert & Donaldson 1971, p.187)  Lactantius saw the special status of 
human beings as conferring duties and responsibilities on others.  He places restrictions on the 
killing of humans including murder, war or infant exposure.  Here, human dignity is equated with 
sanctity; a special, holy thing that must be protected, irrespective of the person’s action, 
behaviour or social standing.  Respecting others is not purely a matter of obedience to God’s law, 
but a response to the worth of the person. 
 
Clement of Alexander (160!215 CE), Gregory the Wonderworker (213!270 CE) and John 
Chrysostom (347!407 CE) express the belief that human beings are reborn in the image of Christ, 
through God’s redemptive power and through life in the Spirit via the practice of Christian virtue 
(Soulen & Woodhead 2006, p.5).  Clement of Alexander thought those who submit themselves to 
the ‘training of Christ’ acquire a moral loveliness and a ‘superior dignity’ (Ibid.).  Dignity here is 
something that can increase over time, is conferred through God’s call to humankind and is 
ultimately rooted in God.  Humanity is made perfect through Christ.  Through the incarnation, 
God made man in Christ, human nature is marked with the divine prerogative. 
 
These ideas are reflected and to some extent consolidated in the later work of Saint Leo the Great 
(400!461 CE).  Saint Leo the Great associates dignity with high rank and he also applies it to 
those people who have been baptized, as it is through baptism that the temple of the Holy Spirit 
has been erected in them.  This link with baptism remains today in the Catholic Rite of Baptism, 
where dignity is something that the Christian should now preserve ‘unstained’ until meeting God 
in heaven. 
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 99. The celebrant says: 
 N., you have become a new creation, and have clothed yourself in Christ. 
See in this white garment the outward sign of your Christian dignity. With your family and friends 
to help you by word and example, bring that dignity unstained into the everlasting life of heaven. 
R. Amen. 
(Rite of Baptism of One Child, from the 1970 Missal, available online at The Catholic Liturgical 
Library, 
http://www.catholicliturgy.com/index.cfm/FuseAction/TextContents/Index/4/SubIndex/67/TextInde
x/7, accessed 6/9/10) 
 
Leo links dignity with character or moral conduct.  The Christian should seek to avoid sin and the 
stain that it brings.  Finally, there is a further notion of dignity that Leo refers to – the dignity of 
all human beings.  This he links to two Christian doctrines: human beings are in the image of God 
(in Genesis) and because of Christ (God being made human) human nature has been dignified. 
 
The doctrine that the human being is ‘made in the image of God’ can be summarised as follows.  
In Genesis human beings have a special position in the natural world with stewardship or 
dominion over all things.  Human beings have the power to understand.  The phrase being made 
in God’s image is often taken to imply humans have a special responsibility over creation.  
Human beings possess some Godlike quality.  This gives them an inherent and inalienable 
dignity.  The biblical notion of dignity at once raises the status of human beings in this way, but 
at the same time it humbles them.  Humans are made in God’s image but they are not divine – 
‘we are creatures, not creators’ (Kraynak 2008).  When this is combined with the second doctrine, 
that human beings are redeemed through Christ’s salvation, this last aspect is modified.  Human 
beings have a transcendent destiny.  Being Christ-like is being God-like.  Thus an ethic for the 
transcendent in each other is combined with a notion of individual perfection to be reached for in 
the human journey towards Christ-like behaviour. 
 
The Church fathers  (for example, Origen (185!254 CE), St. Irenaeus (2
nd
 century – 202 CE), St. 
John Chrysostom (347!407 CE) and St. Basil of Caesaria Cappadocia (329!379 CE) maintain a 
universalistic perspective and they argue that all human beings possess reason, freedom or 
immortality (Erhueh 1987).  Human beings are rational animals and immortal by virtue of being 
sons of god (Ibid. p.36).  Miguel writes, ‘Saint Leo the Great classes dignity as an ontological 
category, without moral content.  This allows him to sustain that the Man “is born” worthy 
(würdig, dignus) and all the human beings from that perspective share the “same” or “equal” 
dignity.’  Miguel disagrees with interpretations of Leo that suggest dignity is something that is 
afforded by baptism and can be won, risked or lost (Miguel 2002, p.4). 
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Human beings may be special simply because they hold a unique place in God’s creation and 
because he has some purpose for them, but uncertainty exists as to the precise nature of the divine 
element that is reflected in humanity.  For some, such as St Augustine, the nature of that divine 
image was obviously reason (Kraynak 2008, p.73) but a number of other possibilities exist: 
freedom, language, a physical trait (such as upright posture), immortality, capacities for love, 
holiness, and justice (Ibid.).  Lorberbaum also notes a number of different interpretations of the 
Imago Dei in Genesis: the human shape, the rational faculty, the conscience, the ability to know 
right from wrong.  He observes that all assume there is a divine spark in human beings 
(Lorberbaum 2002).  This ambiguity may come about because the phrase dignity of the human 
person itself does not appear in the early Christian texts despite being a concept that existed in the 
Graeco-Roman world.  Some read it implicitly within the text, through the prism of the theologies 
that have evolved.  Erhueh takes a position that Imago Dei is a closely associated idea that can be 
traced in the Old and New Testament and is the basis for the love that a Christian must show their 
neighbour (Erhueh 1987, p.23).  In other words it could be seen as a reason for the ethical 
teachings of the Bible.  Miguel, on the other hand, holds it is a ‘forced construction’ as it is 
simply not clearly defined within the Bible itself (Miguel 2002, p.3). 
 
In the work of Thomas Aquinas there is an acknowledgement of the attributive dimensions of 
dignity: 
 
For as famous men were represented in comedies and tragedies, the name ‘person’ was given to 
signify those who held high dignity.  Hence those who held high rank in the Church came to be 
called ‘persons.’  Thence by some the definition of person is given as ‘hypostasis distinct by reason 
of dignity’ and because subsistence in a rational nature is of high dignity, therefore every individual 
of the rational nature is called a ‘person’. (Aquinas, Summa Theol I, 29, 3, ad 2) 
 
While acknowledging this, Aquinas and Bonaventure move to an inherent understanding of 
dignity that flows from personhood, the rational nature of man.  It is essential to the human being, 
not an addition.  This describes what Williams calls an ontological dignity, common to all human 
beings (Williams 2005, p.156).  There is also a moral dignity, the consistency by which a person 
lives.  This is variable and there is the possibility that it may deteriorate.  A human who sins 
deviates from the rational order and so loses his human dignity insofar as a human is naturally 
free and an end unto himself.  There was some debate among Protestant Reformers as to the 
degree that the image of God remained after the fall.  Martin Luther held that the image and 
likeness of God was lost after the fall, though it could be restored through the Word and the Holy 
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Spirit as they think, feel and want exactly what God wants (Grenz 2002, p.165).  Calvin held that 
it was corrupted and whatever left is a deformity (Shih 2004).  In these discussions ontological 
and moral dignity are not distinguished. 
 
Miguel traces the influence of these senses in modern Catholic thought.  In the Documents of 
Vatican II (1962!65), some texts proclaim dignity for everyone such as Dignitatis humanae, the 
Declaration of Religious Liberty which states ‘everyone, according to his dignity, as being 
person’ (Flannery 1996, p.553) while others make reference to the loss of dignity through moral 
action (Gaudium et Spes, para. 16, in Flannery 1996, p.178).  It is linked to the eschatological 
future of humanity: through Christ, dignity is brought to the highest level suggesting it is 
developmental and linked to becoming Christ-like (Gaudium et Spes, para. 22, in Flannery 1996, 
p.185).  Thus different dimensions of dignity are embedded into modern Catholic theology.  
Kraynak argues that the foundation of human dignity in the Bible is the Imago Dei but that there 
is a challenge in balancing the affirmation of everyone’s infinite worth with the demands for 
spiritual and moral perfection (Kraynak 2003).  Just as Cicero’s account leaves us with a tension 
between the cosmic and the social designation, Christian accounts have a tension between the 
universal recognition of human dignity and the particular moral progress of an individual’s life. 
 
Lebech tries to resolve this tension, arguing that the Christo-centric framework gives human 
beings fundamental value for two reasons.  Firstly, because they are made in the image and 
likeness of God, and reflect the creator-God in whom and from whom all things have their being 
and value.  Secondly, human value is confirmed by the incarnation of Jesus Christ, the Son of 
God as man, and is restored through his death and resurrection.  ‘God likeness’ is the defining 
feature rather than rationality per se.  It is a reflexive likeness as it develops through a relationship 
with God. 
 
 Critical tensions  
 
There is a rich vein within the Christian sources that might have influenced the idea of dignity 
and how people think about the worth of a human person, and/or may offer some helpful 
reflection in reaching an understanding of the concept.  However, there are a number of 
difficulties in involving religion in human rights concepts, such as dignity.  Religion can be 
perceived as hostile to human rights (cf. Chapter 1), biblical notions are not straightforward to 
apply, theology could be viewed as an inappropriate discipline to draw on in secular contexts, 
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there are differences between the Christian idea and the UDHR and Christianity has doctrines that 
seem to conflict with dignity.  Each are considered in turn. 
 
(i) Religion has been hostile towards human rights: Religion could be seen as an ambiguous 
source of support.  A challenge to any search for a theological basis to dignity is the at best 
ambiguous and at worst hostile historical relationship between religion and rights (Villa-Vicencio 
2000).  While some argue that human rights ideals are found in the Bible, others maintain that 
religion and freedom are not natural allies (Stackhouse & Healey 1996; Wood 1991).  Villa-
Vicenzio observes that a recognition of this reality has only come belatedly and painfully, ‘For 
hundreds of years the Christian Church actively promoted religious intolerance and persecuted 
those who failed to accept its moral values and customs.  Many of these values and practices are 
today rejected as contrary to a human rights culture and moral decency.’ (Villa-Vicencio 2000, 
p.579)  Some within the Catholic Church have recognized its own initial opposition to human 
rights: 
 
As we are well aware, the Church's attitude towards human rights during the last two centuries too 
frequently has been characterised by hesitations, objections, reservations and, on occasion, even 
vehement reaction on the Catholic side to any declaration of human rights made from the standpoint 
of liberalism and laicism. (Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace 1974, p.1) 
 
With these historical realities in mind some have concluded that the key concepts for 
contemporary human rights cannot have their roots in religion.  Sieghart suggests that human 
rights appeared in the American and French texts of the nineteenth centuries rather than ancient 
religious traditions (Sieghart 1995).  They are a product of the Enlightenment move away from 
trust in religious authority. 
 
(ii) Biblical notions of dignity are hard to apply: In addition to the historical difficulties, the 
existence of differing biblical notions of dignity make it hard to apply as it is not always apparent 
which notion is the primary one.  Religious notions confuse the situation.  Moshe Greenberg 
(1960) describes this dignity as a sense of invaluableness of human life, so that there is no price 
of compensation for a murdered life and only the death penalty will suffice (Ibid. pp.15!16).  
Lorberbaum (2002) notes that precisely the opposite conclusion can also be reached; that even the 
murderer’s life is too valuable to take in an execution.  Schulman (2008) argues that the 
implications for bioethics are not always clear and unambiguous.  In the stem cell research 
controversy, the inherent dignity of man could mean that human life at every stage is sacred, and 
that the destruction of human embryos is therefore forbidden.  It could also mean that healing and 
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preserving human life is a preeminent duty, justifying morally questionable research (Schulman 
2008, p.9).  Arguably, complex biblical notions of dignity do not offer clear prescriptive guidance 
to inform human rights. 
 
(iii) Theology is an inappropriate resource for secular discussions: For some it is not a question 
of difficulty, but the appropriateness of religious doctrines in secular discussion.  A concept of 
human dignity derived from a religious text is unreliable, as religious doctrines have no legitimate 
place in secular bioethics.  Ruth Macklin would banish the term ‘dignity’ from medical ethics 
entirely because of her suspicions about the religious sources of dignity (Macklin 2003).  
Similarly, Dieter Birnbacher (2005) suggests the idea of human dignity is camouﬂage for a 
theology that sees the order of nature as divinely sanctioned, when it is invoked to defend the 
‘natural order’ of human procreation.  This is unacceptable in professional discourse which 
should be thoroughly secular, devoid of theologies. 
 
(iv) The Christian idea is incompatible with that mentioned in the UDHR: Proponents of the 
incompatibility assertion are found both among those who prefer the Christian notion and those 
who are opposed to it.  Soulen and Woodhead (2006) conclude that the Christian conception is 
markedly different from the contemporary conception.  They hold that it is conferred, as a gift 
from God.  It is not a quality of humanity.  It is not found in social convention, but in God’s 
action to humanity of redemption in Christ.  It is not self-possession but dispossession, ‘not so 
much entering into oneself but in reaching out in love and care to the other.’ (Ibid. p.6)  It is an 
idea that, rather than focusing on the worth of human beings, focuses on Christ.  Soulen and 
Woodhead see the Christian conception of dignity as distant from the contemporary concept.  It 
leads to a recognition of responsibilities, rather than rights. 
 
Some political philosophers agree that the Christian idea is different.  Howard and Donnelly 
suggest that the conception of dignity underlying international human rights requires a liberal 
regime, and is not found in the Christian narrative. 
 
Conceptions of human dignity in their social and political aspects, express particular understandings 
of the inner (moral) nature and worth of the human person and his or her proper (political) relations 
with society.  Human rights, by contrast, are the equal and inalienable rights… that each person has 
simply as a human being. (Howard & Donnelly 1986, p.802) 
 
Some conceptualisations give: 
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ideological and practical priority to the community over the individual.  Such societies regard their 
members as worthy of concern and respect, but only as members of society performing prescribed 
roles … Individual deviations from communal norms usually were harshly repressed, and women 
and outsiders usually were treated as inferior beings. (Ibid. p.808) 
 
(These two perspectives are examined in detail in Chapter 6) 
 
Some acknowledge that the biblical sources offer a more nuanced account of the significance of 
the individual.  Wolfson (1992) finds support in the Bible for the idea that the individual is a 
dignified being worthy of respect.  Indeed the modern idea of an autonomous man arguably 
comes from this ancient Judaic notion of the significance of the individual (Lamm 1972).  This 
challenges Howard and Donnelly’s assertion that religion gives superiority to the community over 
the individual.  Nevertheless Wolfson notes there is a sense that it is the individual quality of life 
that has sanctity and brings about dignity, not just their being.  Each life comes from God or 
manifests God.  The individual does not per se have dignity (Wolfson 1992).  There is the sense 
that human beings are of little significance compared to God and that to pursue their own 
greatness would be the mistake of the Tower of Babel. 
 
Shultziner (2006) has furthered this analysis of human dignity in the Hebrew Bible and other 
texts, arguing that there are three distinct features of a Jewish conception of human dignity, which 
can be identified in contrast to core characteristics of a liberal conception of human dignity (Ibid. 
p.663).  The source of human dignity is God and therefore not intrinsic.  In addition, the ‘dignity 
of the people’ (the community) has precedence over personal autonomy and liberty (core liberal 
pillars).  Finally, there is a potential conflict between personal autonomy and liberty, and God’s 
commandments. 
 
(v) Some doctrines seem to conflict with dignity: A further difficulty with theological approaches 
to dignity is possible conflict with other theological resources.  The idea that man has a fallen 
nature is problematic.  Drawing on Martin Luther’s view of man as having a dual nature 
(righteous and sinful), John Witte Jr (2003) is cautious about any defense of human dignity and 
rights without taking account of the fallen nature of man, and Jackson (2003) has explored the 
distinction between human sanctity and human dignity, criticising those who place dignity (as 
autonomy) over sanctity (as inherent worth based on the need to love and be loved). 
 
 Responses 
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However, these efforts to differentiate are not entirely successful.  Religion is overly simplified in 
some of its depictions and arguably it offers more resources for understanding dignity than the 
criticisms acknowledge. 
 
(i) Dignity and human life as gifts from God are difficult to separate:  The dignity of humanity 
may be a gift from God, but the whole of humanity is a gift from God and dignity is part of that 
gift.  The dignity of the human person is part of the human being that God made.  Nothing of 
humanity is not from God, except sin.  To say that dignity is not of humanity is no different from 
saying that the human body is not of humanity.  The belief that God made human beings in his 
image and likeness suggests that dignity was made inherent in the human being. 
 
(ii) Human rights inevitably contain tensions between individuals and community: Howard and 
Donnelly’s criticism that traditional community notions of dignity restrict individual human 
freedom is not only an issue for religion.  Human rights tensions between individual rights and 
liberties and group rights and liberties continue to exist irrespective of religion.  The proliferation 
of group rights, including women’s rights, children’s rights and the rights of indigenous 
populations, all point to an acknowledgement of the significance of groups.  One only needs to 
look back to the Holocaust and its place as a motivation for the UDHR to see that the protection 
of communities needs to be an enduring component of rights discourse.  Howard and Donnelly’s 
characterisation of religion as solely on the side of community in this discourse simplifies a more 
subtle range of sources within the Biblical texts, which emphasise the worth of individual life and 
sometimes recognize that individual’s significance despite the community response.  Examples 
are Abraham’s decision to leave his homeland in response to God’s call, Moses’ rejection of 
Pharaoh and later his people’s worship of idols.  In the New Testament there are further examples 
such as Jesus’ decision to leave his own family and become a travelling religious, and later his 
rejection by the Pharisees and other Jewish community authorities of the time.  While religion 
and community are sometimes seen as synonymous today, there are aspects of religion that point 
to a challenge to or renouncement of community in one form or another.  For example, consider 
the choice to live as a hermit or a mendicant, or the rejection of family life and public life for 
celibacy and enclosed living (in some religious orders).  These elements do not constitute an 
argument that religion is non-community or anti-community but rather that Howard and 
Donnelly’s characterisation of religion needs to better reflect the complex tapestry of religious 
sources and phenomena. 
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(iii) Religious texts help people reflect on deep intuitions: Schulman (2008) argues that religious 
texts have value for believer and non-believer alike, helping people, ‘to articulate and think 
through our deepest intuitions about human beings, their distinctive powers and activities, and the 
rights and responsibilities we believe them to possess.’ (Ibid. p.9)  Beyond that, he suggests that if 
all religious grounds for dignity are dismissed by critics, they have an obligation to find a suitable 
alternative explanation for why human beings should be treated with respect.  To discard ancient 
texts which have persisted in attracting the interest of many millions of people for thousands of 
years is questionable. 
 
(iv) The lack of a clear biblical definition allows a degree of mystery in the concept: The fact that 
the Bible does not refer directly to dignity, and has few references to the Imago Dei leaves the 
phrase open to different theological constructions.  Kraynak has concluded from this lack of 
clarity that mystery is a quality of dignity.  The Bible avoids equating dignity with any particular 
traits, and this teaches people that it is not a set of attributes that confers dignity: 
 
Rather, human dignity and the duties implied by it (such as the command to ‘love one another’) are 
ultimately grounded in God’s mysterious love for man above all the creatures of the universe, giving 
every human being an inherent dignity independent of their physical and mental traits. (Kraynak 
2008, p.74) 
 
Human dignity is grounded in God’s ‘mysterious election’ rather than essential attributes.  Rather 
than seeking a precise and exclusive definition, Kraynak suggests the meaning of humanity is 
broad.  It includes the concept of the soul beyond the rational consciousness.  Within that soul is 
the mysterious divine image.  Kraynak sees reason as a secondary feature of humanity that allows 
natural and social hierarchies according to the perfections of reason.  In other words, he presents 
an inclusive conception that offers more scope for compatibility with the modern notion. 
 
The classical notion that the human person is comprehensively explained as a rational and 
autonomous creature is not an entirely satisfying alternative.  It rests on theoretical premises that 
Kraynak calls speculative.  Is there a causal relation of the mind to the brain or does the brain 
have a self-organising complexity?  There are elements of classical philosophy and modern 
science that suggest man’s dignity is an embodied rational soul at the top of a natural hierarchy 
(Kraynak 2008).  Religion reminds us of the importance of the mysterious nature of the human 
person: 
 
Yet reason could do better if it acknowledged that most of these things are genuine mysteries— 
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questions that will never be fully answered by reason or science, such as how and why the universe 
began (creation), why reason is such an integral feature of the universe (rational order), how the 
mind or rational soul can be united to a physical body (the unity of soul and body), whether the soul 
can be separated from the body after death (the immortality of the soul), and what ultimate purpose 
reason is meant to serve (the ﬁnal end).  When such mysteries are acknowledged, reason’s limits are 
exposed; and the mind may be opened to faith in revealed truths, such as those of the Bible and 
Christian faith. (Ibid. p.73) 
 
Kraynak’s argument is that religious resources acknowledge questions that remain unanswered, 
and may be unanswerable, but nevertheless should be pursued. 
 
(v) Secular conceptions of dignity are unintelligible: Perry has argued that there is no intelligible 
secular version of the idea of human rights and that to say human beings are sacred is inescapably 
religious (Perry 1998). Murphy agrees: 
 
The liberal theory of rights requires a doctrine of human dignity, preciousness and sacredness that 
cannot be utterly detached from a belief in God or at least from a worldview that would be properly 
called religious in some metaphysically profound sense. (Murphy 248 in ‘Afterword: 
Constitutionalism, Moral Skepticism, and Religious Belief’ in Constitutionalism: The Philosophical 
Dimension (Alan S Rosenbaum ed., 1988) quoted in Perry 1998, p.41)  
 
Waldron (2002) has come to a similar conclusion with regards to the associated concept of 
equality, ‘I actually don’t think it is clear that we – now – can defend an adequate conception of 
basic human equality apart from some religious foundation.’ (Ibid. p.13) 
 
(vi) Theological ideas of dignity reveal multidimensionality: Polkinhorne (2006) explores how 
Christian ideas of dignity may proceed.  He argues that there is a ‘much richer, multidimensional 
context for the process of hominid development than that considered by biology alone.’ (Ibid. 
p.101)  He goes on to argue that ethical knowledge comes from an encounter with the moral 
dimension of the reality in which we live, which includes an encounter with the sacred.  
Anthropological accounts of human nature (which inform the idea of human dignity) must locate 
us within the multidimensional reality of our actual experience. 
 
(vii) Universality and the Christian notion of dignity:  Lebech (2004) and Williams (2005) have 
both argued that Christianity has offered a way of overcoming the elitism of antiquity which 
linked dignity to positions of standing, by universalising the subject of dignity to extend to all 
people through the assertion that dignity inheres in all people by virtue of their personhood.  
Aristotle afforded dignity only to free Athenian men, but through Thomas Aquinas’ use of 
Boethius’ definition of person comes two important ideas, ‘that the dignity of the human being 
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depends on human nature, which is intrinsic to the individual, and that all human beings possess 
this dignity equally, precisely because it is inherent in their nature.  Equality and inherent dignity 
are two sides of the same idea.’ (Lebech 2000, p.445)  In these terms, the Christian idea of 
ontological dignity, dignity by virtue of the human person, rather than an addendum, presents a 
powerful source for a moral foundation.  This is developed most clearly in Aquinas but is present 
in the Early Church Fathers where they speak of the dignity of the created human being. 
 
 
Part Four: Enlightenment !  Kant 
 
 Kant’s notions of dignity 
 
An important source of the concept of dignity as found in the UDHR is the Enlightenment 
thought of Immanuel Kant.  Kant is not the only contributor to Enlightenment thinking of dignity 
and his ideas were influenced by others who had gone before.  Soulen and Woodhead (2006) 
point out that Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463!1494), in his work De dignitate hominis (On 
the Dignity of Man) played an important role in the emergence of the modern conception.  He 
suggested that human beings gain their excellence from their ability to choose their own place in 
the hierarchy of creation.  Pico omits any Christology in his reckoning and emphasises freedom 
and self-determination, anticipating Kant.  Nevertheless, the influence of Kant is widely attested 
(Sandel 2007, p.105ff).  While Cicero and Christian ideas are important in understanding the 
historical development, Kant is responsible for shaping much of the way the modern Western 
world thinks about human dignity (Shell 2003).  Kant’s philosophy serves as a guide, ‘as his 
philosophy offers a feasible link between a possible metaphysic and secularism which is the 
existential dimension of modernity and of modern history.’ (Arieli 2002, p.7)  His influence is 
apparent in HRE texts produced by UNESCO to aid teachers in HRE, which use his own 
definitions of dignity.  His wider ethical philosophy is beyond the scope of this study so the 
examination draws selectively on his use of dignity, and refers only in general to how this relates 
to his wider thought.  The purpose here is to concisely review Kant’s view of dignity and how he 
is interpreted as a source for the contemporary idea of dignity in human rights. 
 
Kant defines dignity as something of incomparable worth, in stark opposition to a particular 
value, ‘In the kingdom of ends everything has either Value or Dignity.  Whatever has a value can 
be replaced by something else which is equivalent; whatever, on the other hand, is above all 
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value, and therefore admits of no equivalent, has a dignity.’ (Kant 1916, p.63)  Dignity is beyond 
price so cannot be exchanged for another value.  It is of a qualitatively higher order than the 
things that are to do with general desires and wants in life that have ‘market value’, directly 
rejecting the Hobbesian notion.  These general desires and wants are not intrinsically good.  They 
are not ends in themselves, whereas that which has dignity is an end in itself, having intrinsic 
worth (Ibid. p.64).  For Kant, it is the human being that is an end in itself, that has intrinsic worth 
and therefore dignity, ‘Now I say: man and generally any rational being exists as an end in 
himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, 
whether they concern himself or other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time 
as an end.’ (Ibid. p.55)  While other objects have a conditional worth, a worth given to them 
because of the desire and wants placed on them extrinsically, dignity has an unconditional worth.  
It does not depend on anything that is attributed.  But what is this human being that has dignity, 
what is its nature?  Kant agrees with the Stoic view that dignity is the intrinsic worth that belongs 
to all human beings alone in the natural world.  It is because human beings are rational and are 
called ‘persons’ that their nature points to them being of dignity, an end in themselves.  Therefore 
human beings have an objective worth, ‘These, therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose 
existence has a worth for us as an effect of our action, but objective ends, that is things whose 
existence is an end in itself: an end moreover for which no other can be substituted, which they 
should subserve merely as means.’ (Kant 1916, p.55)  All rational beings are bound together as 
members of the Kingdom of ends where they have power to make moral laws but are also bound 
by that authority to follow those laws.  Kant here offers a new formulation of dignity.  There are 
traces of the prior ideas linking with reason, and like theologians he draws on it as a profound 
source, but for Kant, human beings are not exalted by nature, or by God, but instead by 
autonomy.  Kant’s view is similar to the Stoic idea that dignity is the intrinsic worth that belongs 
to all human beings alone in the natural world, but unlike the Stoics he held that the dignity that 
humans have comes from the fact that they are ‘free from all laws of nature, obedient only to 
those laws which he himself prescribes.’ (Kant 1948, 4,435)  Dignity adheres to human beings 
because of their moral personality, the freedom of a rational being under moral law, ‘the dignity 
of man consists precisely in his capacity to make universal law, although only on condition of 
being himself also subject to the laws he makes.’ (Ibid. 4,440)  This dignity of man is given to 
humans because they have the ability and the freedom to make the universal laws to which they 
are also subject.  In effect, this claim is similar to that made by others (for instance Paine and 
Wollenstonecraft), that human beings have dignity by virtue of their humanity, not the social 
class into which they are born. 
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Kant’s idea of dignity is associated with immortality.  Human consciousness has a self-evident 
status that transcends the time and place in which it exists.  It binds the individual to the infinite: 
 
Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the 
more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above and the moral law within.  I have not to 
search for them and conjecture them as though they were veiled in darkness or were in the 
transcendent region beyond my horizon; I see them before me and connect them directly with the 
consciousness of my existence… 
 
The former begins from the place I occupy in the external world of sense, and enlarges my 
connection therein to an unbounded extent with worlds upon worlds and systems of systems, and 
moreover into limitless times of their periodic motion, its beginning and continuance.  The second 
begins from my invisible self, my personality, and exhibits me in a world which has true infinity, 
but which is traceable only by the understanding, and with which I discern that I am not in a 
merely contingent but in a universal and necessary connection, as I am also thereby with all those 
visible worlds.  The former view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates as it were my 
importance as an animal creature, which after it has been for a short time provided with vital 
power, one knows not how, must again give back the matter of which it was formed to the planet it 
inhabits (a mere speck in the universe).  The second, on the contrary, infinitely elevates my worth 
as an intelligence by my personality, in which the moral law reveals to me a life independent of 
animality and even of the whole sensible world, at least so far as may be inferred from the 
destination assigned to my existence by this law, a destination not restricted to conditions and 
limits of this life, but reaching into the infinite. (Kant 1952, pp.360!61) 
 
The infinite world of absolute value is perceived through morality.  Dignity is a bridging idea that 
connects us to a kind of immortality beyond the everyday world, linking our consciousness in 
place and time and the immortality of the status we hold above animality that transcends it (Shell 
2003, p.60).  Dignity is interwoven with the concept of the human person: 
 
But man considered as a person … is lifted up above all price; for as a person he is not to be 
valued merely as a means to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but as end in himself; that 
is he possesses a dignity by which he necessitates respect. (Kant 1948, 4,440)  
 
The humanity found in one’s person is the link between regard for the individual person and the 
regard for the person as a human being.  Shell, in her analysis, concludes: 
 
Respecting humanity in my own person thus also means not allowing myself to be used merely as 
means by others, even, and perhaps especially, when they do so on the basis of a claim to serve 
me.  Asserting one’s rights, even at risk of one’s life, is for Kant, a perfect duty, and never more so 
when my very right to do so is at stake. (Shell 2003, p.65) 
 
Arguably, Kant provides the most important philosophical account on the grounds of an 
egalitarian notion of dignity, the notion linked with contemporary human rights which also 
embrace equality.  In addition, he provides an account of dignity grounded in rationality, rather 
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than natural law (Meyer 2002).  Autonomy is predicated on the reason making capacity.  This 
egalitarian valuation of the person is that which is found in the idea of dignity expressed in 
contemporary human rights.  For example, Chaskalson (2002) describes dignity as, ‘respect for 
the autonomy of each person, and the right of everyone not to be devalued as a human being or 
treated in a degrading or humiliating manner.’ (Ibid. p.137) 
 
Shell writes that before Kant, dignity was understood in such a way that it could not be equally 
held by all, and had come to be associated with rank and authority borrowing something from the 
dignity of Christ (2003, p.53).  She notes that Kant borrows from the theologians the idea that 
dignity is the deepest source that all humans share.  He borrows from philosophers by linking it 
with reason, echoing natural law ideas (Dicke 2002; van Dun 2001).  It is this distinctive fusion 
that Kant develops in his account of dignity.  Lebech describes the Kantian perspective as a logo-
centric framework.  Human dignity is based on reason or rationality, their ability to understand 
the implications of the ‘universalisability’ of any of the maxims of their actions.  Reason is the 
only criterion for human dignity, but if reason fails it is not clear what happens to human dignity.  
If a person loses reason, have they lost their dignity as well? 
 
Within Kant’s thought there is a second idea of dignity that is related to human action.  This is the 
dignity afforded someone by virtue of the extent to which they perform their duties, ‘we yet 
ascribe a certain dignity and sublimity to the person who fulfils all his duties.’ (Kant 1952, 
pp.70!71)  This aspect of Kant’s view of dignity is largely ignored today (Meyer 1987, p.320), in 
part because this dignity of persons in high position seems unrelatable to the dignity of humanity 
Kant is more commonly known for.  Meyer suggests that Kant makes use of both conceptions of 
dignity, both that which comes from position in society and that which comes by virtue of natural 
humanity, and he goes on to argue that the changing use of the concept is a feature of Kant’s own 
thought (Ibid. p.329).  In this respect Kant is not unlike Cicero, reflecting two traditions of 
thought, one of which has had more influence, or has been seen to be more important 
retrospectively. 
 
Kant’s thoughts about dignity are woven around emerging ideas of rights, in a system that is 
justified not by human happiness but civic honour and civic justice (Shell 2003, p.66).  The 
second notion of dignity provides a justification for the system that extols the first.  Ultimately, 
however, it is Kant’s first approach to dignity that is close to the contemporary concept.  Meyer 
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argues that it is the egalitarian nature of Kant’s concept that is the greatest gift to the 
contemporary age: 
  
Kant’s discussion of dignity is perhaps the most important philosophical account of the grounds of 
such an egalitarian notion of human dignity, … human dignity is that special moral worth and 
status had by a human being.  He has human dignity regardless of not only (hereditary) social 
position, but also race, gender, nationality, ethnicity or other marker of social hierarchy.  This 
egalitarian account of ‘human dignity’ is arguably a moral high-water mark of modern ethical and 
political thought. (Meyer 2002, p.196)  
 
Kant’s influence may be seen in Mahatma Ghandi and Martin Luther King’s view of misplaced 
nobility and humility.  Kant’s notion of dignity has effectively become a modern virtue (Ibid. 
pp.206!207).  It should be noted that while ancient writers recognized the universal or cosmic 
dimension of human dignity, they did not deduce from that the moral obligations that bound the 
treatment of every human being.  Since Kant, that idea has become important in Christian 
theology of the dignity of the human person.  There are other ways in which Kant’s thinking 
foreshadows the modern concept.  He identifies human dignity with a single preeminent 
faculty!rational freedom.  He elevates dignity to the foundational principle for normative ethical 
consideration and he links the concept with specific rights and duties of being treated as an end 
and not only as a means (Soulen & Woodhead 2006, p.11). 
 
 
 Critical perspectives of Kant 
 
Notwithstanding the profound importance of this feature of Kant’s thought and its influence, there 
are a number of criticisms of Kant’s account. 
 
(i) An outmoded view of humanity: Some think it relies on a view of humanity which must be 
wholly given up as a result of discoveries about evolution and behaviouristic psychology 
(Rachels 1990; Skinner 1971).  Rachels has argued that dignity is a moral doctrine that states that 
humans are in a different moral category from animals and are of supreme importance.  Dignity is 
based either on the idea that man is made in God’s image, or that man is a uniquely rational 
creature.  Rachels goes on to argue that it cannot survive the huge shift of perspective brought 
about by Darwin’s theory of evolution.  Human beings are no longer the centre of the universe.  
They no longer have a special status, divinely ordained (Rachels 1990).  However such criticisms 
themselves are problematic.  They leave ethics and morality vulnerable to definition simply in 
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terms of the human motivation of desire, power and procreation.  They come to conclusions about 
morality, which are harsh and pessimistic (Kraynak 2008, p.90).  These conclusions see no wrong 
in the strong dominating the weak, and the weak being replaced ultimately by the strong.    
 
Abrahamic religions have placed humanity in a position of higher moral significance than other 
creatures and Kant follows this trend.  It could be argued that human beings are distinctively and 
particularly human and that the challenge of defining the quality or qualities that distinguishes 
them apart from other beings should not overshadow the fact that human beings are recognizably 
distinctive and particular.  Human sentiency, in terms of moral and rational capabilities, is 
understood to be are more sophisticated than those other animal life forms.  The possibility that 
the boundary of moral significance is still widening and must remain open to change should not 
prevent attempts to articulate moral importance.  
 
(ii) A narrow idea of dignity: Other criticisms do not dispense with dignity but merely the 
exclusive association with rationality.  Kass objects to the way Kant dualistically sets up the 
concept of ‘personhood’ in opposition to nature and the body that fails to do justice to the 
concrete reality of our embodied lives.  By focusing on the universal rationality it detracts from 
the significance of the particular concrete, corporeal context of the human being from zygote in 
the womb to body in the coffin.  Human beings are embodied, rooted and connected with 
aspirations, loves and longings.  These are part of human dignity as well, which are not accounted 
for by the terms autonomy and rationality (Kass 2008, p.313).  Schulman also criticises this 
narrowness and adds further criticisms, notably the difficulty it is to apply in practice.  What 
moral significance is afforded to human beings who have lost the power of rational autonomy 
(those with dementia), do not yet have it (infants), or never will have it (those with congenital 
impairment)? 
 
Browning (2006) thinks Kant’s rational determination of dignity inadequately reflects the 
complexity and diversity of the dignity of the human person.  Instead he argues for a 
multidimensional understanding of dignity.  He contends that the human deserves respect in many 
dimensions and links his observation to a tradition of multidimensional understandings of the 
human person found in a series of modern Protestant theologians.  One example of this 
multidimensionality, which is found in Witte’s essay Between Sanctity and Depravity explores, as 
the title suggests, the paradoxical two-fold contradictory nature of humanity with its carnal and 
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spiritual aspects (Witte 2003).  Freedom is important in this context because the Christian is free 
to pursue his or her divine duty.  Human dignity does not constitute perfection. 
 
In appraising and evaluating approaches which he calls ‘Kantianised Christianity,’ or in the frame 
of this study compatibilistic, Kraynak has critically observed that there is a danger here of on the 
one hand exalting rights and on the other criticising rights culture (Kraynak 2003).  He suggests: 
 
[T]he challenge of our age is therefore to combine a hierarchical view of human dignity in the 
realm of Christian spirituality (which includes the church and the family) with a qualified view of 
the democratic political order that is guided by sober prudence rather than by Kantian rights.  If we 
can achieve that delicate balance, we will have made an important contribution to defending the 
true and authentic dignity of man. (Ibid. p.115) 
 
Kraynak finds this view of human dignity less satisfactory than what he calls biblical and 
medieval views of dignity (incompatibilistic Catholic and Protestant conceptions of dignity), for 
two reasons.  Firstly there is an emphasis in Kant on the human person as being the only morally 
significant feature, and this is unnecessarily anthropocentric which results in difficulties for 
environmental concerns, and secondly, following this, that the primacy of human beings does not 
seem to allow for an sense of the sinfulness of humanity. 
 
(iii) Kant retains a less egalitarian conception of dignity: The egalitarian quality of Kant’s 
dignity has eclipsed the rather more attributive second notion of dignity also found in his work.  
The presence of both notions in his thought seems to mirror Cicero, although in Kant the balance 
has tilted the other way, with more interest in dignity of the human than the other notion.  Basing 
the idea on rationality and autonomy exclusively is more problematic.  In this regard, Kant’s 
attempt to provide an alternative basis to the theological one is less successful.  He has replaced 
one set of problems located around the identification of the origin of dignity with God or 
humanity, with a new set of problems associated with the tension between individual rational 
autonomy and universal moral norms.  It has not provided the modern notion of dignity in human 
rights with an unproblematic foundation.  Nevertheless, the issue of human autonomy and 
rationality is important in modern ethical discourses in which dignity is cited and so there is some 
correlation between Kant and how these ethical problems are viewed (Beyleveld & Brownsword 
2001, pp.661!680). 
 
(iv) Kant has decontextualised dignity and left it weak: Soulen and Woodhead have argued that 
with Kant’s development of the concept, it has been decontextualised, removed from its context, 
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its theological narrative, so that his development of the idea constitutes a threat to dignity.  They 
trace the development of dignity through three stages: contextualisation of dignity in early 
Christian thought, decontextualisation of dignity in modern times pointing to a need for 
theological recontextualisation.  In the early Christian framework, a clear context was given for 
the concept that saw dignity as coming to humans as part of God’s creation, in terms of being in 
the image and likeness of God, and finally in terms of being restored through Christ’s redemption 
and the practice of Christian virtue.  They see a move in the modern philosophical period in terms 
of decontextualisation, particularly under the influence of Kant and Nietzsche, which has left the 
idea of dignity in crisis, as it can no longer serve as a ‘meaningful point of orientation for human 
thought and action.’ (Soulen & Woodhead 2006, p.1)  The consequence of this 
decontextualisation is that by robbing dignity of the narrative context it is made fragile, as it is 
adrift from its theological basis.  Dignity opens human rights to significant attack from the 
philosophical critique that they are without meaning or foundation.  In other words, many of the 
question marks raised in the survey of philosophical discourse come about because dignity has 
been divorced from its theological roots.  It is not able to sustain the ethical and metaphysical 
weight modern rights talk places upon it.  The philosophical critiques of dignity explored above 
demonstrate this fragility and undermine attempts to base human rights on dignity, or use the 
concept of dignity at all.  Soulen and Woodhead identify in Kant’s thinking the claim that 
‘capacity for autonomous rational agency is the root of human dignity.’ (Ibid. p.11) 
 
This has radical theological implications because his concept of dignity is distinct from any 
concept of God; man is placed alone beneath the heavens as the location of freedom and dignity 
in the world.  Dignity is foundational for ethical reflection and therefore the rights of humanity – 
human beings can never be treated as a means to an end.  After Kant, human dignity was no 
longer dependent on the divine.  By grounding dignity in man’s own rational autonomy, the way 
has been laid open for Nietzsche’s dethroning of human moral reasoning and the attack against 
conventional morality to free human beings to live beyond good and evil.  Soulen and 
Woodhead’s analysis reveals the heart of the contemporary nervousness that many religious 
thinkers have about rights and a definition of dignity which is only about individual freedom 
(Soulen & Woodhead 2006).  Dignity based on unrestricted freedom with no connection to any 
idea of the common good, is the consequence of decontextualising dignity from its theological 
foundations.  Soulen and Woodhead argue dignity is neither self-explanatory nor self-sustaining, 
but has a meaning dependent on its being embedded within a broader and more comprehensive 
cultural, conceptual and social framework (Ibid. p.2). 
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Soulen and Woodhead essentially agree with Sulmasy that the modern concept of dignity is 
positioned to be foundational but this, they claim, is an error.  By focusing on the human 
foundation of dignity, ‘dignity now inheres solely in his or her own possessions and 
achievements.’ (Ibid. p.8)  By locating dignity in unfettered human freedom, the contemporary 
concept draws on Sartre and Nietzsche but in reality, as feminist writers have argued, the dignity 
of the human is in fact the dignity of the male, and from a post-colonial perspective, it is the 
dignity of the westerner with ‘civilised’ values.  In other words the decontextualised human 
centred dignity masks the exclusion of non males and non whites. 
 
Kant and others have left the concept decontextualised and weak.  Central to the proper 
‘contextualisation’ of dignity is the idea that dignity is conferred by God and that the measure and 
norm of dignity is found in God rather than social convention, and that dignity is measured in the 
context of the Church, not in an individual context (Ibid. pp.4!7).  Soulen and Woodhead argue 
that Christian theology has a vital role to play in identifying the ways in which dignity is under 
threat in contemporary culture and society.  A theological reconceptualisation of dignity found in 
contemporary Christian thinking is a response to a need to reinforce it in this predicament. 
 
Soulen and Woodhead provide a narrative account of the development of dignity, not unlike 
Lebech, and aim to re-establish the idea, like Sulmasy, but in quite different ways.  While Lebech 
seeks to include the range of perspectives offered by the traditions of dignity and Kraynak 
embraces the mystery of the idea, Soulen and Woodhead seek to restore a weakened concept by 
cutting away that which is a mistake.  This may be what Sulmasy is intending to achieve, but 
while he seeks to restore dignity as a foundation, Soulen and Woodhead seek to restore God as 
the foundation, leaving dignity with an important but derivative status.  While Lebech sees the 
different influences as contributing to a multidimensional perspective, one that is inclusive of 
plural perspectives, Soulen and Woodhead seek to particularise dignity within an exclusive 
understanding. 
 
 In support of Kant  
 
Soulen and Woodhead claim the idea is undermined and needs to be restored by a reconnection 
with the theological framework.  Though it is a compelling claim, it is open to question as Kant’s 
contribution attracts considerable support in human rights thinking. 
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(i) Kant provides an intrinsic justification for human dignity: Kant’s notion may have limitations 
in the field of bioethics, but Schulman does not want to discard the idea of dignity (as Rachels 
and Skinner seem to do). 
 
Kant’s idea of human dignity carries certain theoretical baggage that limits its utility for bioethics, 
while the recently ratiﬁed constitutions and declarations tend to invoke dignity without clearly 
specifying either its ground or its content, suggesting that the concept itself might well be 
superﬂuous.  On the other hand, it is hard to see how ethical standards for the treatment of human 
beings can be maintained without relying on some conception of what human beings are and what 
they therefore deserve. (Schulman 2008, p.15) 
 
The argument that every person, by virtue of their humanity, has intrinsic dignity, rather than a 
socially attributed value, is powerful.  In legal and educational discourses, Kant is attributed as a 
principal source behind the UDHR idea of dignity.  UNESCO have adopted a Kantian formula to 
express the application of these foundational values to the individual in its HRE guidance for 
teachers, which defines dignity as recognizing the individual as an end in him or herself, 
irrespective of family, social and cultural background (UNESCO 1998). 
 
The idea that human beings cannot give themselves away for any price without violating their 
dignity or self-esteem underpins rulings in a French case concerning circus dwarfs, the German 
Peep-Show Decision and, in the context of commerce in one's own body parts, the Warnock 
Committee noted that some oppose surrogacy on grounds that it is inconsistent with human 
dignity that woman use her uterus for profit (Beyleveld & Brownsword 1998, pp.661!80; see also 
the Victorian Law Reform Commission report on workplace reform 2002).  An education 
programme in Romania illustrates this: 
 
In Romania there was a mass society.  The individual was not taught he was an individual with 
rights and responsibilities . . . Everybody was taught they were part of a collective, with collective 
rights.  In Chapter One, I want to bring home the individuality of the person . . . I started from the 
perspective of human rights and man seen as a 'person'.  The emerging perspective is the person in 
the first Article of the Declaration of Human Rights, which is inspired from the Kantian perspective.  
What is a human being?  The human being is an end and not a means . . . A person is a person, with 
reason and consciousness.... We all look for our own identity, and from here we look to others, and 
try to understand differences in people. (Georgescu 1994) 
 
Another example is found in the teachers guide, Understanding Human Rights: Manual on 
Human Rights Education (Benedek 2006, p.31), which attributes Kant with establishing the 
cosmopolitan world citizen vision that underpins the UDHR. 
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(ii) The possibilities of infinity: While Kant does not articulate a theologically grounded 
conception of dignity, he does not exclude it from metaphysics.  Returning to an earlier quote 
repeated here, Kant refers to the moral law and the human connectedness to an infinite world, 
which he says: 
 
infinitely elevates my worth as an intelligence by my personality, in which the moral law reveals 
to me a life independent of animality and even of the whole sensible world, at least so far as may 
be inferred from the destination assigned to my existence by this law, a destination not restricted 
to conditions and limits of this life, but reaching into the infinite. (Kant 1952, pp.160!91) 
 
This suggests that it is not only the freedom in the animal world that defines the dignity of the 
person, but the infinity to which the human person is connected.  Soulen and Woodhead (2006) 
wish to exclude religious narratives from the Kantian account of dignity, but Kant refers to the 
human connectedness with infinity.  It is this element that Miguel touches on when he resacralises 
the concept by introducing a transcendental law with his postulate (Miguel 2002, pp.11!12). 
 
 
Part Five: Reflecting on ancient and modern 
 
Several important threads may be drawn from this discussion of the reviews and the original 
sources themselves.  Multidimensionality and complexity are both features of the discussion.  
Miguel’s analysis does not try to link the contemporary notion of dignity to a single historical 
source.  He is not seeking to advance a particular philosopher or theologian as the father of the 
contemporary notion.  The concept as found in the UDHR has aspects of many sources of dignity, 
from both those that were theologically and naturally grounded, including some of the earliest 
sources.  The contemporary notion of dignity is a complex blend echoing multiple different 
earlier ideas but these different ideas are not coherent.  There are tensions both between and 
within those sources. 
 
Lebech extends this idea and concludes that all of the factors play a contributing role, ‘none of 
them taken on its own can be a sufficient condition for personal identity, and consequently not for 
human dignity either.’ (2004, p.11)  For Lebech, human dignity is a composite, a complexity of 
different facets, which have been identified at different periods, to different extents.  They all 
indicate the human and point towards a being whose existence is of fundamental value.  None 
 149 
taken in isolation provides a sufficient condition for human dignity.  It is only through the 
integration of these different facets that a person’s depths can be opened up: 
 
Only from this depth can I identify the fundamental value of the other human being, as the value of 
his or her existence beyond, but not in independence of, his or her nature, god-likeness, reason and 
social integration.  We call the pure appreciation of the individuality of the other self, love. (Ibid.) 
 
This love then becomes the motivation for the rights of the weak, the young and the old and the 
protection against abuse from the strong. 
 
What we say when we claim that the principle of human dignity is the basis of the international 
world order, is that this world order should be a civilisation of respect and love.  Perhaps we even 
mean that it is only as such a civilisation that it can be a civilisation at all. (Ibid. p.12) 
 
Lebech’s intention is to integrate the different frameworks and account for the 
multidimensionality of the human person.  Her analysis asserts an ideal coherent notion of dignity 
that includes the different elements emphasised by different frameworks.  The different 
perspectives taken together provide a justification for the moral primacy of the value of the 
human person.  For Lebech, this perspective would be incomplete without a spiritual dimension.  
While she does not dwell on the specific notion of human dignity as found in the international 
documents, she sees the development of frameworks of dignity as adding cumulative weight to 
the place of dignity as the justification for human rights. 
 
Sulmasy, like Lebech, argues that dignity is a primary moral foundation but he sees 
contradictions between the differing ideas that cannot be reconciled.  He locates a single essential 
basis for dignity in the intrinsic value of the humanity of the being.  His typology differs from 
Lebech’s focusing on the general features found across different contexts, while Lebech locates 
dignity within the particular contextual logic.  Lebech observes subtle differences within the 
sources of dignity, for instance distinguishing between social attribution and cosmic or 
naturalistic attribution.  Sulmasy, on the other hand, is content to leave aside the justification or 
rationale for the claims for dignity and instead focuses on the application and effects of the 
concept.  His analysis is teleologically driven.  Sulmasy concludes with the rejection of one 
category (attribution) and the acceptance of intrinsic dignity as offering the most convincing 
moral foundation.  He acknowledges that inflorescent dignity is related to intrinsic dignity, but it 
is ultimately dependent on the actions of others and so is not a suitable moral foundation.  His 
inclusion of inflorescent dignity offers a solution to the tension found elsewhere, between the 
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showing of dignity in moral and social conduct or behaviour and the existence of dignity in every 
human person. 
 
Sulmasy’s argument is important for it seeks to establish a categorical grounding or basis for 
human rights.  It is clear that a stronger claim can be made for universal human rights founded on 
an unchanging or intrinsic value, rather than any kind of attributive quality.  However, it is not 
easy to set aside Lebech’s observations of complexity and multi-dimensionality, and therefore the 
position here is to advance a framework that seeks to accommodate the different elements of 
dignity in a relational tension.   
 
The UDHR affords rights to all, irrespective of any social status, position or behaviour, 
suggesting that it is the inherent, ontological or cosmic notion of dignity that provides the most 
suitable basis for a moral foundation of human rights.  At the same time, rights imply a social 
recognition of moral obligation, which human beings are expected to fulfill so that everyone can 
develop fully as a person.  Nevertheless, if human dignity depended upon moral merit, a child 
before the age of reason, for example, would have no dignity, hence no rights (Williams 2005, 
p.157).  Berger et al. (1973) observed that dignity had replaced honour.  In doing so, he noted the 
counter-intuitive claim that dignity was recognition that the individual is independent from 
socially or institutionally imposed roles or norms, despite the fact that this is clearly not the case. 
 
It pertains to the self as such, to the individual regardless of his position in society.  This becomes 
very clear in the classic formulations of human rights, from the Preamble to the Declaration of 
Independence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations.  These rights 
always pertain to the individual ‘irrespective of race, color or creed’ – or indeed, of sex, age, 
physical condition or of any conceivable social status … The modern concept of dignity… implies 
that identity is essentially independent of institutional roles. (Ibid. pp.89!90) 
 
If a person has dignity by virtue of their humanity, does their moral improvement or conduct have 
any bearing at all on their personhood, if not as a moral foundation?  It might be an expression of 
that dignity, an indicator of the flourishing of the human person, the educative development of the 
being.  The way in which the inherent quality extends to inform the expression needs exploring, 
but it is possible that this relationship will remain a mystery because it is bound up with the 
mystery of the human person.  As yet the relationship between brainwaves, thought processes and 
experiences and the sense of the personal person which human beings have, are not understood 
(Kraynak 2008).  It is through the experience of being human that these dimensions of dignity are 
recognized. 
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Dignity, as it is experienced, has other dimensions than the foundational one.  Dignity has very 
clearly emerged from social interaction.  The rights that flow from dignity influence relationships.  
In other words dignity presumes and requires a certain kind of social, moral and attributive 
interaction.  The failure to recognize dignity is a feature of humiliation.  For Berger, this 
divergence reveals a paradox between the foundational role of dignity and the social experiential 
reality of human life.  Williams (2005) describes dignity as a bridge between the metaphysical 
and ethical realm which gives rise to moral obligations.  In effect, it justifies the move from an is 
to an ought, where the ought is social and experiential and the is is metaphysical.  Ultimately, the 
primacy of dignity can be seen not simply in terms of its ability to provide a foundation for moral 
norms, or even that it has a prescriptive or action guiding influence on moral behaviour but 
because it encapsulates the whole moral worldview.  In the words of Shultziner: 
 
[O]ur understanding of the human dignity is deeply inherent in our way of perceiving the world and 
its dwellers.  The word human relates to basic assumptions in our consciousness, or rather sub-
consciousness, about human nature, worth, place in the cosmos, attributes, and character, and 
inseparably of human, we have a strong understanding of dignity: human dignified or natural 
existence, human normative behaviour that best reflects their good nature, and human positive and 
negative attributes. (Shultziner 2007, p.79) 
 
Some readings of the history of the idea incorporate the plurality of concepts within the sources 
as an essential dimension of dignity.  Others identify what they consider to be the strongest claim 
for a moral foundation and exclude or diminish the significance of others.  Remembering that the 
UDHR was established in such a way that enabled many states to sign it, leaving dignity 
undefined, Lebech, Shultziner and others present a way of including both the range of different 
historical sources of dignity and consequently offer an approach that is consistent with the 
UDHR’s nature and purpose. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The examination of three sources reveals multiple dimensions and complexity in the history of 
the concept dignity that form an interconnected pattern within the concept.  This has shed light on 
both the source of dignity, the subject of dignity and the extent of dignity – where it comes from, 
who it affects and the degree of that effect.  The three sources provide different explanations in 
addressing these factors.  The ethical implications of dignity have a further set of variation 
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depending on whether it is based on attributive, inherent or inflorescent modes.  Dignity appeals 
across a number of dimensions. 
 
All the sources examined reveal complexity and diversity in the idea of dignity which is an 
argument for a complex or compound concept with different elements.  None present a concept 
that is singularly defined.  These different ideas reflect tensions.  In Cicero there is, on the one 
hand, the universalistic cosmic idea of the dignity of man beyond and above human society, and 
on the other, the conferred dimension that is rooted in Roman social standing, and dependent 
upon recognized moral conduct and political achievement.  Christianity contains different ideas 
about dignity: dignity as the image and likeness of God, an ultimate divine dignity that is found 
ontologically in every created human being; dignity as a gift received at baptism which is 
preserved through sinlessness and lost or impaired through sinfulness, or even lost to humanity 
after the Fall; dignity as something within the spirit or soul of the person or as something found in 
the body and soul.  In Christian sources there is the tension between the human beings, with 
dignity held ontologically, in virtue of being made in the image of God, and the dignity that is 
granted in baptism and maintained through avoidance of sin, and indeed grows as the person 
becomes more Christ like.  Kant is most commonly remembered for his idea of the inherent 
dignity of the person, located in the individual rational person, but he also talks of socially 
recognized dignity.  The essential difficulty that spans these different sources is how the inherent 
value of the individual can be combined with a recognition of the social dimension of the human 
person – their interrelationships with others. 
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Chapter 5 
A critical analysis of dignity in human rights education 
 
Building on preceding chapters, this chapter aims to critically analyse the concept of dignity in 
HRE literature.  It explores the extent to which earlier ideas of dignity, revealed through the 
historical conceptual analysis of chapters 3 and 4, are present within HRE.  It draws both on these 
theological and philosophical sources in general terms, using them to critically appraise the 
notions of dignity in the HRE literature. 
 
The chapter is divided into three parts.  Part One: Inherent and attributive worth examines 
philosophical and theological sources and how they reflect this range of different notions of 
dignity.  UN international documents stress a notion of dignity that is inherent and a view of 
education that is justified by the inherent worth of the pupils, rather than any output.  Different 
HRE writers refer to dignity in different ways, some echoing the intrinsic notion, while others see 
dignity as related to moral conduct or as another word for respect.  Some offer no theorisation of 
the concept.  This lack of clarity is problematic, given the importance of the concept.  Part Two: 
Inherent worth and the flourishing person explores the developmental dimension of dignity.  In 
the HRE international documents an association is made between the inherent worth of the person 
and the flourishing of that person, as a multidimensional individual.  This link is also found in 
some philosophical and theological sources.  Whether the worth of a person resides in their being 
or in their capacity to be good has quite different consequences for that individual.  The 
theological and philosophical sources have much to offer this understanding.  Part Three: Critical 
observations and discussion draws some conclusions from the analysis. In particular it explores 
the dynamic relationship between inherent worth, the development of that person, and how others 
respond, and how some or all of these elements are poorly understood without conceptual clarity 
in HRE literature.  
 
 
Part One: Inherent and attributive worth 
 
 In the theological and philosophical sources 
 
The philosophical and theological sources explore questions of whether dignity is inherent or 
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attributive; whether it is found within or conferred by another.  The limitations of a form of 
dignity based on class or social standing are obvious in the contemporary perspective.  Attributive 
dignity is found in Cicero and Hobbes (Sulmasy 2008), it is also found in Kant (Meyer 1987) and 
within the moral form of dignity in the Christian tradition.  The extent to which dignity is a 
socially recognized or attributed concept raises different responses.  Attributive dignity refers to 
the worth conferred on others by acts of attribution.  Dignity is created and conferred (by 
individuals or communally) on those we admire or who act in certain ways or have abilities, skills 
or powers; they are conveyed by the valuer.  Taylor (1989) describes this as the characteristic by 
which we think of ourselves as commanding (or failing to command) the respect of those around 
us.  It is the sense of ourselves commanding attitudinal respect. He maintains that our sense of 
dignity may consist of a range of sentiments, ‘It can be our power, our sense of domination in 
public space; or our invulnerability to power; or our self-sufficiency, our life having its own 
centre; or our being liked and looked to by others, a centre of attention.’ (Taylor 1989, pp.15!16)  
It depends on the intentions, expectations, beliefs, desires or interests of the valuer or the 
community of valuers.  It is culturally relative. 
 
This notion is unlikely to provide a foundation for the UDHR as the UDHR rejects the attributive 
idea of dignity.  It recalls the earlier notion of honour, which the contemporary idea of dignity has 
replaced (Berger et al. 1973).  When discussing the UDHR, Kofi Annan rejects this idea as a 
basis for human rights (Quoted in Star 1998).  He describes dignity as that which lifts the status 
of human beings above that which may be conferred in terms of citizenship, be that a citizenship 
that is nationally or globally conceived.  The human rights that flow from dignity are not the civil 
rights that flow from countries’ constitutions.  They cannot be redrawn, adjusted or removed by a 
national judiciary.  Dignity is a universal value, which is not conferred by peer group. 
 
Within the ancient, Christian and Kantian sources examined in Chapter 4 there is consistency 
regarding a notion of dignity, which is variously described as intrinsic, ontological or inherent 
worth, though the accounts differ on the specific nature and source of that intrinsic quality.  Shell 
(2003, 2008) and Meyer (1987, 1989, 2002) show that this form of dignity is commonly 
associated with Kant’s notion of human dignity, but we have also seen that it is present in 
antiquity and the ontological form of dignity in the Christian thinking found in St. Leo the Great 
and later Aquinas.  In antiquity, that intrinsic value or inherent worth was related to the objective 
position of the human being within the cosmos as a being of supreme importance.  Cicero’s use of 
the phrase the ‘dignity of man’ (Cancik 2002) points toward such a notion even if it does not 
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apply to the idea that such life is inviolable.  In Christian sources, intrinsic value comes from 
being made by the creator God and being in his image and likeness, from the association that acts 
of loving kindness to those in need are ways of loving Christ, and from the Christological 
significance for humanity that the divine became human in Christ.  For some, notably Soulen and 
Woodhead (2006), dignity is not a human quality but one of God’s gifts.  However the divine gift 
of dignity must retain its value after it has been given to the receiver, and since that receiver only 
exists by virtue of another divine gift, the gift of life, the clear distinction Soulen and Woodhead 
seek to make can be questioned.  There is a sense of the divine in the human from which early 
Christian sources concluded that that human person must be protected.  In Kant, the intrinsic 
value of dignity is sometimes reduced to rationality and freedom, but there is also a sense of the 
cosmic position of human beings as creatures who perceive the eternal law and are connected to 
the infinite, not by virtue of their autonomy, but something else that is both universal and eternal.  
This element of Kantian thought brings his conception closer to aspects of Christian thinking than 
Soulen and Woodhead would accept.  It is suggestive of a noumenal quality. 
 
In each of these traditions, the special worth of the person is not afforded by virtue of any social 
position.  Nor is it conferred or created by human action.  It is pre-rational and pre-moral.  It is 
asymmetrically related to attributive dignity, that kind which is afforded by others.  The valuer 
must recognize the objective intrinsic worth of the person; his or her dignity.  Human worth is not 
conferred by the attribution of value by an external authority.  Instead the external person must 
recognize the binding authority of the inherent worth of the person.  With this usage, for example, 
racism is an offense against the dignity of the human person.  Intrinsic worth is closely associated 
with the expressions of dignity found in the UDHR and other international declarations. 
 
Sulmasy considers that this form of dignity is the most convincing form if it is to act as a moral 
foundation for human rights (Sulmasy 2008).  Either dignity is defined in terms of a property that 
some beings have (such as age, size, strength, brainwaves, or skin colour), or it is defined in terms 
of being the being.  Defining dignity in terms of properties leads to gross inconsistencies.  If 
dignity was based on the value of what a person could do, then concern for the unemployed and 
disabled could be set aside.  If it was based exclusively on the exercise of freedom or rational 
choice, then it could not be given to those who were not in control of certain functions including 
infants, disabled, or a sleeping person.  Sulmasy concludes, ‘Thus, the argument from consistency 
claims that fundamental human dignity must be something each of us has simply because we are 
human.’ (Ibid. p.482)  From this he concludes that certain duties follow: 
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P-I. A duty of perfect obligation to respect all members of natural kinds [human beings] that have 
intrinsic dignity. 
P-II. A duty of perfect obligation to respect the capacities that confer intrinsic dignity upon a natural 
kind, in themselves and in others. 
P-III. A duty to comport themselves in a manner that is consistent with their own intrinsic dignity.  
P-IV. A duty to build up, to the extent possible, the inﬂorescent dignity of members of natural kinds 
that have intrinsic dignity.  
P-V. A duty to be respectful of the intrinsic value of all other natural kinds.  
P-VI. A duty of perfect obligation, in carrying out PP-I-V, never to act in such a way as directly to 
undermine the intrinsic dignity that gives the other duties their binding force. (Sulmasy 2008, p.482) 
 
The inherent or intrinsic notion of dignity combines the particular individual person with the 
cosmic, divine, eternal or universal aspect of humanity.  As a foundation, it connects the person 
with something much greater than an individual and makes the individual much greater than the 
collection of abilities, attributes and behaviours.  The universalisation of the significance of the 
individual is found in religious traditions.  Inherent worth strikes a cord with the religious adage 
that to take an individual life is to harm the whole of humanity, to save a human life is to save 
humanity (Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 4:8, 37a).  In the New Testament we find, ‘Whatsoever 
you do to the least of my brothers and sisters you do to me.’ (Mt. 25:40ff)  It may be the most 
plausible basis for a foundational moral concept, but its extension runs from the eternal to the 
individual and into the social and experiential dimension.  Through it, the individual transcends 
their particular physical and historical location and form. 
 
It is not clear what the basis of dignity is in the UN international texts.  There is unanimity in 
recognizing human dignity in every human being irrespective of gender, race, or religion, and 
agreement at the international level about the exclusion of non-human animals from such moral 
significance (but see Singer for objections to this (1986, 1993)).  Being human is enough for the 
human to have dignity.  However it does not answer the question of who is a human being.  The 
international documents suggest that dignity exists to a unique degree, but this leaves open the 
question of the consequences of the recognition of human dignity, ‘We may think that human 
dignity is inherent to the universal acknowledgment of some fundamental rights.  A full 
description of all fundamental rights derived from a concept of human dignity or the content or 
limits of such rights could be debated.’ (Miguel 2002, p.18)  Miguel identifies a notion of dignity 
extracted from natural sources, which is not socially or culturally attributed and not based on a 
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person's moral integrity or ethicity.  It is the inherent or intrinsic notion of dignity that most 
clearly remains in the contemporary idea. 
 
Rejecting attributive dignity as a moral foundation is not the same as removing the social 
dimension of dignity completely.  This could be problematic as the social dimension of dignity 
helps to understand the place of experience in the recognition or denial of dignity.  The person 
exists in a physical and historical space and in relationships with other people, and, as theology 
understands it, with God as well.  Human experience of suffering and humiliation or recognition 
and respect takes place in that space and so dignity has a social/spatial dimension.  The 
foundation of human worth is not attributive, but the recognition and respect of that worth is. 
 
In Human Rights Education 
 
Turning to education generally and human rights education specifically, a range of different 
perspectives on the place of inherent or attributive dignity can be identified.  However, it is also 
evident that in many cases, dignity receives little theorisation at all. 
 
References to dignity all but absent: While philosophical and theological ideas of dignity are 
applied to and theorised about in law and bio-ethics, it is difficult to find such examples in 
education.  An online search of The British Education Index (repeated on 8
th
 June 2010) returned 
only two inclusions of the term dignity, neither of which explored the philosophical or theological 
roots of the concept in application to education.  There are references to dignity, typically of the 
kind found in Lindner (2009).  Lindner stresses the importance of dignity for education for 
reconciliation, something which is part of HRE as conceived in the international documents.  
However, beyond stating the importance of equal dignity, there is no detailed discussion or 
justification of the claim, and no references to arguments from theology or philosophy.  A search 
of Institute: Social Sciences, the online database of high quality web resources for education and 
research in the Social Sciences (previously called SOSIG), revealed 20 web links, none of which 
were linked to education.  When the education sub category was searched the term does not 
appear.  The term person led to more hits, over a hundred at the BEI and 12 on Institute: Social 
Sciences, but none of these referred to any theological or philosophical dimension or meaning of 
the term either. 
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In two important English language edited collections of contributions to HRE, published in the 
1990s, Cultural Diversity and the Schools: Vol 4: Human Rights Education and Global 
Responsibilities (Lynch et al. 1992), and Human Rights Education for the Twenty-First Century 
(Andreopoulos & Claude 1997), with fifty scholars producing almost a thousand pages of essays, 
dignity itself features in none of the essay titles, and in neither of the quite detailed indexes 
(covering 36 pages between them).  Substantive treatments of dignity are absent from these texts.  
Taylor identifies the removal of religious language from public space as examples of 
secularisation (Taylor 2007). Professional discourses are marked by the absence of references that 
are religious in origin.  It may be that the omission of dignity in these education databases reflects 
a tendency to see dignity as religious in origin, and therefore its absence indicates secularisation. 
 
Dignity receives speculative or limited treatment: Betty Reardon’s book for teachers, Education 
for Human Dignity: Learning about Rights and Responsibilities (1995), is an example from 
Canada.  Reardon places human dignity, along with integrity, at the centre of a map of 
interrelated values in one of the approaches to human rights education which she calls the values 
approach, ‘Human dignity and integrity are the symbiotic concepts at the centre of the ethical 
system comprising the social values that are the essence of human rights.  Within this approach, 
dignity is defined as the fundamental innate worth of the human person.’ (Ibid. p.5)  In what ways 
they are symbiotic is not clear.  If one acts without integrity does one lose dignity as conceived as 
inherent worth?  This is the implication of the first sentence, but the implication of the second is 
that dignity is innate and therefore cannot be removed through human action.  It links the moral 
probity of the person with their inherent worth, something that the UDHR and modern human 
rights specifically rejects.  Reardon is referring here to the moral acquisitive idea of dignity (close 
to attributive), achieved through good behaviour, rather than the foundational value.  There is 
little of controversy about linking integrity with a judgement about moral conduct.  However, 
these two senses of dignity should be distinguished.  Reardon implies in her writing a move 
towards attributive dignity and away from inherent dignity.  The universality of human rights 
cannot be based on these kinds of judgements.  as they cast dignity in socially attributive terms, 
not as a foundational value inherent to the human being.  This slip in the conceptualization of 
dignity is a failure to differentiate or identify the ontological focus of dignity (Duncan et al. 
2007).  The slip shows a shallow understanding of the distinctive differences of the moral notions 
surrounding dignity, though it does reflect the references to dignity in the international texts. 
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Starkey gives limited attention to dignity in his 1991-edited work The Challenge of Human 
Rights Education (1991a). In Teacher Education and Human Rights (Osler & Starkey 1996) 
dignity also receives a limited treatment.  In exploring what they describe as two key concepts, 
Osler and Starkey set dignity alongside equality although, while the notion of equality receives a 
page and a half of exploration, the phrase dignity receives only a paragraph in which dignity is 
subsumed within equality: ‘Equality of rights is also equality of dignity.’ (Ibid. p.161)  Equality is 
said to protect the dignity of every human being and yet dignity is not equality.  Treating people 
consistently does not entail any decency in that treatment and equality on its own says nothing of 
the reason why a person must be treated with decency (Pojman 1996, p.284).  The human rights 
movement in the contemporary period has had as its focus assuring the human rights of all and so 
equality of worth is bound up in dignity.  Their recent work Teachers and Human Rights 
Education (2010) mentions dignity on many occasions, but again with no theorisation. 
 
Dignity conflated with respect, rather than inherent worth: Krappmann (2006) discusses this 
aspect of children's daily lives and school discipline (Article 28 (2)).  He notes that corporal 
punishment is forbidden by law in the schools of every industrialised country (except the USA 
and outback regions of Australia; see: http://www.stophitting.com and 
www.endcorporalpunishment.org).  He observes: 
 
Additionally, quite a number of teachers administer discipline with other means that are not 
consistent with human dignity as well.  They ridicule, humiliate, or otherwise maltreat children in 
front of the classroom.  The consequences are negative not only for the child blamed who may be 
demotivated and in the long run may lose interest in learning and school.  Also other children may 
be afraid that this treatment can also happen to them. (Krappmann 2006, p.6) 
 
The convention demands that children are protected from all forms of violence but also that 
school discipline is administered in such a way that protects a child’s dignity.  Respect for dignity 
is a matter of professional conduct and failure to express respect so will impair the child’s 
educational development.  Osler and Starkey describe dignity as a pedagogic principle (1996, 
2010).  They restate Cassin’s framework of the concepts of human rights outlining the equality of 
dignity and the rights of all as the foundations of freedom, justice and peace, and the basis of all 
the other human rights.  The discussion of dignity within the book is characterised as a right to 
dignity and explored in terms of the relationship between teacher and pupil and the learning 
environment. 
 
The student’s right to dignity implies a relationship between teacher and student which avoids abuse 
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of power on the part of the teacher, including the avoidance of sarcasm.  In this relationship the 
teacher’s own right to dignity should not be forgotten.  Teachers need to establish, with their 
students, a classroom atmosphere in which name calling and mockery are unacceptable.  It is the 
teacher’s responsibility to ensure that those who are most vulnerable are protected from bullying and 
give the opportunity to learn in a secure environment. (Osler & Starkey 1996, p.154) 
 
Education can be a conduit of humiliation if teachers abuse their positions of power to harm the 
children in their care.  This describes problems that exist, not a hypothesis about what might 
happen if dignity is not respected.  The phrase ‘right to dignity’ itself is problematic.  It conflates 
dignity with respect; the right to respect is the right not to be humiliated.  In themselves, these 
rights are important, but such conflation reduces dignity making it a derivative of respect and 
removes any meta-ethical substance, without which normative discussion is prone to stumble 
(Debes 2009, p.50; Darwell 1977).  This is something quite different from Cassin’s original 
explanation that dignity stands for the underpinning beliefs about what human beings are that 
form the foundation of rights.  If dignity is something we have a right to, rather than a foundation 
for rights, what foundation do rights have? 
 
Inherent worth implied without reference to theological and philosophical sources: UN 
documents link personhood with dignity in references to education, and go further than Osler and 
Starkey.  The Convention against Discrimination in Education adopted by the General 
Conference of the UNESCO on 14 December 1960, which entered into force in May 1962, 
prohibits any form of discrimination which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing 
equality of treatment in education and in particular, ‘inflicting on any person or group of persons 
conditions which are incompatible with the dignity of man.’ (Article 1.d)  Discrimination is the 
failure to recognize the inherent dignity of every human person.  Discrimination in education 
undermines dignity intrinsically, and in terms of the instrumental aims of education as well.  It 
refutes the essential worth and obstructs the development of that person.  This expresses the idea 
that education has an important function in the service of the dignity of individual human beings.  
A similar tone is struck in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which was adopted and 
opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 
November 1989 and entered into force in 1990.  Article 23 is concerned with recognizing that 
mentally or physically disabled children should enjoy a full and decent life, in conditions that 
ensure dignity.  Children deprived of liberty must have their inherent dignity respected.  Article 
28 restates every child’s right to education and adds that this entails a kind of education that is 
consistent with the child’s human dignity, particularly with regards to school discipline (Article 
28 para. 2).  So respect of dignity is justified in intrinsic grounds, irrespective of the morality of 
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the child (child prisoners are included), and irrespective of the child’s ability (given the specific 
inclusion of children with disabilities).  There is a clear emphasis on the treatment of children as 
ends, rather than simply means.  Children deserve education not only because of what they will 
be able to do with it afterwards but because of what it enables them to be or because of what they 
are.  This brings important expectations on the character of education provided. It is not enough 
to be instrumentally oriented.  The child with a terminal illness would have no purpose for 
education if that is the case.  There is something about what education is or does which can 
enhance the person or diminish them.  The important examples above clearly demonstrate that 
this is expressed in the international declarations. 
 
Associations between philosophy/theology and education implied but not examined: In A Human 
Rights Based Approach to Education for All (UNICEF & UNESCO 2007), the overarching aim 
of human rights education is described as promoting, supporting and protecting the ‘human 
dignity innate in every child and his or her equal and inalienable rights’.  HRE publications for 
schools and teachers express this belief in the innate dignity of the human person.  UNESCO 
published guidance for human rights education, All human beings: A manual for human rights 
education (UNESCO 1998), which aims to provide educational activities to be developed in 
primary and secondary schools.  It discusses dignity as the first human rights value in terms that 
echo Kant: 
 
Each individual, without distinction as to family, social or cultural background, must be 
recognized as an end in himself or herself, as a representative of humankind.  In other words 
human dignity resides in each of us and this dignity must be recognized and respected by all. (Ibid. 
p.22) 
 
The phrase ‘must be recognized as an end in himself or herself,’ is clearly influenced by Kant but 
is not expounded upon.  The philosophical foundation is implicit, not explicit.  This is a 
metaphysical claim in the educational literature.  How dignity resides in human beings and what 
that means is not explored.  It is not expanded in the text of the manual.  It therefore has the 
characteristics of a faith claim, a profound assertion about the worth of a human being from an 
objective perspective that needs some theological or philosophical justification. 
 
More recently, ABC Teaching Human Rights: Practical activities for primary and secondary 
schools (OHCHR 2003), published by the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights is a 
guide to human rights education produced for schools.  It mentions dignity when describing the 
content of human rights education, ‘The history of human rights tells a detailed story of efforts 
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made to define the basic dignity and worth of the human being and his or her most fundamental 
entitlements.’ (Ibid. pp.18!19)  It sees the understanding of dignity as arising out of a study of the 
history of rights and the campaigns that led to the UDHR.  Indirectly these are linked to 
theological, philosophical and political beliefs about the worth of human beings.  This is part of 
the formation of personal values, attitudes and behaviour, with an aim of inspiring a sense of 
responsibility for human rights.  Suggested activities include a reflection on being human (Ibid. 
p.50) and how that is worked out in applications to the issues related to rights.  Thus the 
importance of the narratives that have sought to explain dignity is recognized. 
 
Resources produced by NGOs refer to dignity and define it with reference to rights, although 
some do refer to religious and philosophical values.  For example, a guide first published in 1995 
and still used by Amnesty International demonstrates this, ‘The basis of human rights!such as 
respect for human life and human dignity!can be found in most religions and philosophies.’ (AI 
2001, p.8)  It points to those theologies, though does not give any further reflection on where or 
how this is found, but rather defines dignity in terms of recognition of rights, ‘ To live in dignity, 
all human beings are entitled to freedom, security and decent standards of living – human rights 
are “indivisible”.’ (AI 2001, p.9) 
 
Associations between education and theology explored: Writing about human rights education, 
Claudia Lohrenscheit states that, ‘each and every individual is "equipped" with human dignity 
which is intrinsically linked to the uniqueness of the individual.’ (Lohrenscheit 2006)  Here 
Lohrenscheit echoes an idea of the dignity of the person found in the work of the Catholic 
theologian and philosopher Maritain, as well as Jewish thinkers.  Maritain held that the person 
was a universe unto itself (1941), posited within existence distinct from other beings, in unity and 
simplicity in a state of individuality (1946).  Dignity is associated with something about the 
particular, the different.  This emphasis can be linked to the attempt to exterminate difference, as 
the Holocaust might be conceived, and is sympathetic with religious notions of the created unique 
being.  Sacks demonstrates that human diversity is an important feature of Jewish thought, found 
in the writings of Maimonides and Rav Kook (Sacks 2002).  Uniqueness, or particularity, is an 
aspect of inherent dignity. Maritain thought that it was the term person that pointed to the 
uniqueness of the individual, while dignity referred to the worth (D'Souza 2009).  Lohrenscheit’s 
claim, as an educationalist, concurs with one of the dimensions of dignity found in the theological 
and philosophical perspectives.  In the educational texts it is a metaphysical claim offered without 
reference to the philosophical and theological narrative. 
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Catholic educational philosophies and theologies are frequently based on the dignity of the person 
and education.  Elias (1999) has argued that such reflection remains important, reviewing the 
earlier Catholic philosophies of education, and developing adapted approaches using the method 
of Bernard Lonergan, to both reflect upon and to develop norms for an educational theory (see 
Lonergan 1967, 1972).  Elias suggests that when Lonergan's thought is supplemented by the 
thought of Paulo Freire (1970), there emerges a powerful framework for developing a Catholic 
educational theory, which he goes on to outline.  In the outline, it is the centrality of the dignity of 
the human person that becomes apparent.  Lonergan and Freire, he argues, both present a view of 
persons as changing, developing, influenced by culture and influencing culture. 
 
Freire's contribution to a theory of human person comes from his insistence on the barriers 
preventing persons from reaching toward critical consciousness and self-transcendence.  While not 
as perceptive on the barriers to human development as Lonergan, he presents a persuasive case for 
the development of human persons through dialogue and dialectic.  Both thinkers attend to the issue 
that human persons are formed in a social situation… The social thought of these two thinkers, 
especially Freire's, provides a powerful basis for an educational theory that sees the goals of 
education in terms of human, social, and cultural liberation. (Elias 1999, pp.106!107) 
 
Freire sees the aims of education in terms of human and social liberation, and Lonergan sees it in 
terms of human and social development and the interrogation and investigation of the ultimate 
and transcendent purpose of human existence.  Elias is not proposing that these are the only 
sources for a Catholic philosophy of education but it is clear that the dignity of the human person 
is central in ideas from which he thinks a renewed contribution could develop.  In choosing Freire 
he has also identified a thinker that has become crucial to human rights education broadly. 
 
Kelty (1999) identified a change in recent Catholic educational theory and sees a renewed 
theology of education, which he believes is also a philosophy of education emerging under the 
themes of the nature of the person observing, ‘[T]he dignity of the person warrants every 
educational effort that seeks human development.  Such human development is intimately 
connected to how learning enables one to construct a meaningful universe.’ (Ibid. p.21)  These 
examples are applied in general to education, and the references to human development, 
transformation and Paulo Freire are strikingly similar to examples found in HRE.  However, both 
Kelty and Elias acknowledge that this kind of reflection has fallen out of favour in educational 
research.  Catholic theories of education, philosophies of education or indeed theologies of 
education are not prominent in contemporary educational discourses.  This might explain why 
there is nothing published on the clear links between the ideas Kelty and Elias describe and HRE, 
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or any recent considered reflection on the links between liberation theology and HRE.  There is 
reflection on human rights and liberation theology (Engler 2000) and Paulo Freire himself has 
written linking liberation theology with human rights and his own educational thought (Freire 
1985).  While there are examples of HRE literature linking Freire and HRE (Ely-Yamin 1993), 
the connection between the theology and education movement itself is never fully made. 
 
 
Part Two: Inherent worth and the flourishing person  
 
The developing, whole, multidimensional person: Philosophical and theological accounts of 
dignity include some notion of human development, as does human rights education.  Without 
development there can be no possibility of education.  The idea of human development is linked 
to the human person, or the individual, in international documents.  The UDHR confers the right 
to education (UN General Assembly 1948, Article 26) and specifies the nature of this education, 
which shall be, ‘directed to the full development of the human personality and to the 
strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (UN General Assembly 
1948, Article 26, para. 2).  The Recommendation concerning education for international 
understanding, cooperation and peace and education relating to human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, adopted by the General Conference at its eighteenth session in 1974 (UNESCO 1974), 
is cited as an important stage of development in HRE (Baxi 1997).  It developed the original 
definition of education found in the UDHR, ‘the full development of the human personality’ and 
the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.  Here is the sense that 
the human being will be able to flourish and fully develop as a human being ought to be able to 
do in accordance with inherent dignity.  The recommendation enlarged, in general terms, the 
notion of education by implying ‘the entire process of social life’ affecting all aspects of a 
person’s capabilities, their attitudes, aptitudes and knowledge (UNESCO 1974, Article 1a).  It 
includes both intellectual and emotional development, intercultural understanding, a dedication to 
world peace, a rejection of economic exploitation and the promotion of political participation.  
Article 18 includes a focus on developing capabilities to eradicate conditions that cause major 
problems affecting human well-being and survival.  Here the goal is the human person, fully 
developed and flourishing in all aspects, engaging peaceably in dialogue with others. 
 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN General Assembly 1989) recognizes the need for 
the child to grow up in a family environment in an atmosphere of happiness, love and 
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understanding, ‘for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality’ (Ibid. 
Preamble).  Unharmonious conditions that children may grow up in would harm the development 
of their personality.  The conditions in which the child lives and the experience which they have 
impacts on the extent to which their own dignity may extend itself through their development to 
fruition.  It is not ultimately the benefit that they will bring to society or the economy or the 
community that matters, but their own flourishing and their own ability to live life to the fullest 
that they can, even in limiting circumstances. 
 
This theme is found in the writings of HR educationalists. Mohanty (2003), writing on 
development and human rights education, refers to dignity in the context of Article 26 (UN 
General Assembly 1948) and its association with the full development of the human person.  He 
sees the recognition of innate dignity as inextricably linked to the flourishing of all aspects of the 
person and their needs. 
 
The assumption of this innate ‘worthfulness of the individual’ is most significant from the point of 
view of democratic education which intends the full, all-round development of every individual’s 
personality.  This implies that education should take into account all his needs!psychological, 
social, emotional and practical and cater to all of them.  This basic concept transcends the narrow 
academic approach and broadens into an education for living, i.e. an education to initiate the 
students into the many added aspects of living in a community. (Mohanty 2003, p.39) 
 
Mohanty recognizes the holistic dimension of the human personality and that the many aspects 
have differing developmental needs. 
 
Reflecting on the role of HRE in post-conflict societies, George Andreopoulos responds with 
reference to the concept of dignity.  He describes dignity as something violated and traumatised 
by what has taken place, which nevertheless offers an insight into the multidimensional aspects of 
the human personality.  Dignity foregrounds the historical reality of human suffering across time, 
while a recognition of the many dimensions of the human person points to the diverse roles in life 
that constitute a person’s identity: 
 
[E]ducation strategies about human security must be premised on two key notions: the common 
features of intolerable practices which violate essential aspects of human dignity, and the 
multifaceted nature of the human being which no group identification – no matter how 
comprehensive – can capture.  The first points to the remarkable continuity of human suffering 
throughout history: tales of oppression, exploitation, denial of basic needs, persecution, and the 
extermination to which every society can relate in the evolution of its popular traditions.  The 
second points to the varied roles that each human being is expected to assume during his or her 
lifetime, roles that are essential to the formation of the individual’s unique identity and welfare. 
(Andreopoulos 2002, p.15) 
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For Reardon, an account of the wholeness and individuality of the human person and the 
fulfillment of social responsibility are all characteristics of a good society.  She argues:  
 
Integrity refers to the wholeness of the physical, mental, aesthetic, and spiritual facets of the person.  
The good society provides for the expression and development of the multiple facets of the person 
and holds them to be inviolable.  Good societies are built on the active recognitions of the individual 
and group rights and the fulfillment of the individual and social responsibility. (Reardon 1995, p.5) 
 
This aspect of dignity, what Sulmasy terms inﬂorescent dignity, exists in Nussbaum’s notion of 
dignity (Nussbaum 2008).  Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have linked dignity and rights in 
this sense, which they describe in terms of a human development or capabilities perspective of 
human rights (Nussbaum 1999; Sen 1999).  Nussbaum expresses this in terms of achieving 
possible central human functional capabilities that indicate a life of full human functioning, or a 
kind of basic human flourishing (Nussbaum 1999, p.40).  Sen argues this requires ‘the removal of 
major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as 
systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of 
repressive states.’ (Sen 1999, p.3)  The sense is captured by the idea of human flourishing and the 
need for a human person to be free to flourish.  Conditions of humiliation, enslavement and 
suffering are not conducive to human development and are not consistent with the dignity of the 
person.  Within the UDHR, dignity is associated in some way with human development or human 
capabilities.  For Nussbaum, dignity has an important role in her political conception of justice, a 
hallmark of minimum social justice expressed by ten capabilities (Nussbaum 2008).  She lists 
them as follows: 
 
• life, 
• bodily health, 
• bodily integrity, 
• senses, imagination and thought, 
• emotions, 
• practical reason, 
• affiliation (being able to live with and toward others and having the social bases of self-
respect and non-humiliation), 
• other species (being able to live with concern for other life forms), 
• play, 
• control over one’s environment (political and material). 
 167 
 
The dignity of the human person, politically conceived, is expressed if a person is free to flourish 
in all of the ways that a person may.  The flourishing, developing historical person is a 
manifestation of their inherent worth. 
 
The similarities between Sen and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and Aquinas’ idea of human 
development are documented (Risse 2009, especially p.9ff; Lisska 2008).  There are differences 
as Aquinas provides an ontological foundation of the human person while Nussbaum, following 
Rawls’ assertion that, ‘Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the 
welfare of society as a whole cannot over-ride.’ (Rawls 1971, p.586; cf Rawls 1993)  She claims 
dignity does provide a grounding for basic political entitlements and human rights (Nussbaum 
2008, p.372).  Lisska has argued that Nussbaum does not give an adequate account of why a 
human person should have the capabilities that she chooses, beyond some kind of intuition of the 
capabilities that human beings have.  Thus, Lisska holds, Nussbaum offers a weak theory of the 
human person, rather than Aquinas’ strong account, which is based on a philosophical 
anthropology, found within natural law.  Nussbaum and Aquinas both acknowledge a social role 
of the human person and an idea of the common good (Lisska 2008, pp.116!17) and Finnis 
(1980) holds that the rules for governing society are rooted in the development of the human 
person and contribute to the common good of the society. 
 
A further insight can be drawn from Aquinas.  St Thomas says, ‘From the essence of the soul 
flow powers which are essentially different ... but which are all united in the soul's essence as in a 
root.’ (II Sent., d.26, q.1 a.4c, quoted in Gormally 1999)  The powers of the soul, as wholly 
undeveloped, radical capacities, are given to each individual at the beginning of his or her 
existence.  This is the basis of the natural dignity that belongs to every human being.  Human 
development is linked in some way to what it is to be a human being.  Aquinas’ view has been 
highly influential in contemporary Catholic thinking, as illustrated in Papal Encyclicals, 
‘authentic human development concerns the whole of the person in every single dimension’ 
(Benedict XVI 2009, 11).  Pope Benedict reflects on the mystery of the link between the 
historical human, constrained by and within the material world, and yet at the same time able to 
develop and grow in response to their inherent worth.  In Kantian terms, it is the linking of the 
individual to infinity, while theology would link it to the divine destiny of the person with God. 
 
The link between innate worth and human flourishing: The idea of dignity expressed through 
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human flourishing and development is central in HRE.  Human rights educationalists see its 
recognition and encouragement as indicative of a just and democratic society.  Within varying 
kinds of HRE literature, the international agreements, educational theory and teaching resources, 
there is a link between the innate worth of the person and the fullness of their development.  
These sources do not theorise about the nature of the link between the internal inherent dignity of 
the person and the external human flourishing.  This flourishing manifests within human society 
and is facilitated or otherwise by human institutions.  Within the social sphere of human 
existence, the extent to which the dignity of the human person can fully be recognized and 
allowed to flow through the extensions of what it means to be human is controlled, or limited.  In 
this respect it is unlike the un-limitable inherent worth.  It is through the recognition of the dignity 
(inherent worth) of the human person, that the person can be enabled to flourish. 
 
Like HRE, there are notions of human development linked to the dignity of the human person in 
theological and philosophical accounts.  Some of these accounts seek to explain the link between 
an idea of inherent worth with an idea of the development of the human person, unlike HRE.  
Within Christian sources this is closest to the understanding that the human person may grow and 
develop towards an ultimate reality to be Christ-like.  This could be seen in terms of moral 
improvement, and that is the sense found in the Early Church Fathers when they suggested that 
baptized Christians should seek to preserve their dignity, but is more profoundly understood as 
the transformation of theosis, the human becoming divine.  This suggests a developmental 
dimension, an idea of human flourishing or growth across a range of aspects which reflect a more 
complete divine plan than individual moral conduct alone. 
 
The human and the divine, the individual and humanity: Part of the function of dignity is to 
provide an explanation of how a single human being takes on universal significance that 
transcends that one person and seems to be related to all human beings.  Dignity seems to connect 
the personal uniqueness of the individual with the universal commonality.  Writing from within 
the Catholic tradition, Lebech argues that to account for the content of human dignity we are: 
 
referred back to the experience of its fullness in love, kinship and friendship.  In these I learn to 
identify with the essential attributes focused on by each of the frameworks.  I learn what it means to 
be human. (Lebech 2004, p.10) 
 
She integrates the discrete perspectives of dignity through the experience of the fullness of human 
dignity into a holistic picture.  Lebech argues that physical and psychic organisation, and abilities 
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and powers, are all accounted by human nature.  Human attributes and tendencies and the 
material exchange with the surroundings in growth and decay are identified with human nature.  
Reason, integrated physicality with personal experience, assists in the building of character, in 
communication and creativity and integration in human society.  Reason based processes of 
abstraction, intuition and discussion allow for such integration.  However, Lebech argues that 
physical and reason based dimensions cannot account for the spiritual transcendence as a person.  
God joins nature and reason with the rational soul: 
 
Only a power exceeding both of these could effectuate such a synthesis, which accounts also for the 
spiritualisation of appetite in emotion and evaluation.  If I did not identify myself with this synthesis, 
I could find no reason to act in accordance with universal laws and no reason to realize the good. 
(Ibid. p.11) 
 
Lebech acknowledges that some might not call this power God, and others do not try to explain 
this integration, but rather leave it as a mystery.  However this leaves them with no explanation 
for either the integration of nature and reason in the person, or the physical existence of the 
person as personal. 
 
Newlands conceives such integration through a Christological conceptualisation of human rights 
and the dignity of the human person, drawing on Schleiermacher’s person based theology.  In this 
theology, the person is the person of God in Jesus Christ, a Christian construal of human love, 
and a Christomorphic shape in history (a history shaped by Christ) that transcends the social, 
political and personal and expresses God from within human suffering (Newlands 2006, 
pp.143!73).  Newlands articulates Christology for human rights, rather than a Christology of 
human rights.  Such a Christology gives attention to the reconciling power in Christ and the 
instatiation of the person of God in a specific human being (the concretisation in the temporal and 
physical of the abstract and universal).  This figure is then identified with the loss of all human 
rights through the crucifixion.  Incarnation presents a reality of the involvement of God with 
human bodies and His concern about what happens to them.  Jesus Christ can be imagined as 
God’s incarnation of human rights, as subject and object of human rights concern.  Through this 
human beings are recognized as God’s own, with their worth reaffirmed and a destiny to be 
fulfilled through His unconditional love.  Newlands’ Christology is not just a Christology for 
human rights but a Christology for the dignity of the human person.  It is not just human rights 
that are Christologically understood, but the inherent worth and nature of the person that are seen 
in these terms. 
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The claim for the worth of a person is made meaningful through a Christological person based 
narrative.  These may not be the only beliefs that could possibly give meaning to the worth claim 
of a person.  The distinctiveness of Christian theology for establishing dignity is that in 
Christology, a theology of human rights is person-centred, and therefore particularly well suited 
for an educational project that is defined by a moral purpose of learning for and in the human 
person.  This moral purpose is expressed through the phrase for the dignity of the human person.  
It seeks to inculcate values, influence moral decision-making and human behaviour.  These moral 
features are contextualised by the intrinsic worth of the person, a being beloved of God, and the 
necessity to respond to that worth so that the person may flourish. 
 
Inherent worth and human flourishing in balance: Lebech values the societal, which she calls 
community, dimension which explains the inculcation of natural abilities.  Community makes 
demands on the natural, rational and spiritual dimensions of the human person.  There is interplay 
between the two.  Knowledge of identity is formed through identification with others and the 
person’s role in the community.  While social attribution is an unreliable moral foundation, for it 
may be withdrawn at the whim of society, dignity or the lack of it is an experienced phenomenon.  
The recognition of a person’s dignity is a primary obligation of a response to dignity.  It does not 
afford the moral significance to the person, but is, rather, the response to the moral significance of 
the person.  More than that, it is a reflexive encounter between the two persons that takes place in 
human experience.  It is as if the inherent or intrinsic quality of dignity reaches from a 
transcendental location to an immediate proximity. 
 
A further insight can be drawn from an understanding of the nature of the sacramentality as it 
applies to the Church.  The Protestant theologians Jürgen Moltmann (1984) and George Lindbeck 
(1984) have explored how it is important to understand that the idea of the Church as sacrament 
should be informed by both a sense of incarnation and a sense of eschatology.  McBrien (2008) 
also finds this in the theology of Vatican II in the Dogmatic Constitution of the Church (Lumen 
Gentium, Chapter 1 in Flannery 1996).  The two senses offer distinctive understandings: 
incarnation, in that the Church has a holiness within herself; and eschatology, in that the Church 
is in need of perfection.  If there was not an eschatological understanding of the Church then there 
is a triumphalist danger of considering the institution to be perfect already, without any need for 
renewal or reform (McBrien 2008, p.165).  A balance of both aspects is important in notions of 
ecclesiology where the Church itself is seen as sacrament.  This reflection is helpful in notions of 
dignity.  An idea of dignity as inherent worth, irrespective of action, moral conduct or capacity, 
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raises the human to a position of high sanctity, almost on a par with the notion of sacrament.  Yet 
human beings have the capacity to develop, and do good or ill.  If the worth of a person has no 
relation to their conduct or capacity then it is not clear why the person should seek to develop or 
be good.  It might even be used as an argument not to allow a person to develop.  The balance of 
incarnation and eschatology provides a model that might serve our understanding of dignity.  The 
person has inherent worth but also has a destiny to develop, to constantly seek to return to God, 
through repentance and reconciliation and be transformed.  This development in Christian terms 
is not limited to the physical and material development possible for a human being, as the person 
is not understood in exclusively material terms.  The human person is understood as a being that 
has a destiny after and beyond this world. 
 
 
Part Three: Critical observations and discussion 
 
The educational literature contains differing treatments to the notion of dignity as inherent or 
attributive worth.  Some tend towards an attributive sense of dignity, others offer little 
theorisation at all.  UN HRE documents are suggestive of a value that is inherent in the human 
person, though they do not identify the theoretical underpinning for this.  The UN documents, 
therefore, while under-theorised, suggest a concept that is different from that advanced by 
prominent human rights educationalists.  Some theological, philosophical and educational 
reflection has sought to make stronger connections.  In the chain from theology to educational 
theory and human rights education, some links are recognized and others are not.  Nevertheless, 
even those theologians who have identified the theological importance of the concept of dignity 
in educational contexts have also remarked that it has not received much treatment or 
acknowledgement, in contrast to the attention given in contemporary theology more generally.   
 
These examples illustrate the importance of the dynamic relationship between inherent worth, the 
material manifestation of that worth in human development of all areas (moral and intellectual) 
and the recognition of that worth.  While, as foundational notion, inherent worth is crucial for 
HRE, it is clear that a sense of how the human being develops and is responded to by others, also 
matters.  Rights conflicts emerge as a result of one person’s development infringing on another 
person’s development and rights.  Rights protect development.  While we may wish for a person 
to develop fully, and in many ways, how they develop fully, and precisely which ways they can 
develop are influenced by the social dimension of human development.  As a concrete example, 
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human development by one group that exhausts an environmental resource and leaves another 
group in poverty cannot be viewed as acceptable. Here is a sense of common human 
development, informed by ideas of equality or, more precisely, equal worth.  There is, therefore, a 
dynamic relationship between the inherent worth, the development of that person, and how others 
respond.  Human rights provide one way of working out that dynamic relationship.  Nevertheless, 
to forget the inherent worth is to forget the inviolability to which Rawls and Nussbaum refer.  
This is where a level of theorisation and sense of ontology matter.  At the very least, some 
theological and philosophical literacy can support HRE to avoid the pitfalls of casual use of terms 
identified here. 
 
It is important that human rights education has some clarity in its understanding of the dignity of 
the human person, and that within the international documents and the theological and 
philosophical traditions, there are important arguments for why the idea should be composed of 
inherent worth and human development or flourishing.  One acts as a foundational value, the 
other an expression of it.  There is a risk with an idea like dignity that the sense of it may slip into 
a form that is exclusively attributive.  The notion of worth as something conferred by a social 
group is a problematic basis for human rights and moral education, as it leaves the individual with 
a value that is determined by the whims of the group.  Human rights have been developed in part 
to protect individuals from groups and the state.  The international documents themselves do not 
provide an explicit account of how inherent worth within is related to an external projection of 
that through the development of the person.  The educational literature reflects a conviction that 
the human person should be able to develop fully in every way, that limitation and humiliation 
signify a failure to recognize the worth of the person.  Human development in some way points 
back to the essential worth, but educational writing offers little more than this. 
 
The idea that education for the full development of the human personality can be understood 
without some account of the human person can be refuted.  If the inherent worth of the person is a 
basis for the full range of human flourishing then an account of the link is needed.  HRE finds 
itself without a theory of the human person or much of an explanation of the links between 
human needs, purposes and the common good.  Yet human rights and responsibilities imply some 
kind of association.  Answering this question may require the support of the studies of human 
society and human life in general.  Given the importance of religious narratives in the 
development of human society, theological sources may be usefully consulted. 
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There are ongoing debates within these narratives about the attempts to link the inherent worth of 
the human person and their development.  The question which presents itself, therefore, is 
whether HRE should see those discourses as a source of enrichment?  Perhaps the link between 
the intrinsic worth of a human being and their flourishing will always attract mystical and 
philosophical reflections.   What we see here is that there is considerable speculation that such a 
link exists and matters, even if the account of the link is as yet incomplete. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The UN documents set out the case that the dignity of the person means education should follow, 
and education of a certain kind.  The form of the education must reflect the inherent dignity of the 
human person as well as having the extrinsic aims of bringing about a human rights culture.  It 
should be an education that has an intrinsic value, irrespective of benefits to the economy, for 
example.  To advance certain values in education means advancing them in a manner that reflects 
those ideas and principles in how learners are treated and supported.  There is a suggestion that 
human beings may be robbed of their dignity if education is not provided or is impaired through 
discrimination.  The sense of dignity here is of something that is offended or refuted by acts of 
humiliation.  Such offense and humiliation denies the flourishing of development of that dignity 
that emerges when dignity is recognized and respected.  It is reduced or limited if people do not 
properly respect human beings.  It implies that a dignified life is not possible without proper 
education.  But the kind of dignity described here goes beyond proper treatment or respect but 
articulates the inherent worth of the child.  Measures of intellectual or athletic ability are not 
equated with dignity and nor do they confer it.  Children are not to have their life goals restricted 
because of physical or mental disabilities; they have equal worth with other children.  Dignity is 
bound up in their being. 
 
The educational sense of inherent worth, that provokes, or should provoke, a social-moral 
response is consistent with the ideas in theological and philosophical narratives which offer 
broadly consistent parallel accounts of the inherent worth of the person.  There is some 
correlation between the ways in which dignity is referred to in educational declarations and some 
educational resources for teachers.  Some educationalists draw on these but others do not and 
overall the slippage between contrary senses of dignity reveals the problem of poor conceptual 
clarity.  The distinctions explored are not inconsequential or only of theoretical importance.  
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Deciding whether the worth of a person resides in their being, or in their capacity to be good (as 
defined by society) leads to quite different consequences for that individual.  This analysis has 
revealed, through an application of the philosophical and theological conceptions of dignity, that 
in HRE it matters whether dignity is understood in terms of the being of the person, or in terms of 
how they are treated.  A degree of religious and philosophical literacy helps reveal why inherent 
dignity is consistent with the international documents, and why other notions of dignity are 
problematic for human rights.  This has much more than incidental importance due to its 
implications for the aim and character of education.  There are particular offerings from theology 
that seek to explain the connection and dynamic relationship between the inherent worth and 
human development and flourishing.  Chapters 6 and 7 explore these ideas further. 
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Chapter 6 
Exclusive and inclusive approaches to dignity 
 
Chapter 5 has examined how the theological and philosophical sources of dignity help to explain 
the senses in which dignity is used in human rights.  The sources do not feature in HRE literature, 
perhaps because of an anxiety that ideological differences would derail the HRE project.  There 
may be some insecurity that encouraging reflection on the theological sources of dignity would 
lead to an abandonment of human rights.  There is some separation between religious beliefs and 
human rights in HRE, in both the international documents (Chapter 1) and the English curriculum 
(Chapter 2) depriving it of this important resource.  However Chapter 3 has critically considered 
dignity and argued that it is an important idea not easily discarded and Chapter 4 has suggested 
there are common features among the different western theological and philosophical sources.  
Chapter 5 has shown ways in which this separation of the theoretical understandings of dignity in 
HRE endangers human rights.  Conceptual clarity matters for it affects the principles that 
influence the aims and character of education. 
 
The inclusion of different meaning-giving narratives (religious and philosophical) when making 
sense of dignity presents a question about the universal culture of human rights that HRE is 
supposed to be promoting.  It has been suggested here that such links between theology, 
philosophy and human rights are important for helping with conceptual clarity, and reflect the 
reality of how the values and principles underpinning human rights have developed.  For HRE, 
the relative importance of plurality in understandings of dignity and universality and the extent to 
which approaches to dignity should be inclusive or exclusive, is a key point of concern that needs 
addressing.  The aim of this chapter is to analyse in depth the theoretical and practical difficulties 
and opportunities of conceptualising dignity in inclusivistic or exclusivistic ways, with a view to 
how this might influence education policy and practice.  This is a significant debate for the 
concept of dignity which has particular implications for education. 
 
Part One: Exclusive and incompatibilistic approaches to dignity explores the claim that there is a 
single conception of the foundation of human rights to the exclusion of all others and also the 
implications of such a claim.  Principal among these are the claims made by theologians and 
political philosophers that Christian and Kantian/liberal democratic conceptions of dignity are 
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diametrically opposed, which explains why the application of dignity leads to different 
conclusions.  This is a claim that must be considered but is challenged and ultimately rejected 
here. 
 
Part Two: Critical considerations of exclusivism considers three reasons for preferring a 
judgement in favour of a converging and aligning approach.  First is the observation that within 
the sources dignity has different meanings and that there may be some overlapping space between 
different theological and philosophical conceptualisations.  Second is the argument that dignity 
has emerged through contact with differing cultural, social and religious forces.  Third is the 
argument that an international universal human rights project requires dialogue and therefore a 
degree of openness rather than exclusivity.  These arguments have merit and form part of the 
reason for rejecting the position taken by exclusivists and incompatibilists. 
 
Part Three: Inclusivistic and compatibilistic approaches considers examples of convergence and 
alignment within some traditions.  This is notable in some of the writings of Karol Wojtyla, later 
Pope John Paul II, and others who have drawn from the different traditions of dignity without 
diluting the importance they place on worth.  This is set against criticism that in so doing, these 
writers have distorted the essential value of dignity.  These arguments form a further part of the 
reason for rejecting the position taken by exclusivists and incompatibilists. 
 
Part Four: Educational Imperatives examines how the notions of educational enterprise are at the 
heart of the dignity discussion and offer a possible avenue towards a solution to this problem.  It 
will be argued that discussion and dialogue with others, combined with self-reflection are 
educational aspects of the discernment of dignity and a principal part of the moral decision 
making process.  Here the educational importance of the conceptual understanding dignity is 
revealed. 
 
 
Part One: Exclusive and incompatibilistic approaches to dignity 
 
The view that dignity can draw on a wide range of traditions or that different narratives can 
account for dignity equally well is challenged by the argument that there are inherent 
contradictions between some of those notions.  It has already been suggested that there are 
significant parallels between different narrative accounts of dignity (Chapters 4 and 5) but some 
 177 
also claim that the kind of dignity required by human rights is of a very particular kind that could 
never be adequately served by just any rationale.  Dignity must be fixed and clearly understood 
and therefore contextualised within a single narrative, if it is to have a secure action-guiding 
dimension. 
 
Scholars who advocate an exclusive and incompatibilistic foundation and understanding of 
dignity, that is to say a foundation which has an exclusively defined narrative that offers no 
possibility of compatibility with alternative narratives, come from contrasting positions.  On the 
one hand there is a western liberal democratic form found in Jack Donnelly’s work (1982, 2003), 
who advances a notion of human rights and dignity conditioned by a particular collection of 
western liberal democratic values.  These values, which include particular notions of freedom and 
equality, are suggested as universally normative, just as the rights which flow from them are 
claimed to be.  They are not compatible with other notions of dignity found in traditional, 
religious societies which would undermine, for instance, the equality of women.  Donnelly 
requires the adoption of a particular narrative of dignity as an over-riding cultural/moral norm 
against which others are judged. 
 
Another exclusive and incompatibilistic foundation is offered by some theologians who see 
human rights as founded in the gift of God.  Dignity derives from God rather than being an 
inherent feature of humanity.  This is found in the work of Soulen and Woodhead (2006).  In 
addition to the earlier problem that it does not suit a religiously and philosophically plural society, 
there is also a problem of incompatibility with the notion of dignity found in the UDHR, by 
relegating it to a second order value. 
 
(i) Christian exclusivism: Some Christian theologians argue that dignity is not a foundation 
inherent in humanity, but a gift from the founding divine Father, God.  It is a gift given by the 
Creator to the created, which does not come about because of anything inherent in the created 
being.  The suggestion that dignity can be based on human rationality or freedom, inherent 
features of the human person, is to decontextualise dignity from the proper Christian narrative.  
The secular formulation of dignity and human rights undermines a theological imperative.  The 
specialness of human worth was a gift from God that has mistakenly been turned into an aspect of 
humanity (see Soulen & Woodhead 2006).  From an exclusivist Christian perspective, the 
theological imperative that human beings are not saved because of any worth of their own but out 
of God’s love, is undermined by making dignity inherent in human beings.  Additionally, the 
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notion that moral obligation leads to human rights is in fact a deviation from a more orthodox 
Christian determination that moral obligation leads to human duties or responsibilities (Fortin 
1991). 
 
Soulen and Woodhead seek to identify the shifting condition of the context through which dignity 
has developed, from the early Christian narratives to the modern period.  They describe this as a 
process of contextualisation (in the early period) leading to decontextualisation (in the modern 
period).  This, they argue, provides little adequate moral basis and so they set about a project of 
recontextualisation, from a particular Protestant Christian perspective.  This is not aimed at 
restoring dignity as a foundation, but rather restoring its proper derivative role with God as the 
foundation.  The Christian conception of dignity, therefore, is markedly different from the 
contemporary conception, outlined in the UDHR, which declares dignity as intrinsic or inherent.  
If dignity is conferred as a gift from God, rather than a possession or quality of humanity, then it 
cannot be inherent, though we have already noted that this separation is more difficult to sustain 
than Soulen and Woodhead imply.  This forms part of a stance which is opposed to rights-centred 
morality.  Morality is a recognition of responsibilities, rather than rights.  Dignity is not a 
foundation of social convention, but part of God’s action to humanity and redemption in Christ.  
It is not self-possession but dispossession, ‘not so much entering into oneself but in reaching out 
in love and care to the other.’ (Soulen & Woodhead 2006, p.6)  It is an idea that, rather than 
focusing on the worth of human beings, focuses on Christ.  Soulen and Woodhead see the 
Christian conception of dignity as distant from the contemporary (Kantian) concept.  If dignity is 
founded on any aspect of humanity that is not based on the divine foundation that they see as 
fundamental to Christianity, then it is incompatible with Christianity. 
 
A similar case for rejecting what is called the secular understanding of autonomy or freedom is 
made within Catholic theological circles.  Tracey Rowland objects to the use of secular language 
to set out Catholic claims, because it misleadingly suggests that there is substantial agreement 
where in fact none exists (Rowland 2003; see also 2005).  It makes it easier for Catholics to 
accept secular understanding of concepts such as autonomy and freedom, and by extension 
therefore, dignity.  The question of exclusivity in this case falls within a general criticism of 
Catholic use of what MacIntyre calls the ‘idiom and rhetoric of rights’ which he argues, ‘cannot 
serve genuinely rationale purposes.’ (MacIntyre 1991, p.110)  George Cardinal Pell prefers ‘a 
greater use of Godly language’ (Pell 2003, p.1)  when conversing with secularists or advancing 
the Catholic understanding of justice, morality and the common good.  MacIntyre, Rowland and 
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Pell all argue that a genuinely Catholic account cannot use the liberal language of rights as this is 
a distortion. 
 
This form of exclusivism in understanding dignity ultimately undermines any normative position 
of human rights and leads to a radical departure from the human rights project.  However this is 
not the case in the second example of exclusivism, Liberal Exclusivism. 
 
(ii) Liberal exclusivism: The liberal exclusive view agrees essentially that there is some 
incompatibility between Christian (and other religious) conceptions of dignity and that which is 
found in universal human rights.  They agree with the theological analysis that there are 
fundamental differences between the notions of dignity found in Kant and Christianity, but come 
to an opposite conclusion; that the religious idea must be set aside for its fundamental divergence 
from the concept in the UDHR.  Failure to do so restricts the freedoms and rights which must 
flow from that dignity, for example by limiting the subject or scope of such rights.  Restrictions 
on the freedom of women or homosexuals might constitute examples of this.  The Christian 
notion of dignity obstructs the imperative of universality in human rights, because it is linked to 
other prescriptive norms (emanating from divine law, holy scripture or other religious authority) 
that apply to certain categories of person or lifestyle choices.  Howard and Donnelly articulate 
this view.  They argue that the conception of dignity underlying international human rights 
requires a liberal regime which, by implication, is not found in the Christian narrative or any 
religious narrative.  While all societies possess conceptions of human dignity, the conception of 
dignity found in international human rights requires a particular liberal regime. 
 
Conceptions of human dignity in their social and political aspects, express particular understandings 
of the inner (moral) nature and worth of the human person and his or her proper (political) relations 
with society.  Human rights, by contrast, are the equal and inalienable rights… that each person has 
simply as a human being. (Howard & Donnelly 1986, p.802) 
 
Through an analysis of different regimes (including liberal, minimal, traditionalist and 
communist), they establish the impact these regimes have for autonomy, and equality in 
particular.  A common feature is that they give priority to the community over the individual.  
Ultimately, Howard and Donnelly have shown that their conclusions stem from a fundamental 
attitude towards human rights that sees rights as liberal, and stemming from a liberal society, and 
that any society that protects human rights becomes a liberal society.  Thus the argument about 
the incompatibility of differing notions of dignity stems from a more fundamental question of 
whether international human rights themselves contradict notions of morality found in religion. 
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(iii) Common features and further arguments. Both positions are exclusive in that they reject the 
possibility of an alternative equivalent narrative.  They each maintain that there is only one way 
of understanding the meaning of dignity.  Both also argue that other attempts at defining dignity 
threaten dignity or rights; it leads to an incorrect understanding that has damaging moral 
consequences.  The Christian argument ultimately undermines the normative moral status of 
human rights.  There can be no universal agreement to multiple justifications for human rights.  
Universal agreement could only be achieved if everyone adopted the Christian narrative as 
Soulen and Woodhead consider it.  The western liberal argument is similar in promoting a single 
universal narrative, but in this case it is the adoption of western liberal norms regarding 
understandings of equality and rights, rather than the Christian narrative. 
 
These exclusivist positions suggest an essential and irresolvable incompatibility between the 
moral frameworks in use, not merely the language used to express them.  The existence of this 
incompatibility could explain why simultaneous attempts to apply dignity in specific situations 
lead to different conclusions.  These differences emerge the further away one gets from the basic 
idea of inherent worth. 
 
The divergent understandings are even more pronounced as one gets further away from the 
protection of the minimum core of human dignity (as discussed earlier) like life and physical 
integrity, and more into the difficult weighing of competing goods characteristic of constitutional 
claims generally.  This will be only truer as we continue to see deeply contested moral questions 
all becoming processed as juridified human rights claims, and as the challenges of new 
technologies and new threats to human existence continue to make themselves felt. (Carozza 2008, 
p.8) 
 
The case of euthanasia identifies a clash between dignity as autonomy and dignity as inherent 
worth (Correa & Sgreccia 2000).  It is not just theologians and political philosophers who argue 
for clarification, but lawyers too.  O’Connell insists that a fuzzy concept of dignity is not helpful 
in the development of equality jurisprudence.  If judges refer to it then they need to spell out the 
norms underpinning the concept: 
 
While there is little harm that can be done by invoking dignity to expand the scope of equality law, 
the same is not true when it is used to limit equality claims.  In that context, unless firmly 
anchored to ideas about prejudice, stereotypes, and disadvantage, a recourse to ‘dignity’ may 
actually hinder the quest for substantive equality. (O’Connell 2008, p.9) 
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O’Connell’s real concern is that a failure to be precise will allow for subjectivity to creep into 
decision making by judges.  Dignity may be a mask for other ideas or principles which are not 
spelt out.  The need to be precise about dignity is established, but the consequences of that may 
mean rejecting one notion and accepting another, rather than developing a concept that can be 
held in common, or in alignment with others (that is to say has similar operative features even if it 
is rationalised with different meaning-giving narratives). 
 
Williams identifies a number of examples where the application of the concept dignity leads to 
quite different conclusions because it has been inappropriately co-opted.  Both those who argue 
for and against voluntary euthanasia call on notions of dignity to support their case (Williams 
2005, p.149).  From his Catholic perspective, he describes this as the deconstruction of dignity.  
Instead dignity must contain certain characteristics for a grounding of human rights.  In his view, 
it must be prescriptive of moral norms, universally predicated on all human beings and distinctive 
to the human person.  However, for Williams the problem here is the inappropriate use of dignity, 
rather than the decontextualisation of dignity described by Soulen and Woodhead. 
 
 
Part Two: Critical considerations of exclusivism 
 
Incompatibilistic and exclusive definitions of the foundation of human rights do not leave much 
space for inter-religious or intercultural dialogue in moral education.  There is a danger they 
encourage monologue (Stern 2007).  Moral education is limited to acceptance or rejection of the 
foundation and its narrative – conversion or heresy.  However, human rights history has many 
examples where the declarations allowed for groups to be excluded and left to be humiliated by 
those who had rights.  Women, slaves, those of the wrong race or religion, were lesser humans 
and so could be treated badly.  Baxi (2003) argues that dialogue is necessary to allow for ongoing 
revelation of suffering – he sees human rights in terms of revealing where suffering is; 
intercultural dialogue as a crucial mechanism for voicing such revelations.  Without the 
possibility of dialogue, for which there is a need to listen to differing accounts, different 
experiences understood through different narratives, there is a danger that suffering continues 
unobserved.  Such dialogue requires that people come to the table on equal footings, otherwise 
there will be a strong sense that some parties, likely non-western parties, will begin to reject the 
perceived western/Christian imperialist overtones. Baxi argues, ‘all come as equal strangers to 
the task of protection and promotion of human rights.’ (Ibid. p.26)  Without a sense that we are 
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equal strangers, any intercultural, multi-civilisational discourse on the history or genealogy of 
human rights is weakened, if not disabled.  A precondition to enter the conversation is to be ready 
to listen to different voices and treat them with parity in the dialogue.  If human rights or dignity 
are a western liberal or western Christian invention then it is a short step to conclude they are 
absent in the non-west.  Baxi concludes: 
 
This leads to a rank denial, even in a post colonial and post socialist age, of equal discursive 
dignity to other cultures or civilisations.  It also imparts a loss of reflexivity, in terms of 
intercultural learning, for the Euro-American traditions of human rights. (Ibid. p.25) 
 
This leads to a tension for human rights education in a religiously plural society. 
 
The argument that there can be no reconciliation between any of the differences may be 
challenged, in part because the implications for such a position would undermine the universal 
human rights project and in part because they rest on simplified presentations of the traditions of 
dignity.  There are four principal objections deduced from the review of sources and other areas.  
Firstly, in seeking to recontextualise dignity, Soulen and Woodhead simplify the contributions to 
dignity found within Christian tradition.  Furthermore, in trying to show how a ‘traditional’ 
regime cannot support universal human rights, Donnelly is accused of simplifying religious 
traditions (Preis 1996).  Secondly, these conceptions of dignity reduce the concept, disregarding 
the mystery of the human personality (Kraynak 2008), and the experience of dignity as it is 
perceived, ‘as an expression, “human dignity”, refers beyond criteria to the fundamental value of 
the existence of individual human beings.’ (Lebech 2004, p.12)  These arguments suggest that 
ideas of dignity offer a more complex concept and within that complexity the differences are not 
quite so evident.  A third argument emerges from an appraisal of the development of dignity.  The 
argument against any compatibility between Christian and liberal notions must address closer 
historical involvement in the development of the concept in relation to human rights.  Here 
Taylor’s observation that it was essential for human rights to move beyond Christendom for it to 
reach its fullest development is important.  This can be linked to a fourth argument found in the 
cautionary observations of Baxi, that human rights must exist within a dialogue if they are not to 
simply exclude categories of groups deserving of rights as earlier ideas of human rights, which he 
calls modern, did.  In addition, evidence suggests that it is in dialogue about dignity that practical 
decisions are made about the application of human rights.  Each of these arguments is considered 
in turn. 
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(i) Simplified notions of dignity mask plurality within, as well as between, traditional sources: 
Those who take a stance of incompatibility are simplifying their conceptualisations of dignity.  
The review and analysis of sources undertaken in Chapters 4 and 5 revealed diversity within the 
three major sources frequently referred to: Cicero, Kant and the Christian tradition.  While 
autonomy and reason are principal elements of dignity as defined in Kant, they are present within 
Christian sources as well.  Kant focuses on these as foundations for dignity, ‘Autonomy then is 
the basis of the dignity of human and of every rational nature’ (Kant 1952, p.275), which for 
Soulen and Woodhead is contra the Christian concept which they claim is a derivative idea based 
on God.  However Kant sees this in the context of an eternal law and infinity, which opens the 
possibility of a divine dimension, and while he does ground dignity in autonomy, he also points at 
something deeper than autonomy in his argument that humans cannot change their own status as 
ends in themselves.  Human beings are limited.  We have also seen that a number of Christian 
sources identify an inherent or ontological sense of human dignity, rather than the derivative form 
Soulen and Woodhead cite.  The characterisation of dignity as something emanating from God 
and being derivative of Him, therefore not inherent, must explain how it can be disentangled from 
the gift of the human body and the gift of the human person.  Christian theology holds both that 
all life comes from God and human beings exist as beings distinct from God.  If God has created 
a thing distinct from Him to which he has given inherent worth, then the thing itself has inherent 
worth.  It is only derivative of God in as much as all life is derivative of God.  In the words of St 
Leo the Great (395!461 BC), ‘Christian, acknowledge your dignity, and becoming a partner in 
the Divine nature’ (Sermon XXI, III in Feltoe 1985) and ‘Awake, O man, and recognize the 
dignity of your nature.  Recollect you were made in the image of God, which although it was 
corrupted in Adam, was yet re-fashioned in Christ.’ (Sermon XXVII on the Feast of the Nativity, 
VI in Feltoe 1985)  These two examples illustrate the complex sense of dignity understood in the 
times of the Early Church Fathers. 
 
Donnelly has been criticised for being simplistic in his generalisation of traditional religious 
regimes and the kind of rights and dignity framework which might follow.  Preis (1996) argues he 
fails to take account of the plurality and diversity of religious regimes, narrowly conceiving  them 
as particularly illiberal while disregarding the alternative religious forms which are not illiberal.  
Donnelly’s criticism of non-rights based ideas of dignity and fairness, which he finds in many 
non-western cultures (Donnelly 1982; Howard & Donnelly 1986), must be mediated.  Preis is 
critical of the simplistic understanding of culture in the literature on non-western conceptions of 
human rights.  This simplicity fails to adequately capture the fluid complexities of intersubjective 
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meaning and practices.  The temptation to generalise and simplify cultural or even theological 
constructions of dignity presents a paper tiger which is easy to knock down.  It also leaves no 
space for subtle influences – the possibility that an aspect of religion or culture might contain 
libertarian conceptualisations of dignity.  Many writers argue that there is considerable inter-
religious compatibility.  For example Moosa reminds us that, ‘the pith of the modern human 
rights debate is about the preservation of human dignity (karciina)’ (Moosa 2001, p.209), and 
that, ‘The Qur'an and the teachings of the Prophet explicitly entrench human dignity as a 
fundamental ethical norm in human conduct. Islamic law and ethics have an established 
philosophy that was designed to protect human dignity.’ (Ibid.)  Notions of Islam that present an 
essentially unified religion on questions of equality and liberality need to acknowledge the 
diversity within the religion (Panjwani 2005) and, on the specific question of equality and 
women, need to address the Muslim feminist theological movement (Ramadan 2004, 2009).  The 
subtlety of different religious understandings of human rights is evident from this study of 
Catholic and Protestant theological approaches to dignity. 
 
Donnelly’s principal concern seems to be that religious traditions might lead to a socially 
attributive form of dignity that confers it on the person, rather than the ontological or inherent 
form of dignity found within the person (2003).  He has claimed that, ‘a human rights conception 
of human dignity rests on the fact that human beings have an essential, irreducible moral worth 
and dignity independent of the social groups to which they belong and the social roles that they 
occupy.’ (Ibid. p.17)  This is an important factor that helps to clarify the debate.  If religious and 
liberal traditions can agree on the foundational characteristics of dignity, whether it is because of 
an inherent or attributive human feature then a compatible way forward is indeed possible. 
 
Both Soulen and Woodhead and Donnelly in their own ways resolve the question of dignity.  
They do so through a narrowing and simplification that can be challenged.  This is not simply a 
misrepresentation of the sources but a reduction of the notion of dignity, which disregards the 
mystery of the human personality (Kraynak 2008), and the experience of dignity, as it is 
perceived (Lebech 2004, 2009). 
 
(ii) The historical development reveals the necessity to move beyond an exclusively Christian 
conceptualisation: A further reason to challenge the adoption of exclusive positions, particularly 
in relation to the Christian – liberal divide, arises from a reflection on the historical account of 
the development of dignity. Taylor has argued that the disconnecting of dignity from Christianity 
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is a necessary stage to allow the fruition of the idea (Taylor 1999).  The concept only fully 
developed once it was detached from the political ‘Christendom’ project.  Breakout was a 
necessary condition for dignity and human rights to come to fruition. 
 
[M]odern liberal political culture is characterised by the affirmation of universal human rights – to 
life, freedom, citizenship, self realisation – which are seen as radically unconditional; that is, they 
are not dependent on such things as gender, cultural belonging, civilisation development, or 
religious allegiance, which always limited them in the past. (Ibid. p.16) 
  
He suggests that within the terms of Christendom, a civilisation where structures, institutions and 
culture were supposed to reflect the Christian nature of society, the radical unconditionality that 
characterises human rights, and indeed the Christian notion of love, would never have been 
attained.  Full equality for atheists, members of other religious traditions, those who are at odds 
with aspects of the Christian code (such as homosexuals) would have been unlikely.  While the 
modern rights culture is not perfect, ‘it has produced something quite remarkable: the attempt to 
call political power to book against a yardstick of fundamental human requirements, universally 
applied … it is impossible for the Christian conscience not to be moved by this.’ (Ibid. p.18)  
Villa-Vicenzio (2000) agrees and goes further, suggesting that the emergence of human rights 
within the Western Christian tradition reflects a reality of interaction between religion and other 
social and cultural forces in society that influences the development of both. 
 
(iii) Dialogue is an essential feature in the exploration of dignity: The presentation of human 
rights as exclusively understood as a product either of western liberalism, or alternatively western 
Christianity, or indeed of any other particular narrative, has consequences, intended or otherwise.  
Baxi identifies a number of them.  Firstly, it disables any intercultural, multi-civilisational 
discourse on the history or genealogy of human rights.  If human rights or dignity are a western 
liberal or western Christian invention then it is a short step to conclude they are absent in the non-
west.  This approach leads to a loss of reflexivity, in terms of intercultural learning (Baxi 2003, 
p.25) with a tendency towards monologue (Stern 2007, p.17). 
 
There has been much debate about the place of human rights in non-western contexts.  Many 
have argued that human rights are not a western invention (Manglapus 1978; Pollis & Schwab 
1980) and can be found in other traditions such as Islam (Ishaque 1974; Mawdudi 1976; 
Tabandeh 1970).  Said has argued that the precepts that establish human rights are in the Islamic 
tradition (1979, p.64) and that in Islam, ‘human beings have certain God granted rights.’ (1980, 
p.92) 
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Donnelly’s conclusion that human rights and dignity are the product of western liberalism has 
consequences for the possibility of the universalism he considers so important.  The danger that 
Baxi (2003) alludes to is that the west moves to persuade or coerce the adoption of a particularly 
western perspective on rights.  It raises equally important questions for Soulen and Woodhead 
and their particular Christian theological conceptualisation, both in terms of inter-denominational 
discussion, and inter-religious discussion.  Baxi (2003) sees earlier forms of human rights as 
essentially excluding categories of people, be they slaves, people of a different religion or ethnic 
origin, and disregarding the human suffering of those ignored groups. 
 
Secondly, Baxi argues that the Enlightenment epoch which gave birth to the liberal conception of 
human rights, created notions of human property which gave power to the few over the destiny of 
millions in a form of socialised global Darwinism, ‘Planned destruction of “traditions”, cultures 
and peoples was considered necessary and desirable, during the violence of the long dark night of 
colonialism, for the ideas and practices of bourgeois legality and rights to flourish worldwide.’ 
(Baxi 2003, p.25)  He is equally concerned about the contemporary economic globalisation of 
free trade, commerce and global capitalism, as, ‘Communities in struggle and people in resistance 
have contested, often at the price of unspeakable human violation, these hegemonic versions of 
human futures and human rights.’ (Ibid.)  Baxi is essentially motivated by a desire to establish 
universality without imperialism.  A failure to adopt such a framework could lead to the 
nightmarish scenario postulated by Stackhouse: 
 
Non-Western cultures will gain evidence for the view that human rights are merely the artifacts of 
a phase of modern Western sentiment or merely philosophical intuitions born from peculiar social 
conditions.  Fortified by such evidence, they may become more entrenched in their resistance to 
what appears to them to be a new colonialism.  They will not have to face the question as to 
whether documents such as the United Nations’ Universal declaration represent an ultimately 
valid insight about and for humanity. (Stackhouse 1998, p.264) 
 
A similar kind of argument is made by Cahill (2000) who is concerned about limiting the capacity 
to respect human rights to religious groups.  He suggests this would be a grave mistake, cutting 
off human rights from mainstream national and international discourse.  In a world dominated by 
economic institutions, ‘Some sort of intercultural, inter-religious defence of an idea like “human 
rights” is more, not less necessary in this new world order.’ (Cahill 2000, p.52)  Cahill feels that 
the language of economic institutions could not accommodate religiously defended human rights 
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and that an inter-religious, or non-religious language would be more influential on such 
institutions. 
 
The writers who adopt exclusive Christian or liberal democratic positions, which focus on one 
aspect of the traditions of dignity to the exclusion of all others, have a number of obstacles to 
overcome.  They need to demonstrate that they fully appreciate that the different sources of 
dignity have elements that are in common and more diverse than is currently appreciated.  They 
need to respond to the historical argument that ideas about human rights and dignity have 
developed through interaction with both religion and other social and cultural forces and have 
been able to fully develop once detached from the Christendom project.  Finally, they need to 
show how they will engage with the wider multi-civilisational discourse.  Such discourse prevents 
the denial of equal discursive dignity.  It ensures opportunities of intercultural learning which 
were absent from earlier human rights generations, are not restricted or limited.  In the past such 
restrictions had terrible consequences for vast numbers of people.  To take an exclusive position 
on the definition of dignity within a narrowly conceived single tradition is difficult to maintain in 
light of the challenges noted above.  At present these challenges have not been satisfactorily 
addressed and so the project to find a universally acceptable narrative which justifies the 
foundation of dignity is obstructed. 
 
 
Part Three: Inclusivistic and compatibilistic approaches 
 
There are examples of those who maintain that it is possible to find some degree of alignment and 
compatibility around the notion of dignity, as inherent worth.  It is evident in Catholic theology, 
notably the work of Maritain, the writings of Vatican II and the writing of Pope John Paul II, both 
before and after he became Pope.  He advances a more compatible notion of dignity that 
recognizes it is an inherent or intrinsic good.  This is an inclusive religious and philosophical 
alignment at a conceptual level.  The compatible notion can be understood within differing 
meaning-giving narratives and could provide a foundation for moral education with human rights. 
 
John Paul II (1989) expresses the need to explore dignity within one’s own tradition as an 
educational imperative.  Here tradition exploration includes personal faith development and 
personal moral and values development.  He writes that we are inspired to explore more deeply 
the nature of human dignity.  He goes further to say this is the task of all religious believers, ‘It is 
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…the task of the various schools of thought – in particular the communities of believers – to 
provide the moral bases for the juridic edifice of human rights’ (Ibid. para. 7) and we can extend 
this to suggest it is the task of all. 
 
To this we can add the educational need for intercultural dialogue around the concept of dignity, 
‘Dialogue is only possible when we recognize the voice of the Other.  Dialogue entails the 
recognition of plurality and multiplicity.  Any exclusion of certain voices from the public sphere 
emerges then as a form of social and epistemological violence.’ (Baxi & Mann 2006, p.271)  
There are examples where diverse groups have been affected by common experiences of 
suffering and have overcome differences in responding to those experiences.  ‘Transnational 
dialogue of this kind is a provocation to reflect more deeply, collectively, and comparatively on 
the breadth of human experience and the fulfilment of elemental human needs and desires.’ 
(Carozza 2008, pp.7!8)  Such experiences have led to intercultural reflection on dignity. 
 
Soulen and Woodhead place human rights on a divine foundation, rejecting the basis suggested in 
Kantian thinking.  Those scholars view the relationship between religion and human rights as one 
in which rights are derived from divine commands or a universal moral law.  They locate the 
source of human rights in something other than the inherent worth, the sacredness of individual 
human beings themselves.  Amesbury and Newlands suggest that this is inadequate, ‘[I]nsofar as 
they place the object of moral respect somewhere outside human beings themselves, these 
accounts are better suited to talk of duties than to talk of inherent rights.  Respect for human 
beings is rendered a by-product of respect for something “higher”.’ (2008, p.56) This is precisely 
what Soulen and Woodhead and others do. 
 
There are examples of convergence and alignment within the dignity discourse.  This is notable in 
important contemporary Catholic theology, as articulated in the Vatican II teachings, and the 
writings of Pope John Paul II.  While a number of Catholics object to this language, this 
represents a debate about the moral understanding articulated in Catholic teaching.  In Dignitatis 
humanae, the Declaration on Religious Freedom, the Roman Catholic Church declares: 
 
A sense of the dignity of the human person has been impressing itself more and more deeply on 
the consciousness of contemporary man and this has inspired a search into the sacred tradition and 
doctrine of the Church!the treasury out of which the Church continually brings forth new things 
that are in harmony with the things that are old. (Paul VI 1965, p.1) 
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David Hollenbach’s book on human rights in the Catholic tradition, Claims in Conflict: 
Retrieving and Renewing the Catholic Human Rights Tradition (1979), is titled and written as an 
expression of theological recontextualisation.  He traces the beginnings of the emphasis on 
dignity and rights in Leo XIII’s encyclicals through John XXIII’s writing at the time of Vatican 
II.  The language of the dignity of the person and rights has come to be central in Catholic 
thinking and is not easily excised from the Roman Catholic tradition without reworking much of 
the social teaching of the Catholic Church in the last century and beyond (Ibid.; Ruston 2004).  
John XXIII’s Pacem in Terris contains a list of rights for which Hollenbach claims, ‘the thread 
which ties all these rights together is the fundamental norm of human dignity.  Human dignity is 
not an abstract or ethereal reality but is realized in concrete conditions of personal, social, 
economic, and political life.’ (Hollenbach 1979, p.68) 
 
Here, recontextualisation is not seen as a dangerous force, but rather part of the theological 
process.  Leven Boeve pursues such a theology of recontextualisation.  He argues that it is 
theology that must be recontextualised.  Drawing on Metz, Boeve suggests that theology 
continually recontextualises itself and indeed this could be thought of as God interrupting history 
(Boeve 2003, 2007).  In the Second Vatican Council documents, Catholic thinking on dignity is 
reconceptualised in a way that aligns itself with the notion of dignity in the UDHR.  Murray noted 
that the Vatican council statements, ‘are programmatic for the future.  From now on, the Church 
defines her mission in the temporal order in terms of the realization of human dignity, the 
promotion of the rights of man, the growth of the human family towards unity, and the 
sanctification of the secular activities of this world.’ (1966, p.601)  In this development, the place 
of dignity is foundational.  The Second Vatican Council’s work on religious freedom was 
founded on dignity.  Murray writes, ‘the Council declares that the right “has its foundation in the 
very dignity of the human person, as this dignity is known through the revealed word of God and 
by reason itself. The right is therefore inalienable”.’ (1967, p.5)  Freedom and dignity, key 
elements of Kantian philosophical thinking, are here expressed in distinctive but compatible 
terms, as part of the wider recognition of the importance of these ideas in understanding human 
rights. 
 
These trends are clearly seen in the work of John Paul II.  Like Soulen and Woodhead, he rejects 
Nietzsche’s attack on rationality and morality.  In Fides et Ratio he says the rejection of objective 
truth is an attack on the grounding of human dignity (John Paul II 1998, p.90.iii), whereby issues 
of justice and human rights become matters of social convention rather than necessary extensions 
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in the realization of human dignity.  The absolutisation of freedom thus fosters an individualistic 
ethos wherein each individual possesses ‘his or her own truth’ (John Paul II 1993, pp.35 & 41).  
Once freedom has been uprooted from all objectivity, it alone becomes the source of values (John 
Paul II 1993, paras 32, 48, 84 & 106) granting people the right to determine what is good and evil 
(John Paul II 1993, paras 35 & 51) and undermining any basis for personal rights commonly held 
by all. 
 
However the criticism is that dignity is becoming attributive, not that it is derivative of an 
external foundation.  In Veritatis Splendor (John Paul II 1993) he describes this as freedom 
exalted to the point of idolatry (para. 32 & para. 48) gaining ‘a primacy over truth’, so that truth 
itself comes to be a creation of freedom.  This endangers dignity and the inherent value that it has.  
John Paul II elucidates the Christian tradition’s two principal models of dignity; that there is an 
ontological and inherent dignity and a moral dignity.  Williams (2005) considers the two kinds of 
dignity in Pope John Paul II’s reflection on the parable of the Prodigal Son (Lk 15:14!32) in his 
1980 letter on God’s mercy, Dives in Misericordia.  In this letter John Paul II refers to the tragedy 
of lost dignity by the son who wastes his inheritance and finds himself in circumstances below 
that of his Father’s servants.  Here moral dignity is a function of man’s faithfulness to God.  
However the man continues to be his Father’s son, as Williams suggests, ‘That is while moral 
dignity was truly lost through sin, there is another more rudimentary, ontological dignity that 
remains.’ (Williams 2005, p.157)  Elsewhere John Paul II describes this as personal dignity, ‘Not 
even a murderer loses his personal dignity, and God himself pledges to guarantee this.’ (1995a, 
p.9)  On October 5, 1995, he addressed the United Nations General Assembly, repeating a 
message he gave the UN on October 2, 1979.  He said that the quest for freedom ‘has its basis in 
those universal rights which human beings enjoy by the very fact of their humanity.’  (1995b) 
From this survey, Williams, like Ruston and Hollenbach, comes to a different view from that of 
MacIntyre, Rowland and Pell on the use of liberal language about rights and dignity. 
 
Before he was John Paul II, Karol Wojtyla wrote in Love and Responsibility of a notion of dignity 
that is inherent and not derivative: 
 
Anyone who treats a person as the means to an end does violence to the very essence of the other, 
to what constitutes its natural rights …  Nobody can use a person as a means towards an end, no 
human being, nor yet God the Creator … This elementary truth – that a person, unlike all other 
objects of action, is therefore an inherent component of the natural moral order. (Wojtyla 1982, 
p.27) 
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Pope John Paul II specifically identifies Kant in this text, quoting his maxim ‘act always in such a 
way that the other person is the end and not merely the instrument of your action’ (Ibid. p.28) and 
then restating it as follows, ‘[W]henever a person is the object of your activity, remember that 
you may not treat that person as only the means to an end, as an instrument, but must allow for 
the fact that he or she, too, has or at least should have, distinct person ends.’ (Ibid.)  He then goes 
further to indicate that the principle is the foundation for human rights and freedoms, ‘This 
principle, thus formulated lies at the basis of all the human freedoms, properly understood, and 
especially the freedom of conscience.’ (Ibid.) 
 
This theological development presents an understanding of dignity that is both contextualized 
within a Christian tradition, while at the same time is foundational in a manner that aligns itself 
closely to the conceptualisation in the UDHR.  It presents an example of how resources have been 
identified within a religious tradition that can support the moral force of the foundational nature 
of dignity. 
 
For some it is a step too far.  Ernest L. Fortin is concerned with what he calls, ‘John Paul II’s 
unprecedented insistence on the more or less Kantian notion of the dignity that is said to accrue to 
the human being, not because of any actual conformity with the moral law, but for no other 
reason than that he is an ‘autonomous subject of moral decision’ (Fortin 1991, p.229).  Fortin sees 
dignity as contingent on the fulfillment of prior duties, a dignity that is to be achieved and which 
could be lost.  Fundamentally Fortin believes that contemporary Catholic teaching is 
discontinuous with pre-modern teaching.  Pre-modern Christian ethics were ethics of duty, not an 
ethic of rights. 
 
Against Fortin, Williams has argued that the human rights tradition and conception of dignity 
expressed in recent Church teachings and the work of John Paul II can be based in the Catholic 
Church’s pre-modern tradition.  Fortin is drawing on one of the traditions of dignity found in the 
early Christian sources, but he seems to not recognize that there are other traditions of dignity, 
such as ontological or inherent dignity that is associated with the Imago Dei doctrine.  Williams 
also notes that Fortin fails to observe John Paul II’s criticisms of theories of moral autonomy in 
Veritatis Splendor, 35!41 (Williams 2005, p.154 note 19 and p.155) and also Aquinas’ and 
Bonaventure’s understanding that dignity is a mark of personhood, ‘not an addendum pasted onto 
personhood – it is essential to the very concept of personhood.’ (Ibid. p.155)  Pope John XXIII 
expresses this when he writes, ‘A man who has fallen into error does not cease to be a man.  He 
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never forfeits his personal dignity; and that is something that must always be taken into account.’ 
(John XXIII 1963, p.158) 
 
Maritain, contributing as a member of the group gathered by UNESCO to consider the questions 
of dignity at the time of the drafting of the UDHR, expressed before either took place in 1944, 
‘The dignity of the human person?  The expression means nothing if it does not satisfy that … the 
human person has the right to be respected, is the subject of rights, possesses rights.  These are 
the things that are owed to man because of the very fact that he is a man.’ (Maritain 1943, p.37)  
It is on dignity that Maritain thinks a multiple justification approach to human rights can be 
sustained: 
 
I am quite certain that my way of justifying belief in the rights of man and the ideal of liberty, 
equality, fraternity is the only way with a firm foundation in truth.  This does not prevent me from 
being in agreement on these practical convictions with people who are certain that their way of 
justifying them, entirely different from mine or opposed to mine ... is equally the only way 
founded upon truth. (UNESCO 1948, pp.10!11) 
 
As it is illustrated in Chapter 4, these differences are not simply found in the contemporary 
period, but can be traced in the Christian Fathers in their identification of different senses to 
dignity.  While the current debate is framed in terms of acceptance or rejection of the language of 
modern human rights, the positions which inform those viewpoints reflect the diversity of 
understandings in the earliest developments of Christian doctrines of dignity. 
 
 
Part Four: Educational Imperatives 
 
Joseph Ratzinger (now Pope Benedict XVI) stated the need to establish an alignment between 
secular and religious ethics in these terms: 
 
[It] is so crucial to develop a philosophical ethics that, while being in harmony with the ethic of 
faith, must however have its own space and it's own logical rigor.  The rationality of the arguments 
should close the gap between secular ethics and religious ethics and found an ethics of reason that 
goes beyond such distinctions. (Ratzinger 2006, pp.130!31) 
 
In the 1940s UNESCO invited a group of philosophers from the west and the east, including 
Jacques Maritain, Mahatma Ghandi and Teilhard de Chardin, to examine what was being 
prepared.  The group confirmed that there were some common standards of decency that were 
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widely shared but it was much more difficult to establish how deep that agreement went.  
Afterwards Maritain commented that some were astonished agreement had been possible given 
the opposing ideological starting points of many in the group.  He recounted what was said at one 
meeting, ‘We agree about the rights but on condition no one asks us why.’ (Maritain 1948, I)  
Maritain argued that agreement between different schools was possible over human rights as 
currents of thought that did not belong to any one of those schools of thought (Ibid. pp.13!14 and 
for further discussion see Lerner 1999).  They did not agree on the detail of the foundation, 
leaving this aspect of the task unfinished (McKeon 1948).  While the group of philosophers and 
theologians were tasked with establishing common ground between the traditions, they were not 
able to solve fully the question of the foundation of human rights.  They suggested that the task 
was unfinished, not that it could not be finished.  The moral urgency of seeking to more deeply 
and universally understand dignity remains, especially in the light of new questions of dignity 
arising out of emerging technologies and the continuing examples of human rights atrocities.  In 
the words of John Paul II, ‘It is … the task of the various schools of thought – in particular the 
communities of believers – to provide the moral bases for the juridic edifice of human rights.’ 
(John Paul II 1989, para. 7)  To this can be added an additional factor.  It is not simply for the 
religious, cultural and philosophical traditions to construct a foundation for human rights, but that 
they do so through a shared project in more deeply understanding the concept of dignity.  In 
response to this two educational projects can be identified.  On the one hand there is a need to 
pursue ever more deeply an understanding of the nature and implications of dignity as a moral 
foundation within one’s own tradition.  In the absence of a universally held narrative, the 
imperative is to maintain the centrality of dignity and human rights in an effort to reduce the 
suffering brought about by violations of human rights.  This is not the effort of an individual 
religious or philosophical tradition.  Amesbury and Newlands (2008) argue that while the task of 
articulating religious grounds for the idea of human rights must remain theological for Christians, 
at the same time all supporters of human rights should encourage efforts by those of all religious 
traditions and none, ‘That sort of generosity of spirit will perhaps be easier to muster once it is 
appreciated that multiple justifications are compatible with a single moral truth.  Thus, that the 
“ownership” of human rights by any one tradition is not at stake.’ (Ibid. p.85)  Multiple 
justifications for the dignity of the person are pragmatically desirable for the good of human 
rights.  This is not enough on its own.  There is also an essential need to enter into multi-
civilisational dialogue with others.  It is not enough to simply establish in your own terms how 
dignity fits into your single narrative.  This would rule out the possibility that insights from other 
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perspectives will illuminate further experiences of suffering.  Such insights are possible by 
entering into a dialogue with others and other traditions. 
 
These dialogic activities are central to addressing the philosophical and religious challenges of 
the contemporary international human rights project, and the ambiguities within the sources of 
dignity.  They must also be realized within a modern plural context which presents its own 
challenges. 
 
(i) The self-reflective project: Karol Wojtyla conceives the practice of discerning the principles 
and implications of dignity as the purpose of education for adults and children: 
 
Obviously we must demand from a person, as a thinking individual, that his or her ends should be 
genuinely good, since the pursuit of evil ends is contrary to the rational nature of the person.  This 
is also the purpose of education, both the education of children, and the mutual education of 
adults; !it is just that!a matter of seeking true ends, i.e. real goods as the ends of our actions, and 
of finding and showing to others the ways to realize them. 
 
But in this educational activity, especially when we have to do with the upbringing of young 
children, we must never treat a person as the means to an end. (Wojtyla 1982, p.27) 
 
This defines not only the purpose of the project, but the manner in which it is to be accomplished.  
Education is not conceived as solely developing people as means for some external end, such as 
to make them economically productive, but as a project that must serve the dignity of the person 
and the dignity of others.  Education cannot be exclusively instrumentalist because the learner is 
to always be treated as an end, never just a mean.  Education has an intrinsic purpose, not just an 
extrinsic one.  The nature and purpose of education should reflect the dignity of the human 
person. 
 
Charles Villa-Vicenzio argues that this is particularly important because people are not inspired 
by the imposition of ethical rules but rather the theological and spiritual grounding for those rules.  
He writes that it is in communion with God, within the context of the human community, that we 
are inspired to explore more deeply the nature of human dignity (Villa-Vicenzio 2000, p.598).  In 
the words of the Reformed declaration on human rights, it ‘involves the bonding of persons to 
others under God's law, for God's Kingdom, empowered by God's love.’ (Ibid.)  He cites Gustavo 
Gutierrez, who stresses the need for all people to be free to drink from their own respective wells, 
in contributing to the reservoir of values that constitutes the nation.  Gutierrez identifies reflection 
on the experience of following Jesus as a central theme of theology, ‘[E]xperience is at the heart 
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of movement set afoot by the poor of Latin American.  They seek to assert their human dignity 
and their status as daughters and sons of God.’ (1984, p.1) 
 
(ii) The project of transcultural learning: Mary Ann Glendon suggests that this is the most 
important project within HRE, indeed the only project.  What needs to be investigated is not 
whether it is possible to reach agreement on a single foundation, but whether human rights could 
be grounded in each of the world’s major cultural, philosophical and religious traditions (Forward 
in Williams 2005, vii, cf Glendon 1999).  However the imperatives of the importance of dialogue 
that Baxi and others have explored would suggest that whether or not there should be a common 
project to reach a single foundation, there is much to be gained from dialogue.  Secondly, the 
reality of the interplay between social and cultural forces and religion that Taylor and others 
identify reflect an existing dialogue within the development of human rights concepts.  While 
there is a priority to drink from our own wells, as Gutierrez suggests, there is a second 
educational project. 
 
Charles Villa-Vicenzio (2000) asks whether Christians can affirm the authenticity of other faiths 
as well as a secular quest for life and truth.  He reflects on the history of struggle in South Africa 
where people of different religions, ideologies, races and ethnic groups struggled and died 
together, ‘Religious particularity was transcended in common experience, without any particular 
religion being denied.’ (Ibid. p.599)  Hollenbach describes this as part of Christian love which, 
‘calls for the building up of the bonds of solidarity among all persons, and such solidarity requires 
efforts to understand those who are different, to learn from them, and to contribute to their 
understanding of the good life as well.’ (2002, p.153)  He suggests that the pursuit of the common 
good is dialogic and that cultural differences are so significant that a shared vision of the common 
good can only be attained in a historically incremental way through ‘deep encounter and 
intellectual exchange across traditions’ (Ibid.).  He goes on to argue that such a dialogue is 
simultaneously an expression of fidelity to the gospel and of respect for the other, ‘Christian faith 
entails care and respect for all persons, and respect for their dignity means listening to their 
interpretations of the human good.  They are God's creatures for whom Christ died and rose, not 
aliens.’ (Ibid. p.154)  He links the mandated for dialogue with the Imago Dei doctrine, for it 
embodies a dynamic interaction between the biblical faith and the intelligence that is a 
preeminent manifestation of the Imago Dei in all human beings. 
 
 196 
This second project can take place therefore, within the context of reflection on common 
experiences shared by people from different religious, philosophical and ideological persuasions.  
This is not simply an observation made by Christians.  Sharma (2002) has argued that reflection 
on dignity is a foundation for human rights discourse and therefore provides a mechanism for 
discussing different generations of human rights and the families of rights for bridging secular 
and religious divisions.  The project that the philosophers from different backgrounds were tasked 
to undertake at the time of the drafting of the UDHR is the ongoing educational task for everyone. 
 
How might this educational project proceed?  Professor of Law, Upendra Baxi, offers a number 
of further initial principles to adopt before undertaking the task.  Firstly, the endeavour must rest 
on the premise that, ‘all come as equal strangers to the task of protection and promotion of 
human rights.’ (Baxi 2006, p.26)  This is not because he does not recognize the initiative of the 
Euro-American contribution to the development of human rights, but rather because he sees them 
as ‘tradition-constituted’ and ‘tradition constitutive.’  This means they permitted the terrible 
atrocities to the ‘non-Euro-American Other’.  Baxi has also applied his principles to current 
contexts where people have lived experiences of harm and hurt.  The voice of the other must be 
recognized for dialogue to be possible.  To exclude voices is, ‘a form of social and 
epistemological violence’ (Baxi 2006, p.271).  A number of implications follow from this starting 
point including access to the dialogue, in terms of the availability of public space, the means of 
communication and avoidance of pre-censorship, the principle of free speech and an attitude of 
reflexivity, so granting participants the possibility to learn and unlearn (Baxi 2006, pp.271!72; 
Hargreaves 2002). 
 
Baxi makes some suggestions of how non-Western traditions may be examined for how they 
anticipated and reinforce contemporary human rights. 
 
• In what ways did the classical traditions of thought (African, Buddhist, Confucian, Hindu, Islamic 
and indigenous civilisation) configure the notion of what it meant to be human? 
• How did these entail ideas and ideals of equality, dignity, and justice in social and political 
relations? 
• To the extent that these traditions had no linguistic or semiotic equivalents to the ‘modern’ notions 
of rights, what other tropes carried the burden? 
(Ibid. p.26) 
 
Taylor has made suggestions for how this might be envisaged (1999) and Yasuaki understands 
this in terms of an intercivilisational approach to human rights (1997). 
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Through this process, Eurocentric traditions of the rights of men may be detraditionalised and in 
his view, the future of human rights will be more secure than it is now.  Such a process is similar 
to that proposed by the Norwegian educationalist Oddbjørn Leirvik, ‘A dialogical approach must 
be one that searches from common themes… developing pupils’ capacity for empathetic 
understanding and dialogue across different religions and beliefs.’ (Leirvik 2001, p.165)  Another 
Professor of Law who has specifically identified the importance of a project of dialogue on the 
meaning of dignity is Paulo Carozza.  He described it as vital for the future of the human rights 
experience and argues for a substantive transnational dialogue about the meaning of dignity, 
rather than a procedural, bureaucratic or institutional dialogue. 
 
I do not mean 'dialogue' in a weak sense, a mere interchange of discourse and deliberation without 
genuine difference or desire to get at the truth of things, but a dia-logos, a sharing of reason with one 
another.  The 'common enterprise', in other words, is an occasion for exchanging reasoned and 
substantive judgements across cultural and geographic divides about the meaning of human 
flourishing, what it requires of us in justice, and how it can be variously understood and protected in 
communities constituted by their commitment to a common good. (Carozza 2008, pp.7!8) 
 
In the educational project, how are we to understand the relationship between inherent dignity 
and human flourishing (inflorescent dignity), and how may the person flourish in metaphysical as 
well as physical ways?  If dignity relates that which is particular and unique about and individual 
to that which is universal and shared, how do both of these elements flourish?  The metaphysical 
provides a route to giving some explanation for bridging the immanent and transcendent qualities 
of dignity.  The question of the connection between inherent dignity and inflorescent dignity, to 
use Sulmasy’s phase, must be part of the educational activity. 
 
While Baxi and Leirvik suggest that the dialogue that takes place in intercultural learning is a 
dialogue between religions, Carozza goes on to extend this notion as taking place at the individual 
level in the particular context and circumstances that people find themselves in.  Carozza 
identifies a number of questions which may form the basis of reflection and point to a more 
individually conceived dialogue: 
 
• What reasons can I give you to care about and commit yourself to human rights? 
• Why should we recognize the authenticity of these demands of dignity as opposed to 
others? 
• What is the basis for regarding a particular thing as both good for me and good for others 
like me, both within the communities to which I belong and across their boundaries? 
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It is a project that must take place at transnational level and in the individual and community 
level, ‘Transnational dialogue of this kind is a provocation to reflect more deeply, collectively, 
and comparatively on the breadth of human experience and the fulfilment of elemental human 
needs and desires.’ (Carozza 2008, pp.7!8)  Carozza identifies a link between reflection on what 
human flourishing means and the ability to recognize and work for the good of the other: 
 
In the end, however, reasoned reflection on human flourishing needs to take place at the level of 
individual persons in community with others.  There, dialogue can lead to greater critical self-
reflection, and a greater capacity to recognize and commit oneself in solidarity to the good of 
others.  Only in that way will human rights be about loving people in their concrete 
experience!hard work, rest, and a sad song in the garden!rather than the abstraction of loving 
Humanity. (Ibid.) 
 
Heid Leganger-Krogstad (2003), writing about religious education at the classroom level, sees 
dialogue in the school context as operating at this interpersonal level.  She writes, ‘How can 
children be taught to take responsibility for the globe unless through school they learn how to 
take responsibility for their classmates by engaging in dialogue with recognition of the otherness 
of the other.’ (Ibid. p.186)  The educational enterprise involves a commitment to the solidarity 
and good of others.  This is at the heart of the purpose and process of recognizing the dignity of 
both self and other. 
 
 (iii) Reflexivity between the educational imperatives: An important consideration to add to this 
account of intercultural learning can be drawn from the research in British religious education on 
intercultural education.  The two educational projects described could be depicted as an interior 
conversation within one’s own group, and an exterior conversation with other groups.  However, 
a much more reflexive interplay between these two imperatives is needed to account for the 
contemporary reality of multiple influences.  Skeie discusses this situation (1995) of traditional 
and modern pluralities, as does Jackson (2004, p.8).  Jackson notes that while traditional plurality, 
‘corresponds to the observable cultural diversity presented in many western societies … modern 
plurality relates to a variegated intellectual climate of late modernity and postmodernity.’ (Ibid.)  
Traditional plurality relates to observable cultural diversity present in western societies as waves 
of immigration have brought significant numbers of culturally diverse and religiously different 
groups.  Skeie describes modern plurality as pointing to the fragmentation of societies with 
differing groups having different, sometimes competing rationalities.  Alongside this have been 
the growth of individualism and the privatisation of religion (Heelas 1989; Heelas et al. 1996; 
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Heelas & Woodhead 2005).  This has been described by some as a move from late modernity to 
high modernity (Giddens 1991) or from modernity to postmodernity (Lyotard 1984) though it 
may now also be seen as part of a process of postsecularity in which not all forms of modernity 
are religious, characterised as they are by individualised and diversified religiosity (Habermas 
2008, cf. p.1). 
 
This has important implications for the kind of spiritual reflection that people might undertake in 
the educational imperative to reflect deeply on the sense of dignity in their own traditions and in 
dialogue with others.  Nesbitt describes plural spirituality to convey something of this modern 
plurality.  She suggests, ‘at the deepest level of questing, enquiry and experience individuals 
encounter images, ideals and idioms from (what are in some ways and according to dominant 
perceptions) different sources: Christian and Hindu, European and African, sacred and secular.’ 
(2004, p.149)  Not only do children experience a wide range of influences, but there seem to be 
developing increasingly complex patterns of individual identity, ‘Ethnographic studies disclose 
identity forming through successive encounters with “others”.’ (Tajfel 1981, quoted in Nesbitt 
2004, p.149)  Nesbit continues, ‘Identity is itself processual, forming in definition and 
redefinition through contact with groupings that are in some respects different from one’s own 
and in other respects overlap with it.’ (Ibid. p.149)  Viewing the two educational imperatives in 
light of such ethnographic research reveals a need to conceive of the two projects as reflexively 
interrelated.  This nevertheless presents a challenge to each of those projects.  The context for the 
exploration of educational imperatives is the differentiation of understandings of dignity through 
a shifting tableau of influences.  It is this context of fragmentation that MacIntyre was most 
concerned about in his rejection of human rights, yet it is hard to deny the reality of this 
observation as the context within which we now live.  It is hard to see how the changes brought 
about by global movements and interactions of peoples could ever be undone, even if this was 
thought desirable. 
 
Against this backdrop, the self-reflective process may seem to be impossible.  Is there a single 
tradition for individuals to pursue their self-reflective learning?  If Sen and others are correct that 
we are constructs of multiple traditions with plural affiliations and social contexts (Sen 2006), 
then even this process is dialogical.  The interior and self-reflective exploration is a dialogue 
between those influences, conditioned by the experiences of the individual.  The project of 
transcultural learning joins that inner dialogical process by bringing interactions with others who 
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may have differing experiences but a common identity complexion, or different identity 
complexions but common experiences. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have seen examples of exclusivists in religious and secular liberal forms, defining human 
dignity and its relationship with human rights.  The adoption of exclusively defined and 
determined notions of dignity and the profession of incompatibility with universally agreed 
human rights present major if not insurmountable challenges.  Such position taking is at odds 
with the understanding that dignity is a complex idea which has developed through religious, 
social and cultural forces.  This position is based on a theological or political imperative that 
ascribes a very particular and narrowly conceived reading of the concept.  Such an approach risks 
distancing many peoples from human rights which they may see as an imperialistic project 
irreconcilable with their meaning-giving narratives.  Disabling dialogue in this way also leaves 
open the possibility that the voices of those who continue to suffer might not be heard.  It risks a 
drift back to a position where groups were simply excluded from the designation of human being, 
as happened in the first generation of rights.  These limitations provide a reason to reject such a 
position of exclusivity and incompatibility. 
 
Contrasting with this exclusivist approach, there are examples of an alignment or convergence 
between enlightenment and theological ideas of dignity.  These retain theological particularity but 
embrace the central notion of the inherent dignity of the human person as an overarching or 
underpinning notion.  Taking the Catholic example examined here, opponents question whether 
the contemporary Catholic expression of human rights and dignity in language that some find 
Kantian, is a true reflection of Church teaching.  However, to disregard the steps taken by such 
important figures as Pope Leo XIII, Pope John Paul II as well as major Catholic thinkers like 
Jacques Maritain would require the wholescale re-writing of Catholic teaching on social justice, 
which is now firmly based on such theology (Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace 2005).  It 
would also set aside the argument of Hollenbach, Ruston and Williams that this shift in fact 
reflects a reality within the Catholic and wider Christian traditions.  Thus the argument for an 
inclusive and compatibilistic approach is strengthened. 
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These disputes reflect responses to the evolution of the theory of dignity as it encounters 
religious, social and cultural forces and highlight the educational imperatives of the human rights 
project as a whole and the exploration of dignity in particular.  Two projects are identified: to 
explore within one’s own tradition the foundations for human rights, on the one hand, and to 
explore those foundations through dialogue with others reflecting on the shared or common 
experience of suffering and dignity.  In an era where people share multiple identities, where 
monocultural units have broken down, both projects proceed simultaneously, one reflecting and 
responding to the other, just as dignity has developed through a evolutionary dialogue in contact 
with multiple social, cultural and religious forces. 
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Chapter 7 
Recontextualising human rights education 
 
Through a conceptual analysis of the idea of the dignity of the human person in human rights and 
HRE, through a range of contextual perspectives (philosophical, theological and educational), it 
has been demonstrated that dignity is an important idea, both as a moral foundation but also in the 
way it informs approaches to education.  The modern idea of dignity, on which human rights 
depend, has been influenced by philosophical and theological sources, as well as the historical 
experiences of the twentieth century.  The sources are found in different meaning-giving 
narratives and yet there are common patterns in the way those narratives explain dignity.  This 
pattern, which can be called an underpinning framework, includes notions of inherent worth, 
societal response/attribution and human flourishing or development.  A form of HRE could be 
developed and practiced in such a way that it encourages the exploration of multiple foundations 
within different meaning-giving narratives, while at the same time holds fast to a common 
concept of dignity which constitutes a provisional shared understanding.  This form addresses 
both the universalism and particularism of human rights. It rejects the argument that religious 
education only has a meaning for those who come from a religious background and that an 
entirely secular-based subject, such as citizenship education, is an appropriate replacement for the 
study of religion, offering a moral provision for non-religious pupils (Hargreaves 1994). 
 
The common pattern is based around a belief in the inherent worth of the human person, which 
has central importance to the human rights of the UDHR as foundation.  Inherent worth is 
interrelated with the other two senses, as is clear when the concept is adequately theorised and 
analysed.  Within dignity, there is a dynamic theoretical framework as there is a relationship 
between how a person responds to the other and the inherent worth of the other, and how a 
person’s inherent worth requires development.  It is a framework characterised as moral 
principles, but embedded within the contextual narratives of the traditions.  
 
A form of HRE developed around this dynamic framework of dignity offers a more inclusive 
approach that is philosophically and theologically literate, and more robust to better withstand the 
theoretical problems within human rights.  Such an approach embraces plurality, in a way that 
secular approaches to HRE do not.  It may serve the aim of encouraging understanding and 
friendship more effectively than those that disregard religious diversity, and indeed religion, as an 
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ally to HRE.  Here it is advanced for all maintained schools in England but may have much wider 
applications elsewhere. 
 
The dynamic pattern or framework is contextualised in distinctive ways within particular 
narratives.  An approach of theological inclusivism, which recognizes the merit of different 
perspectives that are consistent with this dynamic theoretical framework, avoids the dangers of a 
relativistic plurality, which could ultimately undermine all that human rights have sought to 
achieve, as no values would have permanence.  Relativism is conditional to the different ways in 
which meaning-giving narratives offer accounts of the underpinning framework of dignity and to 
how rights are deduced from that framework.  That conditionality is dynamically informed by 
human experience, which is important given the historical and political evidence that clarification 
of rights is an ongoing process of revelation, and understandings of the human good may need 
ideas other than rights, such as capabilities. 
  
Writing on HRE characterises religion as problematic and sometimes directly suggests religious 
educational institutions and meaning-giving narratives are extremist (Davies 2008).  These views 
seem to assume, suggest or hope that secularisation theories may one day prove correct, and see 
human rights as a feature of secular thought.  However, such views are challenged by the 
postsecular context in which religions persist or grow, spiritualities evolve, and diverse forms of 
modern society develop.  Recontextualisation can be used to understand the development of 
human rights in this complex state.  The development of human rights occurred in an interplay 
between religion and culture.  Taylor (1989) argued that the separation of rights from the 
Christendom project was essential in the development of an understanding of the universality of 
human rights.  While Soulen and Woodhead (2006) may characterise this as decontextualisation, 
it could instead be characterised as a necessary recontextualisation to account for the changing 
world.  HRE, when viewed through the European context that Boeve (2007) and others have 
observed, is recontextualised itself.  The idea of advancing a secular universal moral education is 
problematic as it fails to acknowledge the reality of plurality and new forms of spirituality and 
religiosity (Gutmann & Taylor 1994).  Over the decades human rights declarations and 
agreements have moved from a singularly expressed universal mode of human rights which 
envisages a universal code of rights for all, to a recognition of plural distinctiveness in the needs 
of women, indigenous populations, children and so on, and the associated declarations, 
agreements and covenants for these groups. 
 
 204 
Expressing human rights in non-religious terms has benefits within universal documents that all 
must be a signatory to, but when applying these ideas to educational contexts we move from an 
inter-governmental space into, within Europe at least, local environments where culture and 
religious narratives exist in a plurality of diverse forms.  Educational projects which disregard 
this context lack integrity or plausibility.  They pursue an imperialist assimilation project through 
HRE, one that as Baxi (2003) observes, characterised previous forms of human rights.  
Alternatively, we can envisage a form of HRE which acknowledges its contextuality and 
recognizes and responds to a plural and detraditional religiosity.  Recontextualisation is therefore 
a normative idea for human rights and HRE.  It must begin with learners whose understandings 
are based in their distinct and different narratives.  This means it begins with their own socio-
cultural religious understanding of self and then explores how this relates to meaning-giving 
narratives. 
 
This chapter proposes changes to HRE as it is currently found in the English secondary school 
curriculum documents and as it is commonly found in HRE literature.  It recontextualises HRE 
around the dignity of the human person, and posits it as an enterprise that better serves a 
postsecular society.  The changes are informed by the conceptual analyses in the thesis.  It 
proposes a transformative model of HRE that is theologically inspired, inclusively founded and 
religiously literate. 
 
The chapter is divided into three parts.  Part One: Five proposals for a recontextualised HRE 
outlines proposals for the transformation of HRE.  Belief in the inherent worth of the human 
person should be nurtured at the moral centre of HRE.  HRE should be recast as a two-fold 
enquiry into the dignity of the human person though self-reflective and dialogic undertakings.  
The ongoing search should be understood as reflection on lived and shared experiences and 
religious and philosophical narratives.  HRE should consider itself part of the enquiry into what it 
is to live in which a person may flourish, and as such should permeate all aspects of the whole 
school curriculum.  Lastly, HRE should take seriously the aim of friendship and understanding 
between different religious (and other) groups, and the value of philosophical and religious 
traditions as sources of understanding, which gives particular significance to religious education. 
 
Part Two: Ethos and curriculum explores how the broad proposals may be interpreted to inform 
the character of the school and how learning is organised within it.  Here Christian sources are 
drawn upon to illustrate how this might feature within a particular religious school context.  
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Central to the curriculum in any school context is the interconnection of RE, HRE and moral 
education. 
 
Part Three: Learners as theologian-philosophers proposes a new characterisation of the learner 
in this subject area.  The theologian-philosopher works within the constraints of a belief in the 
inherent dignity of the human person, but enquires further into the meaning-giving narratives, 
continuing the work begun by the group established by Eleanor Roosevelt for the UDHR.  The 
boundaries of the scope of learning are articulated by interpreting the proposals as commitments, 
which replace the UK government’s promotion of a commitment to human rights. 
 
 
Part One: Five Proposals for a recontextualised HRE 
 
Five proposals are outlined below to set out the main actions arising out of this research.  These 
proposals refer to intrinsic and extrinsic features of HRE.  They cover beliefs, the forms of 
enquiry and learning, and the aims of education. 
 
Proposal One: A belief in the inherent worth of the human person 
The current English curriculum does not define what is meant by the commitment to human 
rights that is described as an aim of the National Curriculum (QCA 2007b).  This commitment 
should be reinterpreted as an enquiry into the ways in which the human person is understood to 
have an inherent/intrinsic/ontological worth.  Whether this commitment entails a belief based on a 
faith conviction or assent to a philosophical rationale, the centrality of such a belief is consistent 
with a number of different theological and philosophical narratives.  This commitment entails an 
orientation for the other person, a sense of unconditional compassion and responsibility for 
others.  Acknowledging the inherent worth of others leads to duties or responsibilities and it is as 
a result of that acknowledgement that human rights proceed. A commitment to inherent worth 
entails a commitment to the need for the human person to develop and flourish alongside others. 
 
This belief may be thought of in terms of conventional religious belief but also philosophical or 
rational conviction that brings a person to the same sense of conviction. 
 
Proposal Two: Recasting HRE as a two-fold enquiry into the dignity of the human person 
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It is proposed that this commitment should also be understood as a commitment to an ongoing 
search into the dignity of the human person.  Over the decades and centuries new understandings 
about justice and suffering have been revealed and the pursuit of greater understandings is a 
principal focus.  This search entails both a self-reflective process and a dialogic ‘listening to and 
for’ the other.  In the self-reflective process, learners examine the meaning-giving narratives that 
have influenced their identity and beliefs in search for what these narratives say about dignity.  
By narratives we mean the particular belief systems, texts, traditions, ideas and practices.  As a 
consequence many elements of what is typically understood to be religious education come 
within the scope of HRE.  Citizenship education and religious education need to be structured to 
enable these elements to be drawn into relationship with one another.  Religious narratives have 
an important place within the scope of HRE, complementing the international agreements, 
legislative structures and the rights issues.  The links between religion and rights become 
essential elements of the content, acknowledging the multiple justifications for human rights from 
different religious and philosophical traditions.  It is therefore inclusive of religious and 
philosophical difference.  It does not explicitly or implicitly assume a secular basis for human 
rights, though it does not exclude it either.  In the dialogic process learners listen to the other, in 
terms of the other learners around them and the different narratives that exist in plural society.  
This listening is also for the other since it is an altruistic, rather than a self-serving, process.  
Listening for requires a deep appreciation of who the person is and what they are saying.  This 
listening to the other reflects the acknowledgement of the inherent worth proposed in the first 
proposal and recognizes the other as a source of revelation. 
 
Religious narratives, which for some give meaning to human life and experience, provide insights 
into how communities for centuries have explored the question of what it is to live a life in which 
people flourish.  They constitute a moral resource for making sense of what it is to have inherent 
worth and how that might be explained.  They give visions of life that were developed through 
lived experiences in different contexts at different times and places.  Their development and 
refinement provide an example of how the task of illuminating the mystery of the human person 
and the nature of human flourishing requires continuing attention and reflection. 
 
The plurality and diversity of religious narratives provide a cautionary note against overzealous 
triumphalism in projecting a final account or answer.  This enquiry is not reduced to religious 
offerings but should draw on the fruits of civilisation, the arts, humanities and sciences.  At the 
same time, religions do offer particular resources which try to answer the question of why human 
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beings matter, and have the potential to encourage a wider perspective than simply those people 
who are family or close friends.  Though their universal claims can be seen as the cause of 
conflict, when those claims are about the worth of human beings they provide multiple 
justifications for human rights.  Religious education is properly a key component to HRE, both 
for its cognitive and intellectual offerings, and also for the power it brings to motivate human 
compassion and moral responsiveness.  Religious narratives also contextualise the response and 
particularise it.  The response is taken from the abstract conceptualisation and implemented 
within a meaning-giving framework.  People approach human rights issues and interpret them 
through these frameworks. 
 
The study of the narratives of religious life, the experiences of religious people and in particular 
the answers given to the questions ‘why the other person matters,’ and ‘what is it to flourish in 
life’, is therefore a valuable component of HRE, though the inquiry is not restricted to religious 
interpretations, nor should it presuppose religious adherence. It should therefore seek to explore 
the space where consensus may be found. 
 
Proposal Three: Understanding the ongoing search as a reflection on experience and narrative  
The content of HRE must be composed both by local experiences close to the learner and the 
experiences of others, both in the locality and globally.  It should not simply refer to global issues 
that are distant from the learner.  The experiences in question are those which touch on human 
suffering and humiliation, and human dignity.  The process of reflection here is a reflexive one 
which involves recontextualising the learners’ own narratives through experiences and 
recontextualising their own experiences through narratives.   
 
This process values the contextual nature of human rights in HRE (Osler & Starkey 2010, 
pp.94!96).  A concern for human rights arises out of an awareness of the suffering of self or 
others.  This is evident from the pre-history of human rights, which can be traced to movements 
that were motivated by particular examples of suffering, such as the antislavery movement.  It is 
also evident from the sense of righteous anger and frustration experienced as a result of an 
apparent injustice to ourselves or those we care about.  Our capacity to experience this sense for 
ourselves or others and understand the significance of this sense, to realize that a person is 
distressed, is an emotional resource for doing good.  These concerns and sensitivities in some 
cases become overpowering forces that compel the person to act morally. 
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Through the enquiry into the experience of suffering, the belief that the human person matters 
may be cultivated.  As it is cultivated and developed, the enquiry deepens.  These features 
provide a deepening spiral of moral awareness and moral concern.  An inability to identify with 
or show compassion for the self or other is a precondition for humiliation.  Compassion has been 
proposed as a principal focus for moral education (Ruiz & Vellejos 1999) which, given the place 
in religious traditions (Armstrong 2009), brings a spiritual dimension to character education 
(Gruber-McCallister 2002).  It is a point of convergence among different religious traditions 
(Armstrong 2009), the absence of which may breed an inability to recognize that harm is being 
done to the self or the other.  It may also prevent a willingness or recognition that a moral 
response is called for and therefore supports the application of human rights.  The need to 
recognize the suffering of a person is a further precondition.  Dehumanisation is a necessary 
psychological step towards the humiliation or destruction of the other.  The burying of empathy 
for the human person under an ideological or pragmatic blanket formed of ‘greater goods’ is 
likewise a further psychological step towards the failure to respond morally. 
 
An enquiry into the experiences of worth and suffering of self and others provides a framework 
within which empathy and consciousness of moral worth may be cultivated.  The kind of learning 
in this enquiry is not purely cognitive but empathetic, emotional and psychological.  It must 
bridge divisions among the learners, as much as make distanced observations of examples of 
suffering.  It must seek to develop openness to the other person, to provide a willingness to listen 
to their experiences, and an ability to listen closely to what others are saying.  It must also 
develop an ability to share with others one’s own experiences.  The curriculum must be as readily 
defined by local circumstances and experiences as global moral or social concerns.  Both 
elements would seem to have a role to play here. 
 
Listening to the other person requires attentiveness and imagination; being focused both on what 
the other is saying and who is speaking.  Being attentive to the other and having the imagination 
to understand deeply what the other is saying assumes an ability to step out of one’s own 
preoccupations, needs and desires, and to walk with the other person.  It is an altruistic act in 
itself, to be other-centred and not self-centred.  It requires an awareness of the limitations that we 
have in removing our own narrative framework through which we interpret and understand 
nuances and motifs.  It requires an honest recognition of prejudices and ignorance which might 
impair interpretation and understanding. 
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Listening to others and expressing oneself are important features, but so is moral response, or 
activism for the other.  A concern to act in response to the enquiry into the suffering, to show 
compassion for the other, is crucial.  Furthermore, capacities and character are necessary to 
motivate a moral response.  Knowledge of suffering and empathy towards those who suffer are 
important, but the development of the will to act and an awareness of how one may act are 
included in this enquiry. 
 
To enquire into the experiences of worth and suffering is to demand the practice of other-
centredness, which entails recognition of the inherent worth of the other person and their 
experience of suffering and/or human flourishing, not self-centredness.  It requires the cultivation 
of solidarity, and empathy for the other person, rather than individualism.  It needs to cultivate 
moral responsiveness through the development of characteristics consistent with such 
responsiveness so that the person has the will to act. 
 
Proposal Four: HRE should consider itself part of the enquiry into what it is to live a life in 
which a person may flourish 
An acknowledgment of suffering is linked to an awareness of what it is for a human being to  
flourish and develop.  Acute observations of where and how this flourishing life is lacking are 
conditioned by an understanding of dignity.  Human rights themselves are suggestive of the 
liberties and freedoms which human beings need to live well and therefore how we may live well 
is a central concern.  By undertaking an enquiry into the different ways in which a human being 
may develop, a more complete picture of what is needed for a life that flourishes, and conversely 
what may be an obstacle for human development or flourishing, can be articulated.  This goes 
beyond the things that people might have a right to but should include the capabilities that human 
beings have.  Capabilities express a person-centred approach to understanding human 
development that does not reduce human flourishing to freedom.  The freedoms of human rights 
are not unconditional, though they may be professed as inalienable.  Because of this complexity, 
rights thinking tends to become preoccupied with rights conflicts, placing different rights in 
competition with one another and different people in competition with one another.  Rights 
become relative values and rights thinking is reduced to identifying winners and losers arising out 
of a legal exchange.  Focusing on the capabilities of the human person and the different possible 
ways in which human beings may flourish takes, as a starting point, the inherent worth of the 
person, and the nature of human development.  The implication of a person who has the potential 
to flourish and develop is a moral response focused on cultivating a society in which individuals 
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may develop, rather than the rights contest.  It looks holistically at the flourishing person, rather 
than compartmentally at their different individual rights.  Moral responses can be informed by a 
person-centred perspective, and human rights can be approached as ways of supporting human 
development, rather than a contest between individuals.  This does not evade the inevitable 
conflicts between different people’s developments, and it does not remove the reality of points of 
contention between one person’s development and another person’s development.  It views that 
conflict through a human development perspective.  Such a focus offers the possibility of 
identifying new areas of concern that rights do not yet adequately address and encourages an 
ongoing pursuit of new realizations of what it is for a human being to flourish.  Thus the enquiry 
into human flourishing conditions the learner into an approach not limited to a single subject but 
the whole breadth of human learning.  Not limited to a particular phase of education, the enquiry 
must be pursued through life, as people encounter different experiences and different people. 
 
Proposal Five: Taking seriously the aim of friendship and understanding between different 
religious (and other) groups 
Interfaith and intercultural dialogue are central aims of HRE.  In the past these aims could be seen 
as divergent from the aim of promoting a common culture of human rights, but if that culture is 
understood in terms of the first three proposals this divergence is tempered.  The development of 
friendship and understanding might include co-operation on projects of common interest arising 
out of the shared commitment in Proposal One, shared experiences in Proposal Two and it might 
also include the dialogue referred to in Proposal Three.  Friendship and understanding are not 
likely to be cultivated through the conflict of legalistic rights which often take cultural forms, but 
through the processes described above, of listening to and for the other, of being for the other and 
through engagement in a dialogue that can bring about new transformations through the 
encounter of both parties. 
 
 
Part Two: Ethos and curriculum 
 
The ethos of the school should be defined by a moral commitment to the inherent worth of the 
child and the person; a central belief to be examined, explored and nurtured as foundational to 
educational institutions.  This commitment may be reached from multiple starting points.  
Schools of a religious character have an opportunity to interpret this approach through their 
particular religious tradition (Haldane 1996), while needing also to acknowledge the essential 
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place of interfaith dialogue and encounter, and the experience of the other, within the curriculum 
experience.  There are particular resources available from the Christian tradition to support this, 
such as the ethic of unconditional love for the other, seeking God in the other and the dialogical 
experiences which characterise many of the encounters between Jesus and those he met in the 
Gospels.  These elements are as important or more important than notions of transmission of 
factual information.  The particular sources for the concept of dignity found within Christianity 
provide a distinctive opportunity for these schools, and others argue similar resources may be 
found in many of the great religious traditions (Armstrong 2009). 
 
A theological contribution which may help Christian schools is found in Boeve (2007).  He 
observes that recontextualisation can be seen as a continual process whereby theology is 
constantly challenged by contextual change and novelty.  In religious terms, Europe can be 
understood now as a place influenced by detraditionalisation and pluralisation.  People have 
sought religious meaning in different traditions and in ways not connected with traditional 
structures of religion.  Detraditionalisation and pluralisation are seen as features of a postsecular 
Europe and therefore theology is faced with this recontextualised situation.  This thesis is 
legitimate in seeking to reconnect a theological and educational discourse surrounding HRE.  
However, Boeve goes further than this descriptive tool, which he thinks is useful for analytical 
purposes.  Instead he develops recontextualisation as a normative category that calls for a 
theological programme in which ‘insights into the intrinsic link between faith and context inspire 
theologians to take contextual challenges seriously, in order to come to a contemporary 
theological discourse that can claim both theological validity and contextual plausibility.’ (Ibid. 
p.3 n4)  He develops the normative category of recontextualisation as a theological method that 
acknowledges the shift from continuity to discontinuity, from secular to detraditional and plural.  
One can no longer depart from a position that assumes a substantial continuity between the 
Christian faith and modern culture and society.  At the same time, claims of normativity by social 
scientists and philosophers often belie hidden presuppositions and agendas.  Boeve argues that if 
one could analyse the many ways of living, thinking and acting, the many religions and narratives 
in terms of radical plurality, then the first level of reflection is our own particularity (2007, p.39).  
He continues, ‘The starting point is thus the specific narrativity of a fundamental life option 
whether religious or not, the level of the concrete particular narrative.’ (Ibid.)  He argues that the 
awareness of the specific particularity of the Christian faith option places precisely the specificity 
of this option in the foreground, ‘namely, the confession that God became involved with human 
history in and through Jesus Christ.’ (Ibid.) 
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In the light of this ethos a revised curriculum is necessary.  Such revisions would not be limited to 
particular subject areas.  However, the current situation indicated by the curriculum documents 
for England, and demonstrated in wider HRE literature, suggests there is a particular need to 
restructure the subject areas.  Knowledge of the deep religious and philosophical meaning-giving 
narratives of dignity is important, along with how those narratives inform responses to 
experiences of suffering.  Beliefs in the meaning-giving narratives that shed light on the 
uniqueness and sanctity of human life should be related to the moral responses to rights abuses.  
What matters here is that pupils see this interrelatedness and any structuring of CE and RE, as 
well as moral education, must support this interrelatedness.  The danger of continuing to separate 
these fields is that while RE may be informed by religious literate understandings, CE, in which 
much HRE is found, may take on secular perspectives of human rights and disregard the 
importance of deeper theological understandings. 
 
Pupils need opportunities to explore the moral concepts on which human rights depend.  To do 
this they must explore religious narratives within which and from which those ideas emerge.  Of 
particular importance is how different understandings of the ideas may lead to different 
applications of rights.  This is not simply a matter of rights, but pupils also need the opportunity 
of exploring other ethical ideas which dignity leads to.  Human rights have an important role to 
play but so do virtues, character and conscience. 
 
These two subject areas, which currently stand as separate curriculum fields, need, at the very 
least, to be interconnected, and more likely combined in a radical restructuring which 
acknowledges the interrelationship between religious, philosophical, moral and political 
dimensions of learning.  One LAS which articulates this kind of interrelationship, albeit within 
the scope of RE, is Wokingham (2006), although this is in stark contrast to many LAS.  At 
present, much of the secondary curriculum is determined by examination board specification and 
these are lacking for their failure to properly understand and represent the interconnections 
needed.  Such interconnections can be appreciated by a combining of these subject areas (Gearon 
2004). 
 
A revised curriculum sees a combination of citizenship education, moral education and religious 
education into a core education in human dignity, which would frame the whole secondary 
experience.  The school curriculum is framed by a need to enable the full development and 
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flourishing of all children.  Examination and assessment systems would need to be appropriately 
revised to focus on the development of children’s capacities and capabilities across a whole range 
of areas but including personal reflection and dialogue with others. 
 
Figure 6. Revised Curriculum   
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Part Three: Learners as theologian-philosophers  
 
When the UDHR was formed, there was an initiative to try to find agreement between the 
different religious groups for the foundation of human rights but agreement was not forthcoming, 
except with regards to the rights themselves and the idea of dignity which, left undefined, could 
be understood within the different narratives.  However, the lack of success obscured a more 
important observation about the process, that of encouraging and stimulating dialogue about 
human dignity, and as a result encouraging the participants to continue this search within their 
narratives. 
 
This influence can be traced from Maritain’s presence on that UDHR working group, to his 
thought that inspired aspects of Vatican II teaching on dignity and in the thinking of John Paul II.  
We can advance this example as parable for HRE inspiring both a continued search for deeper 
understanding of the dignity of the human person within the particular narrative and a dialogical 
encounter with others.  The understanding of education within the UDHR itself contains 
references to inter-religious understanding and friendship and so we can conceive of HRE as an 
interfaith educational project.  We have traced where and how this understanding has begun to 
emerge within the idea of intercultural education. 
 
One key dilemma for HRE is how to resolve the tension between conceiving education as the 
promotion of a universal ethic and encouraging, in a transformative way, a dialogue which 
accounts for different starting points.  Whether that universal ethic is found in the rights 
themselves, as HRE commonly suggests, or, as I have suggested here, is found in a common 
understanding of a dignity dynamic, the tension remains.  Are there no boundaries to where such 
dialogue may lead?  Here MacIntyre’s work (2009) on the role of the Catholic philosopher 
provides an example with striking conceptual similarities to the one in which the student and 
teacher of HRE find themselves.  Drawing on his study, we can adapt his thinking to the situation 
at hand.  MacIntyre argues that in Catholic philosophy, enquiry exists after pre-philosophical 
commitments and convictions.  The Catholic philosopher undertakes his or her enquiry within a 
context of a conviction to revealed truths that is pre-philosophical.  MacIntyre argues that 
Catholic philosophers may come from different starting points but that there are some positions 
which are ultimately incompatible with the presuppositions of the Catholic faith.  His argument 
refers to the instructions of Pope John Paul II in Fides et Ratio (John Paul II 1998) to practice 
philosophy in such a way as to address the deeper human concerns that underline its basic 
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problems, without sacrificing rigour or depth.  MacIntyre characterises this task as follows: 
 
It would present human beings – not just philosophers – as themselves engaged in trying to give 
just such an account of themselves, as trying to understand what it is that they are doing in trying 
to achieve understanding, a kind of understanding that will enable us to distinguish what it is 
worth caring about a very great deal from what it is worth caring about a good deal less, and both 
from what is not worth caring about at all.  So there is a crucial relationship between metaphysics 
and ethics. (MacIntyre 2009, pp.177!79) 
 
Human rights have expressed this link in the mentioning of dignity as their foundation, but as 
Nobel laureate Czeslaw Milosz mused: 
 
[T]hose beautiful and deeply moving words which pertain to the old repertory of the rights of man 
and the dignity of the person … I wonder at this phenomenon because maybe underneath there is 
an abyss.  After all, these ideas had their foundation in religion, and I am not over-optimistic as to 
the survival of religion in a scientific-technological civilisation.  Notions that seemed buried 
forever have suddenly been resurrected.  But how long will they stay afloat if the bottom is taken 
out? (Czeslaw 1997, p.32) 
 
However, Czeslaw’s view of the survival of religion seems overly pessimistic in view of the 
postsecular discourse (Boeve 2007; Habermas 2008).  Nevertheless, Glendon has argued that the 
human rights project will rest on shaky foundations unless and until the philosophers and 
statespersons collaborate on the business that the framers left unfinished (Glendon 1999, p.3).  
The business, that is, of establishing the foundation and elaborating on the notion of the dignity of 
the human person.  She continues: 
 
[T]he drafters of the UN Charter were prudent to say that human rights rest upon a ‘faith’ in 
human dignity.  It would be a mistake, however, to leap from that proposition to the notion that 
this faith is merely an act of will, an arbitrary choice.  All in all, one may say of ‘dignity’ in the 
Universal Declaration, what Abraham Lincoln once said about ‘equality’ in the Declaration of 
Independence: it is a hard nut to crack.  The framers of the Universal Declaration were far from 
naïve about the difficulties that lay ahead.  That is evident from many statements in which they 
acknowledged the priority of culture over law … If Maritain, Eleanor Roosevelt, Charles Malik, 
Rene Cassin and others who held this view were right, then a great challenge faces the world’s 
religions, for religion is at the heart of culture.  Ultimately it will be up to the religions to 
demonstrate whether they are capable of motivating their followers to fulfill their own calling to 
perfect their own dignity, and in so doing respect the dignity of fellow members of the human 
family. (Ibid. pp.13!14) 
 
This religious task of pursuing respect for human dignity is part of the task of the Catholic 
philosopher, which in MacIntyre’s terms, is close to that of HRE.  There are some positions 
which are incompatible with the belief in the inherent worth of the human person and the rights 
and responsibilities which flow from that belief. 
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In HRE there is a commitment to a value, or a set of principles that acknowledge an undeniable 
starting point, the inherent worth of the human person.  This is not unproblematic in that it 
requires obedience, but it is conjoined with another element that is problematic and requires 
ruthless questioning (cf MacIntyre 2009, p.8).  The enquiry, the dialogue and the reflection are 
not unbounded.  They explore and search for meaning but their search has moral limits.  HRE as I 
have constructed it or as it otherwise exists, is not relativistic.  An awareness of the relationships 
between the commitments to certain values, and the pursuit of reflective and dialogical learning is 
an important component of learning in HRE.  The dialogic dimension, and the context for that 
dialogue which often may be a common experience of suffering, give qualities to the learning 
community that bear similarities with the ancient philosophers who were participants in a 
community of enquiry (Ibid. p.21).  It is not simply a theoretical standpoint but entails a 
communal commitment to values and processes. 
 
There is here a convergence in the aims of HRE and the task of the Catholic philosopher.  The 
learner is the theologian-philosopher who should participate in this undertaking and HRE should 
support him or her in achieving this undertaking.  Schools should become laboratories that 
continue the task of the philosophers and theologians whom Eleanor Roosevelt gathered to help 
the development of the UDHR.  This requires a confidence about religious literacy and courage to 
engage in interfaith dialogue throughout all levels within the school!staff, parents and pupils.  
The school as a learning community must strike a balance between shared commitments and an 
openness to the experiences of different people, and the possibility of deeper understandings of 
how those commitments guide moral actions, whether understood in terms of rights or other 
moral concepts. 
 
This results in a change from seeing learning as primarily about the transmission of propositional 
knowledge, fixed facts that are learnt, towards seeing learning in terms of being a philosopher and 
a theologian.  Education in dignity is concerned with praxy as well as doxy, what is done, as well 
as what is known or believed.  Learners are invited to engage in a personal shared learning 
journey of enquiry into the idea of human worth and the experience of human suffering.  This is 
particularly appropriate in a context where a deeper understanding of dignity has only just begun 
to be established (Debes 2009, pp.67!69). 
 
The five proposals may be translated by schools and educators as five commitments to be 
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cultivated among learners, teachers and educational communities, and adopted by the learner 
theologian-philosophers: 
 
1. A commitment to a foundational belief in inherent human worth, rather than taking a line 
that is relativistic about values 
2. A commitment to the pursuit of deeper understanding about human dignity through 
religious and philosophical traditions, and dialogue with each other about shared 
experiences, rather than treating learning and knowledge as a-spiritual, non-religious, or 
compartmentalising religion and philosophy  
3. A commitment to ongoing reflection on the insight of religious traditions and human 
experience and how each informs and contextualises the other, rather than pursuing a 
dogmatic, declaratory non-discursive or dialogic approach to human rights 
4. A commitment to education as revealing all of the ways in which a human being may 
flourish, which requires a broad curriculum, the design of which is not driven by 
instrumentalist or economic goals 
5. A commitment to deepening friendship and understanding with others, and placing this at 
the heart of the educational purpose, rather than seeing these sorts of character 
developments as secondary to intellectual aims 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The present chapter has articulated proposals for a recontextualisation of HRE in the English 
secondary curriculum.  The proposals include the values that should underpin this approach, 
important pedagogical elements, suggestions about the curriculum content and the ethos of the 
school.  These proposals are supported by the research and analysis of proceeding chapters.  They 
are presented as suggestions that are in keeping with the theoretical analysis and framework that 
has gone before.  Though they will need to be tested and refined and others may also be 
developed, they are presented as examples of the way in which a dignity-centred vision of moral, 
religious and human rights education may be conceived. 
 
Using these proposals as principles, a detailed curriculum could be developed.  These proposals 
advocate the inclusion of multiple justifications for human rights, which include religious 
justifications.  This is possible in the English maintained school system, which has a plural 
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religious education system.  Such an approach is warranted given the reality of a postsecular 
culture, and the need to find adequate groundings for a commitment to human rights.  It has 
presented a recontextualisation of HRE centred round the dignity of the human person, because 
this idea is one that is found in different narratives with a degree of consistency. 
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Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this conclusion is to review the key findings of the present study and make 
suggestions for further research.  This research has been carried out through a series of critical 
analytical and inter-disciplinary approaches, which theorise dignity and apply it to an educational 
setting. It is situated against a backdrop of the place of religion in HRE.  A number of specific 
findings and proposals can be articulated. 
 
This research aimed to explore some of the links between religion and HRE through an analysis 
of international documents, educational writings and a study of English secondary school 
curriculum documents.  This review found little reference to theological or religious influences in 
the international documents, and a sense that HRE is a secular ideology.  From a post-secular 
perspective such a situation is problematic. 
 
The ideals underpinning HRE emerged from a series of educational movements aimed at the 
promotion of international education, intercultural education and peace education.  In the pre-
modern period these were conceived within the context of religious narratives, but in the modern 
age HRE came to be dissociated from religious connections, justifications or links, in part in an 
acknowledgement of differing religious and philosophical perspectives.  Instead HRE has sought 
to advance a global set of decontextualised shared values around the ideas of human rights.  At 
the same time, it has sought to promote building of peace, tolerance, friendship and understanding 
between different peoples including those of different religions and philosophies.  Inevitably, 
given these aims, tensions between the secular and inter-religious ambitions need to be addressed.  
The hope to achieve friendship and understanding between different religious groups led in the 
1970s and 1980s to a recognition and respect of cultural diversity and in recent decades 
intercultural education initiatives have identified a place of importance for religious education in 
intercultural education.  HRE is frequently defined in terms that distance it from religion, despite 
obvious theological links with religious movements such as liberation theology. 
 
The analysis of the English curriculum reveals that there are few links between human rights in 
citizenship and religious education and that the provision fails to reflect the importance of linking 
beliefs and philosophies with human rights systems and structures.  There is little regard of the 
possible influence religion might have or have had on HRE.  The English secondary curriculum 
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has articulated an increasing commitment to human rights and a sense of self-worth as key 
features of the moral education of children.  From a study of religious and citizenship education 
curriculum documentation for the 11!16 age range, including exam specifications, a number of 
findings are evident.  Religious education, which is marked by multiple GCSE options and local 
curricula, is revealed as having widely differing approaches to the inclusion of human rights and 
different attitudes towards it.  Rights are variously presented as an essential element of religious 
ethics in some cases, but for others they are not examined or seen to reflect a secular worldview.  
Citizenship education gives great emphasis to HRE with a treatment that is principally in terms of 
legal structures and issues of injustice.  Theological or philosophical foundations of rights are not 
examined, raising questions about the place of ethical literacy.  The study concludes that HRE is 
dislocated across these two curriculum areas, with the emphasis on the idea that rights are 
unrelated to religion and not concepts with important ethical or religious values underpinning 
them or justifying them.  The curriculum seems to reflect the secularisation thesis.  The 
consequence for the curriculum is that important insights on human rights may be lost from pupil 
learning.  There are compelling reasons to embrace a pluralistic approach that includes a range of 
different approaches and justifications for human rights.  In a postsecular society where religion 
has been transformed, rather than removed by secularisation, HRE must reflect this new context.  
This reality is recognized in intercultural education projects, which increasingly acknowledge and 
reflect religious diversity and take account of inter-religious education, but not in the English 
curriculum.  CE and RE have many reasons to collaborate in HRE and this is more likely to 
succeed in a curriculum that encourages dialogue around and between the plural perspectives on 
human rights and the values that underpin them. 
 
The study aimed to provide a critical analysis of the significance and meaning of dignity in 
human rights and HRE.  This was achieved through several contexts: a cross disciplinary 
conceptual analysis of the dignity discourse; a conceptual analysis of dignity in HRE literature; 
and historical conceptual research into the meanings of dignity in human rights.  This reveals that 
while there are important debates about dignity and human rights in law, medicine, philosophy 
and theology, there is little discussion in HRE literature.  While some are critical of the concept 
of dignity, there are enduring arguments for its significance and it is viewed favourably as 
providing a possible point of convergence across religious traditions.  The analysis reveals that 
within each of the classical, Christian theological and Kantian sources frequently referred to in 
the literature, three interrelated meanings of dignity are found: intrinsic worth, societal 
recognition and respect and human flourishing.  These sources provide compelling evidence that 
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an underlying common framework can be articulated and advanced, building on these important 
traditions. 
 
The study explored the place and importance of dignity in HRE, informed by its professed status 
as the foundation for rights in the UDHR, and also the argument that it may act as a bridging 
concept drawing together different religious and philosophical perspectives.  The analysis of the 
concept discourse across a range of disciplines reveals criticisms that dignity lacks definition, is 
of little substance or is of little practical use.  It could be seen as having the effect of distancing 
human rights from the frameworks or narratives of particular religious or philosophical traditions.  
However this fails to appreciate the importance of uniting different groups by leaving a dialogical 
space for an ongoing discourse about its meaning.  The ambiguity of the term in the text of the 
UDHR is in part a product of political necessity, a placeholder that provides a point of agreement 
and discussion from different ideologies, philosophies and theologies.  It does not mean that 
within that dialogue differing but compatible strong justifications exist.  The undefined quality of 
dignity makes it possible for human rights to be dynamic and dialogic.  It steers away from the 
absoluteness that is feared by some as enforcing a western legislative structure on peoples and 
cultures that have evolved through different contexts.  
 
Scholars from many disciplines use dignity as a starting point for further understanding and 
clarification.  However this is a weak defense of dignity.  For it to be able to be a foundation or 
justification for human rights, some clarification is needed as unchecked debate and discussion 
relativises the concept and leaves it vulnerable to redefinition in such a way that it undermines the 
rights it is supposed to ground. 
 
The historical concept analysis of three meaning-giving narratives or sources (ancient, Christian 
and Kantian), which are widely referenced in current literature about dignity, reveals multiple 
dimensions of dignity and the possibility of a common framework.  This has shed light on both 
the source of dignity, the subject of dignity and the extent of dignity – where it comes from, who 
it affects and the degree of that effect.  Dignity is understood to have three main forms: inherent 
worth, attributive or societal worth, and human flourishing or inflorescence.  All the sources 
examined reveal complexity and diversity in the idea of dignity.  In Cicero there is, on the one 
hand, the universalistic cosmic idea of the dignity of man beyond and above human society, and 
on the other, the conferred dimension that is rooted in Roman social standing, and dependent 
upon recognized moral conduct and political achievement.  Christianity contains different ideas 
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about dignity: dignity as the image and likeness of God, an ultimate divine dignity that is found 
ontologically in every created human being; dignity as a gift received at baptism which is 
preserved through sinlessness and lost or impaired through sinfulness, or even lost to humanity 
after the Fall; dignity as something within the spirit or soul of the person or as something found in 
the body and soul.  In Christian sources there is the tension between the human beings, with 
dignity held ontologically, in virtue of being made in the image of God, and the dignity that is 
granted in baptism and maintained through avoidance of sin, and indeed grows as the person 
becomes more Christ like.  Kant is most commonly remembered in modern human rights debates 
for his idea of the inherent dignity of the person, located in the individual rational person but he 
also talks of the socially recognized dignity.  The essential difficulty that spans these different 
sources is how the inherent value of the individual can be combined with a recognition of the 
social dimension of the human person – their interrelationships with others.  However, what this 
does reveal is that there is a compatible framework of ideas in some degree of dynamic 
relationship with one another within these sources.  These frameworks are differently 
contextualised within the particular narratives, but they each offer a balance of the three notions 
of dignity. 
 
The study aimed at developing an approach to HRE that is inclusive of religion and religious 
plurality, and aligned with religious education.  The suggestion that approaches to dignity in HRE 
should reflect on religious and philosophical sources faces the challenge that these sources are 
plural and diverse.  There are those who advocate adopting a single conception of dignity that is 
exclusive, and those who suggest a more inclusive or plural approach.  The adoption of 
exclusively defined and determined notions of dignity and the claim that human rights are 
incompatible with other ideas of dignity, including religious ideas, are problematic.  Such 
position taking seems not to fully reflect the emergence of dignity as a complex idea which has 
developed as a result of religious and other social and cultural forces.  Rather it is based on a 
theological or political imperative that narrowly ascribes a very particular reading of the concept.  
Pragmatically, there is an inherent danger in such an approach, that non-westerners might respond 
negatively to both positions by distancing themselves from what they see as an imperialistic 
project of a Christian or Enlightenment centred project.  Disabling dialogue in this way also 
leaves open the possibility that voices of those who suffer might not be heard.  It increases the 
risk of drifting back to a position, not unlike the first generation of rights, where groups were 
simply excluded from the designation of human being. 
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Alternatively, there are those who recognize the possibility of an alignment or convergence 
between enlightenment and theological ideas of dignity, which still retain theological particularity 
but embrace the central notion of the inherent dignity of the human person.  Taking the Catholic 
example examined here, opponents question whether the contemporary Catholic expression of 
human rights and dignity in Kantian language is a true reflection of Church teaching.  However to 
disregard the steps taken by such important figures as Pope Leo XIII, Pope John Paul II as well as 
major Catholic thinkers like Jacques Maritain would require the re-writing of Catholic teaching 
on social justice which is now firmly based on such theology (Pontifical Council for Justice and 
Peace 2005).  It would also set aside the argument of Hollenbach, Ruston and Williams that this 
contextual shift in fact reflects a reality within the Catholic and Christian traditions. 
 
These disputes reflect responses to the evolution of the theory of dignity as it encounters 
religious, social and cultural forces and highlight the educational imperatives of the human rights 
project as a whole and the exploration of dignity in particular.  Two projects are identified: to 
explore within one’s own tradition the foundations for human rights, on the one hand, and to 
explore those foundations through dialogue with others reflecting on the shared or common 
experience of suffering and dignity.  In an era where people have multiple identities, where 
monocultural units have broken down, both projects proceed simultaneously, one reflecting and 
responding to the other, just as dignity has developed through a evolutionary dialogue in contact 
with multiple social, cultural and religious forces. 
 
The study focused on the dignity of the human person in relation to human rights and HRE.  The 
idea, which has foundational significance in international documents, is understood through the 
religious and philosophical narratives.  There are many different narratives and those examined in 
this study have come from western philosophical and theological sources.  These sources have 
been important in influencing the sense of dignity found in human rights.  The study has revealed 
that there are common patterns in different discourses within narratives and that many articulate 
notions of inherent worth, societal response and human flourishing in explaining dignity.  
Inherent worth is seen as having a central importance to the human rights of the UDHR and of 
principal importance among these notions, though it remains interrelated with the other two 
senses.  There are strong currents of theological and philosophical agreement about this pattern 
(found in prominent Catholic theology and Kant).  This pattern can be called the dynamic 
theoretical framework of dignity and it is understood in distinctive ways within particular 
narratives; it provides a provisional shared understanding.  Adopting this shared understanding 
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which is inclusive of different narratives is not the same as taking a purely relativistic approach to 
the plurality of perspectives.  An approach of theological inclusivism which recognizes the merit 
of different perspectives that are consistent with this dynamic theoretical framework avoids the 
dangers of a relativistic plurality, which could ultimately undermine all that human rights have 
sought to achieve, as no values would have permanence. 
 
Returning to the UDHR and HRE literature, this thesis has revealed the presence of the pattern of 
the notions of dignity found in the sources.  The early UN documents set out the case that the 
dignity of the person requires education, and education of a certain kind.  The form of the 
education is one that should reflect the inherent dignity of the human person as well as having the 
extrinsic aims of bringing about a human rights culture.  In other words it should be an education 
that has an intrinsic value, irrespective of benefits to the economy for example, because all are 
entitled to education irrespective of whether they are judged as being able to return a profit on 
that education.  Measures of intellectual or athletic ability are not equated with dignity and nor do 
they confer it.  Children should not have their life goals restricted because of physical or mental 
disabilities; they have equal worth with other children.  Dignity is bound up in their being.  
Education must be advanced in a manner consistent with the recognition of the dignity of the 
learner.  There is a suggestion that human beings may be robbed of their dignity if education is 
not provided or is impaired through discrimination.  Acts of humiliation deny the flourishing or 
development of that human person and refute their inherent worth.  The educational sense of 
inherent worth provokes a social-moral response.  This is consistent with the ideas in theological 
and philosophical narratives which offer broadly consistent accounts of the inherent worth of the 
person.  There is some correlation between what the declarations say about dignity and the 
educational literature and teaching resources for teachers.  Some educationalists draw on these 
but others seem to show less conceptual clarity about the idea, which can slip from a foundation 
notion to another word for respect.  Deciding whether the worth of a person resides in their being, 
or in their capacity to be good leads to quite different consequences for that individual, as the 
study of the sources illuminated.  It matters for HRE whether dignity is understood in terms of the 
being of the person, or in terms of how they are treated.  Here the importance of religious and 
philosophical literacy helps reveal why inherent dignity is consistent with the international 
documents, and why other notions of dignity are problematic for human rights. 
 
The thesis proposed changes to the approach to HRE as it is currently found in the English 
secondary school curriculum.  It presented a recontextualisation of HRE centred on the dignity of 
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the human person, for a curriculum serving a postsecular society.  The changes are informed by 
the examination in the present thesis.  Using these proposals as principles, a curriculum could be 
developed.  These proposals advocate the inclusion of multiple justifications for human rights, 
which include religious justifications.  This is possible in the English maintained school system, 
which has a plural religious education system, but would be problematic in a secular educational 
environment that prohibited religious discourse in the public sphere.  Such an approach is 
warranted given the reality of a postsecular culture, and the need to find adequate groundings for 
a commitment to human rights.  Dignity is found in different narratives with a degree of 
consistency, providing a starting point for such grounding.  This thesis has also articulated a 
theological rationale for this approach, which means it may be embraced by schools of a Christian 
religious character.  The proposals themselves include the values that should underpin this 
approach, important pedagogical elements and suggestions about the content.  These proposals 
are supported by the research and analysis of proceedings.  The precise form of the curriculum 
has not been presented.  This is in acknowledgement of the legal complications in doing so given 
the statutory arrangements for local religious education curricula and a national curriculum for 
citizenship education.  It also reflects the view that the context of particular schools and localities 
should inform the precise form of this curriculum.  Nevertheless, what is articulated is enough to 
indicate a change from the current models in the English curriculum.  Such a change could lead to 
a more meaningful process in which a commitment to human rights could be developed through 
the context of learner and school community.  In this way HRE should be re-imagined for a 
postsecular context. 
 
This research has demonstrated that there are important differences to how HRE might be 
approached, depending on what dignity is taken to mean.  Those assumptions are often not 
articulated in the education literature, which is out of step with other disciplines.  This situation 
has probably been exacerbated by a lack of adequate integration with religious and philosophical 
traditions that are related to the development of human rights and provide some kind of 
conceptual framework and foundation.  Rather than leading to dissolution of agreement, dignity 
offers the possibility of establishing a rationale to unite different religious groups by signposting 
the necessity to continue to enquire with each other and within their own traditions, to reach 
deeper understandings of the value of inherent human worth and the necessity to respond to it and 
support human flourishing.  A number of key western religious and philosophical narratives have 
enough commonality around these three aspects of dignity for such a project to be developed, 
although further enquiry is required to examine the other religious and philosophical systems of 
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the world to discover the full extent to which this approach would have global and universal 
applicability.  Nevertheless, an education approach based on self-enquiry and discussion with 
others, around the sources of meaning and shared experiences of suffering, provides a practical 
route for a recontextualised HRE.  Approaches based on the particular variant of western 
secularism found in Britain and other parts of western Europe seem to unhelpfully exclude those 
with different worldviews from embracing HRE in terms that are aligned with their particular 
religious traditions and life experiences.  The evidence of the continuing significance of religion 
in the world has been better recognized in intercultural education, and the importance of some 
harmony between RE and HRE is pressing. 
 
The initial research questions have received substantial answers though further questions have 
arisen.  In light of the theoretical discussion and the empirical findings, further questions ought to 
be asked about the theological and education implications of this research.  Firstly with regards to 
the nature of HRE in the English curriculum: what are teachers' own understandings of these 
matters?  This research has revealed issues in the curriculum organisation but this does not tell us 
how lessons respond to or address these issues.  One possibility here is to undertake a systematic 
review of educational practice, classroom resources and schemes of work.  These may not reveal 
a different picture, but it would be important for addressing a second question: what are the 
practical challenges in developing the subjects of citizenship education and religious education in 
the ways suggested?  Addressing this question involves examining general issues of secondary 
curriculum development and teacher education.  Teacher identity is likely to be an issue here as 
citizenship teachers may feel their professional identity is being challenged by religious 
educators.  More important, however, would be to understand the conditions in which successful 
collaboration can take place to draw on the specialism of both groups of professionals. 
 
Secondly, the boundaries of this research were drawn around the western philosophical and 
religious traditions that have influenced the conception of dignity found in international 
documents.  Indian religious traditions have been excluded and warrant further examination.  
Comparative studies could be undertaken in other national education contexts.  To what extent 
are the patterns found in the English curriculum identifiable elsewhere?  With regards to the 
theological questions, this author echoes the remarks found elsewhere of the need to explore the 
theology of education within particular religious and denominational traditions.  In the context of 
plural religious societies, an interfaith theory of education might be called for.  Further research 
into the idea of postsecular education is recommended. 
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While this thesis has drawn on commonly cited sources in the discussion of dignity, a systematic 
study of the development of this idea in western philosophy and theology would greatly enhance 
the debate, as would comparable systematic studies in other religio-cultural regions.  Comparative 
studies might then be undertaken.  A further study would need to consider, in much greater depth, 
the schools that have characters based on the other religious traditions. 
 
Further study is also necessary to examine the implications of the notion of the inherent worth of 
non-human animals and indeed any other creatures.  Such research may shed insight on the topic 
of this study and raise new challenges.  Related to this, and important because of additional 
theorization found in other literature, is the conceptual relationship between dignity, beings and 
persons or personhood and the self.  Greater clarity might be achieved through a study of the 
relationships between these concepts and human rights. 
 
Irrespective of these further questions, this research strongly suggests that if HRE is conceived as 
being free from philosophical or theological contribution or significance, then it is unlikely to 
develop a critical dimension.  If HRE is conceived as a secular and non-religious global 
movement it will exclude many of its audiences by disconnecting itself from their meaning-
giving narratives that give significance to human life.  It may fail to adequately acknowledge 
projects which are defined in religious terms.  It will exclude the voices of those who articulate 
suffering in religious terms.  It will lose an alliance with traditions that can provide foundations 
for human rights and motivate believers who campaign for human rights.  In the English 
curriculum the consequences can be seen in a disjointed and unnecessarily disconnected learning. 
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Appendix 
A list of the 42 Agreed Syllabuses surveyed for Chapter 2, drawn from the 151 SACREs, 
representing 51 areas. 
 
Barnsley 
Bexley 
Birmingham 
Bradford 
Bracknell Forest 
Bristol 
Cornwall 
Coventry 
Croydon 
Cumbria 
Ealing 
East Riding 
Enfield 
Gloucestershire 
Hammersmith and Fulham 
Herefordshire 
Kent 
Kingston upon Thames 
Lambeth 
Leicestershire 
Lincolnshire 
Luton 
Medway 
Merton 
Newport 
Norfolk 
Nottinghamshire 
Redbridge 
Shropshire County and the Borough of Telford and Wrekin 
Staffordshire 
Suffolk 
Sutton 
Swindon 
Tameside 
The East Riding of Yorkshire, Kingston upon Hull, North Lincolnshire and North East 
   Lincolnshire 
Thurrock 
Wakefield 
Waltham Forest 
Warwickshire 
West Sussex 
Wirral 
Wokingham 
 
